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ABSTRACT
 This dissertation aims to investigate the role of development banks in financing 
economic growth in Latin America throughout the 20th century. Two study cases are 
examined: Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA) in Mexico and the Banco Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) in Brazil. We use a comparative- historical 
approach to address similarities and differences between Brazil and Mexico in using 
financing to spur economic growth. In so doing, we expect to draw useful lessons for 
policy-makers. The dissertation consists of five sections. The introduction addresses the 
motive of this dissertation and outlines its approach and structure, and then closes with 
a necessary background discussion of what development banking is. Section 2 gives a 
brief historical review of the early progenitors of current development banks. Sections 
3 and 4 constitute the bulk of the dissertation. They respectively investigate NAFINSA 
in Mexico and the BNDES in Brazil. The bulk of each section is a careful historical 
investigation of the structures and practices of each bank, including in  particular how 
they changed over time. Each of the two sections concludes with a short discussion 
of implications suggested by that case study. The final brief section 5 of the thesis is a 
combination of the suggested implications for development banking in Latin America 
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: MOTIVATION AND DEVELOPMENT BANKS
1.1 Motivation
 The explosion in the number of development banks is a post-WWII phenomenon. 
It is a result of the acceptance after the war of the belief in the need for national 
policies to foster industrialization to promote development. A 1967 OECD study listed 
334 institutions that were considered to be, or by their functions could be considered to 
be, development banks (Nyhart and Jannsens 1967). Half of those had been in existence 
less than 10 years, and many of the others were earlier post-WWII creations (see Kane 
1975, 3). The Japan Development Bank (JDB), the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(KfW) in Germany, the Industrial Development of Canada, and the Korean Development 
Bank (KDB) were some of the banks that were established after the WWII. The United 
Nations reported in 2005 about 5201 national development banks for a total of 185 countries, 
for an average for these countries of 2.8 development banks. Underdeveloped countries 
have on average three or more development banks, while developed countries tend to have 
fewer institutions. According to the report, the region with the largest number of 
development banks with 152 is Latin America and the Caribbean. Of course, the 
number of banks does not directly determine the amount of resources, since in some 
1 Felipe Guth (2006, 47) points out a possible source for an overestimation of the number of development banks. Some 
Islamic countries have laws against usury by commercial banks, defined as making money by lending money. Then 
some banks in those countries that carry out the activities of commercial banks classify themselves as development banks. 
Since this is not generalized even throughout the Islamic world it is not a major distortion, but it does occur in some 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Afghanistan.
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cases, developed countries can mobilize a greater quantity of resources and thereby 
have a large impact on their economies with their smaller number of development banks 
(United Nations 2005a, 5).
 After WWII, some development banks were successful and others did not prosper. 
Reasons for failure or success could have been the internal social, economic, and political 
characteristics of each country and the international context where these banks 
operated. The neoliberal period undoubtedly weakened the idea of strong states fostering 
industrialization. However, important to this dissertation is that currently development 
banks are still considered important to spur economic and social development.
 Following a meeting in Quito (Ecuador) in May 2007 at which it was announced 
that the Banco del Sur would be created, on September 26, 2009, the presidents of Brazil, 
Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay signed an agreement 
establishing the bank with an initial capital of $20 billion.  The bank was intended to 
replace the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank as a source of borrowed 
capital for countries in Latin America, in particular for infrastructure and social 
projects. This immediately suggests a historically important question for Latin America 
and the motivation for this dissertation: what is necessary for this bank to succeed in its 
mission? What sort of structure and what sort of policies would be best suited for such a 
development bank, in the given context of Latin America?
 Brazil and Mexico are the two largest economies in Latin America. Both of them 
have had a development bank that was extremely successful at particular periods in their 
country’s history, and not so successful in other periods. This then provides us with two 
natural experiments, two case studies, of development banks in Latin America.
 The economic question that will be addressed by this dissertation is: what 
conclusions can be supported2 by a detailed study of these two development banks? The 
studies will cover their entire histories, which means that the studies will include major 
2 Case studies can never “prove” the superiority of particular structures or procedures.
3changes in the banks’ structures and procedures, and major differences in different time 
periods in their success in their central goal of contributing to their country’s development. 
Hence, these studies will involve a collection of different natural experiments which 
will generate the rich variety that is necessary for comparing different possible approaches 
by a development bank to the desired promotion of development.
 The dissertation will consist of five sections. The introduction will briefly 
motivate the dissertation, outline its approach and structure, and then close with a 
necessary background discussion of what development banking is followed by a short 
and broad comment concerning the states that are behind state development banks. 
Section 2 will give a brief history of the progenitors of development banking. Sections 
3 and 4 will constitute the core of the dissertation. They will respectively investigate 
Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA) in Mexico and the Banco Nacional do Desenvolvi-
mento Econômico e Social (almost always shortened to BNDES) in Brazil. The bulk of 
each section is a careful historical investigation of the structures and practices of each 
bank, including in particular how they changed over time. Each of the two sections will 
conclude with a short discussion of implications suggested by that case study. The final 
brief section 5 of the dissertation will be a combination of the suggested implications for 
development banking in Latin America from the two case studies.
 As suggested by the opening comments on motivation, these conclusions will 
hopefully be of value for the ongoing consideration of the structure and procedures of 
the Banco del Sur. A note of caution, however, is that the intent is to learn from the past 
without being enslaved by it. A popular “definition” of insanity is to do once again what 
has repeatedly failed and expect success. It is important to know the past to avoid its 
errors. But the past can also give suggestions on what might work for the present, if one 
makes the necessary modifications to adapt successful past procedures to a present that 
is always different from the past.  All of this, however, is only a presentation of mo-
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 Hence, structural commonalities cannot serve as a basis for a definition 
of development banks. Notwithstanding the repeated assertions in the second quote 
that their functions also differ markedly, both these authors and most others turn to the 
functions of the institutions as the basis for defining development banks. In fact, it is in 
the broad nature of the functioning of the institutions that one finds the commonality for a 
tivation: this dissertation will not directly further discuss the project of the Banco del Sur.
 The rest of this introduction will discuss the necessary background issue of what 
a development bank is, followed by a short and broad comment concerning the states 
that are behind state development banks.
1.2 Development Banks
 This section discusses four issues concerning development banks: firstly, what a 
development bank is; secondly, what sectors development banks can foster; thirdly, 
what type of ownership can be possible; and finally what kind of enterprises, public or 
private, can receive resources.
 A sensible first step for developing some aspects of a definition of a development 
bank would be to look for commonalities in the structures of institutions which are 
called development banks. Unfortunately, as many authors point out:
There is no universal model to which development banks conform. Each bank is 
structured with the political, social and economic fabric of the country in mind. 
And each in its own way is a unique institution. (Kane 1975, 13)
The fact is that development banks come in forms so diverse, with functions so 
diverse, that, despite similarities in name, they have little in common; and institu-
tions with quite different names often have attributes generally associated with 
development banks. The Development Industrial Bank of Egypt, the State 
Investment Bank of Turkey, the Korean Long-Term Credit Bank, the Industrial 
Credit and Investment Corporation of India, the Bank of North-East Brazil, 
the Finance and Guarantee Fund for Small-Industry in El Salvador, the Finnish 
Industrialization Fund, the Columbian Finance Corporation – all these differ widely 
in ownership, scope of activities, policies and operations; yet they perform the 
functions of a development bank. (Diamond 1957, 3-4)
5definition, despite the great variety of specific functions that Diamond, a leading mainstream 
authority on development banks, correctly notes. “I started by saying I would define a 
development bank, but one can do so only in terms of functions” (Ibid., 5). 
 Once it is established that the definition of a development bank should come 
from its functions, the name “development bank” immediately suggests the two 
functions that an institution must fulfill to carry this label (both functions equally impor-
tant):  1) it is a financial intermediary, and 2) it must have the goal of promoting deve-
lopment (Maug 1973, 6-7; Ramírez 1987, 22; Diamond 1981, 4; Guth 2006, 49). Both 
functions must correspond to the overall national economic policies carried out by the 
respective country, for the way in which the development banks carry out these two 
activities can vary enormously between countries. The economic, political, and social 
conditions of a country and the concept of development of its government interact to give 
very different structures and practices. 
 Additional consideration of the two aspects just mentioned will help to further 
clarify what a development bank is. First of all, while it is a financial intermediary, it is 
not what is usually simply called a bank, meaning a commercial bank, because the main 
activity of commercial banks is short-time lending. Due to the nature of the process of 
development, development banks to the contrary have to provide medium- and long-
term finance. Further, they often carry out other roles in addition to lending not engaged 
in by commercial banks. Development banks carry out some mixture of three activities: 
1) long-term loans (similar to an investment bank, to be discussed below), 2) holding 
equities and “. . . managing specific companies as well as . . . providing financial 
support” (Diamond 1957, 2), and 3) providing technical assistance.
 Second, in relation to its objective of development, many development banks 
focus on a limited specific number of sectors of the economy according to the needs of 
the country, such as agriculture, industry, or building infrastructure such as railroads, 
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subways, universities, hospitals, etc. Often a development bank will be entirely dedicated 
to development in one sector. Or in some cases and according to the circumstances, a 
development bank would promote import substitution or encourage exports.
 There is disagreement in the literature about what sorts of sectors development 
banks should promote. We will see below that development banks came out of industrial 
banks, and some authors such as Bosky (1959, 3) still argue that industrial activities 
should be the priority for a development bank. As opposed to a particular sector, 
recently some advocates have argued that given the skills of both workers and 
managers in many less developed countries, development banks should focus their 
efforts on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Contrary to these or other restricted 
views, however, most authors have come to see development banks as appropriate 
for any sector of the economy that the government wants to promote the development 
of. While no one argues development banks should only be for agriculture, the im-
portance of this sector to one of the most basic priorities of development, adequately 
feeding the population, has meant under the approach of developing whatever sector is 
needed, agricultural development banks flourished in the half century after WWII, until 
the neoliberal paradigm put a damper on all development banks.
 Third, there is also disagreement in the literature about the issue of public 
versus private ownership of a development bank. No one argues that all development 
banks should be private, for to do so would be entirely at odds with the actual history 
of development banks since WWII. One group including Diamond (1957) and Ramírez 
(1986) argue, in line with neoliberalism’s overall advocacy of privatization, that a 
development bank can be public, private, or a combination of both. A much smaller 
group rejects this approach and continues to promote the position that was dominant 
after WWII before neoliberalism, that development banks should be “. . . government-
sponsored financial institutions . . .” (Armendáriz 1998, 1). 
7 Finally, there is also disagreement in the literature about the issue of the public 
versus private nature of the enterprises that should be promoted. Diamond (1957, 4) 
argues that a development bank should promote only the private sector of an economy.3 The 
opposite view is argued in a United Nation’s document (2005b, 10), “. . . Development 
banks are a financial instrument of national development policy whose performance 
is measured more in terms of social benefits generated. . .” and by Felipe Guth (2006, 
51) who says that a development bank has to contribute to increase employment and 
to improve distribution of income.  The common “middle ground” between these two 
views can be found in Kane (1974,14):
Development banking, it is suggested, is neither so narrow in scope as to be 
limited to institutions financing profit-oriented private-sector investment projects 
only, nor so broad as to be a general channel through which funds are directed to 
any development-oriented project or program.
 The following by Diamond4 can serve as a terse definition of a development 
bank that includes brief references to some of the various considerations just discussed:
The principal function of a development bank is the provision of medium- and 
long-term finance for fixed assets. It also helps to provide, in addition to finance, 
such other essentials of productive investment as entrepreneurship, technical 
skills and managerial experience. It relies on the success of the enterprises it 
finances for recovery of the investment rather than on the security of collateral, 
and it does so in a manner that balances commercial standards of operation with 
economic benefit.5 (Diamond 1957, 4)
3 For Diamond, financing the public sector is more related with planning.
4 The definition that will follow is consistent with Kane’s middle-of-the-road definition just given, and not with the just-
previously cited position of Diamond that they should only fund the private sector. This definition allows public 
enterprises, and specifically argues that commercial considerations, be balanced with social welfare confederations, 
but does require that and such public enterprises generate enough income to pay back their financing. This would then 
argue that development projects that are not designed to generate such revenue, such as for example, a toll-free national 
road system, are not appropriate for development banks and should be funded through other channels.
5 Joseph Kane (1974) makes a similar but much more extended argument concerning definition by function in Chapter 
2. Along the same lines of a functional definition, see Mya Maung (1973, 6).
1.3 States Behind State Development Banks
 It was established above that although this dissertation will not directly discuss 
hypotheticals concerning the Banco del Sur, it is motivated in part by the desire to draw 
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positive and negative lessons concerning possibilities for promoting development in 
the Latin American context that conceivably could be used by such an institution. But 
a note of caution concerning the use of lessons from the case studies of NAFINSA and 
BNDES is necessary as part of the background material for the dissertation in this 
introductory section.
 Like the majority of the post-WWII development banks which were created 
by the state and operated under its the supervision, from the perspective of the 
state, the purpose of the two banks that will be studied, even when building or directing 
state projects or enterprises, was to facilitate and promote the accumulation of private 
capital, in the short-, medium- and long-run (like all development banks throughout 
history, private or public, that existed in capitalist societies). However, as scholars such 
as Ares (2007) have stressed, the state is not simply an instrument at the service of the 
bourgousie. They maintain that the state does have some degree of autonomy, its 
decisions are based in part on the discretion of the policy makers. Ares goes on, however, 
to recognize at the same time the important limitations to its autonomy that come from 
the state being embedded in a society dominated by the logic of markets focused on the 
maximization of profits. 
 Following Hamilton (1983), this dissertation takes as part of its background 
assumptions that the state backs and supports the bourgeoisie in its pursuit of the 
accumulation of capital. In underdeveloped countries, this intervention by the state is 
particularly important because of the weakness of the bourgeoisie. More specifically, 
among other functions, the state in underdeveloped countries typically intervenes strongly 
in support of private capital accumulation in the following five ways: i) creating infras-
tructure; ii) more broadly along the same line, carrying out any nonprofitable activities 
that are necessary or even useful for the accumulation of capital; iii) developing and 
codifying private property laws and institutions to regulate the relation between labor 
9and capital; iv) regulating in the general interests of the nation’s capital conflicts that 
arise between specific capitals pursuing their partial interests; and v) once a country’s 
capital has reached a certain level of development (Brazil being a clear example today), 
the expansion of national capital in the global sphere.6
 As this dissertation is being written, there is a battle going on over what the na-
ture will be of the Banco de Sur. One side would like to see the bank be a development 
bank of a type that has never previously existed, one that genuinely focuses directly 
on promoting human well-being as opposed to promoting private capital accumulation 
with the background argument that this will necessarily promote human well-being. 
The other side is fighting to make it a traditional development bank that serves private 
capital accumulation. A particularly important aspect of this fight is that the Banco del 
Sur will not be subservient to any single state, and cannot therefore be directed by a 
single state to carry out the sorts of support for private capital accumulation just listed 
that development banks are typically used for by capitalist states. Whether the one side 
will succeed in making it like the World Bank or the existing regional development 
banks (an extension to a supranational level of the role of promoting private capital 
accumulation) or the other side will create a new type of development bank remains to 
be determined by history. The research for this dissertation is being conducted with the 
perspective that even if it becomes a new type of development bank that directly promotes 
development for human well-being, there are many lessons from the experiences of the 
capitalist-state backed NAFINSA and BNDES that, notwithstanding their different 
goal of supporting private capital accumulation, could be usefully translated into the 
frame and goal of the new development bank and contribute to making it successful.
6 Alvater (1973) discusses the latter two more.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE EARLY PROGENITORS 
OF DEVELOPMENT BANKS
2.1 Introduction
 Banks in some form have existed for several thousands of years, and for several  
hundreds of years in forms more similar to current banks. However, despite this long 
history of banking, it was only very recently, in the 1800s, that some banks began to 
focus on what is the concern of this dissertation, financing the development of produc-
tion, beginning with industrial production. This was a result of the exponential growth 
of industrial production at that time. These banks, located in what today is referred 
to as the First World or developed countries, were then referred to as “investment banks.” 
These were profit-oriented banks and they were owned by private capital. As opposed to 
this, today, particularly in underdeveloped countries, the biggest banks whose purpose 
is to provide “medium- and long-term finance” for industry, agriculture, and other basic 
parts of the economy necessary for development, are generally government-sponsored 
institutions known as development banks.7 Their main goal is not profit, but rather 
promoting, fostering, and financing the development of some particular economic activity, 
or a variety of economic activities.
7 As indicated in the opening section of this dissertation, today the terms “industrial bank,” “development bank”, and 
many other similar terms are used very inconsistently in the actual names of these banks in both the First and Third 
Worlds, but the distinction between (and arguments concerning) government sponsored banks versus private banks 
continues to be an important issue.
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 This section will briefly review the birth of development banking; its concern is 
the growth of this type of banking prior to the particular two case studies of development 
banking that are the focus of this disseratation, Mexico and Brazil. The important sub-
ject here with this history is not as part of a study of development banking in itself. This 
brief consideration of the history of development banking is necessary rather for an unders-
tanding of the environment in which these two banks emerged. After this introduction, 
this chapter will first consider the first industrial banks. It will then consider specifically 
the cases of Germany and Japan where banks in general, and investment banks in parti-
cular, came to play such an important role in the process of investment in the economy. 
The final section in the chapter will look at the history of development banks in the 19th century 
in underdeveloped countries.
2.2 Development Banks as Investment Banks
 During the incipient industrialization of England in 18th century, the mercantile 
British state played a role: 1) protecting domestic markets in order to obtain a favorable 
trade balance, and 2) opening foreign markets through military power. However, nei-
ther the British state nor the private sector had an important participation in the indus-
trialization of England during the 18th century through banks whose overall business 
was focused on loans for industrial development. This was not necessary, because the 
early stages of industrialization required relatively small amounts of capital. These 
were originally provided almost entirely by merchants, and later by reinvesting the 
capitalists’ profits. When additional capital was needed beyond what could be provided 
by autofinancing, it came from either the existing commercial banks (Diamond 1957, 
17; Itoh and Lapavitsas 1999, 84) or capital markets (Hermann 2002, 71). Commercial 
banks granted capital in two ways (Cameron 1961, 12): 1) local banks granted working 
capital, 2) some banks were created by a capitalist or a group of capitalists to finance 
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their own activities, but these were relatively small because 1) there was no possibili-
ty of limited liability, and 2) because bank partnerships were not allowed to consist of 
more than six people.
 By the 19th century, continental Europe faced a different situation. To begin with, 
the amount of capital needed for modern investment projects was continually growing. 
Second, there was a shortage of capital in comparison to the needs, since long-term 
investment in heavy industries such as railroads were beyond the possibilities of one per-
son, family, or group. Ongoing changes in capitalism involving more complex forms 
of property and necessitating more complex forms of credit reinforced this shortage of 
capital in comparison with needs. Third, even though some countries such as France had 
significant initial industrialization and progress in science and technology (see  Hobs-
bawn 1997, 37 and Cameron 1958, 2), all the continental countries felt they were behind 
Great Britain and had to “catch up.” They felt the need to both launch large long-term 
projects in infrastructure such as railroads and canals, and to develop heavy industry like 
electricity and chemistry. And even though being a “late developer” can potentially 
generate the well-known technological advantages of transfers, imitation, and copying, 
it can also pose less discussed problems concerning available capital. As Diamond 
points out: 
The mere fact of following, while providing the opportunity for imitation, also 
created difficulties. For once the urge to develop emerged, there was a keen 
desire to do so quickly, to “catch up” with the leader. This was an expensive 
task, partly because of the high capital outlay required to take over the latest 
techniques of production and implant them in an economy relatively primitive, 
partly because of the need to lay down quickly the costly base of overhead 
facilities (especially transport) essential to rapid growth, and partly because of 
the conviction that investment in many fields simultaneously was essential to 
quick development. Sudden increases in the scale of production and investment 
were necessary in countries seeking to transform their economies rapidly, 
which had not been necessary in Britain earlier. (Diamond 1957, 21)
 It was in this context that development banks as private industrial banks arose 
in continental Europe (see Diamond 1981; Kane, 1975). The first investment bank 
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for industrialization in continental Europe was the Société Général pour Favoriser 
L ‘Industrie National in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 18228  (Diamond 1957; 
Arméndariz 1998; Da Rin and Hellman 2001). This was a joint-stock investment bank 
founded by King William I. In its first years of existence, it carried out the functions 
of issuing bank notes, discounting bills of exchange and securities, cashiering for the 
Kingdom, accepting deposits, and providing short-term credit (Cameron 1972b, 132). 
In fact, during its initial years, this bank did not contribute significantly to promoting 
industrialization. Only after the independence of Belgium in 1830 did it become more 
active as an industrial promoter. According to Da Rin and Hellman (2001, 8), “Belgium 
. . . achieved its industrialization roughly between 1830 and 1850. Over this period, its 
GNP grew yearly at 2.5 %, well above the 1.4 % European average,” and in this Belgian 
growth, the Société had a very important role.
 The Société Général implemented projects mostly with its own private capital, 
since only a small amount of resources were available from deposits. Three particularly 
important investment-related actions carried out by the Société were the following: 
1) during the economic crisis at the end of the 1820s, the Société took companies with 
debt problems and converted their short-term credit to long-term credit and 
subsequently sold shares of these companies, thereby fostering a stock market; 2) from 
1830 onward, it continually expanded its encouragement of financial, commercial, and 
industrial ventures; and 3) the Société provided technical assistance to advise 
especially mining companies (Deloof et al. 2007, 7). Hence, the Société carried out all 
the functions that were discussed in Chapter 1 as defining a development bank; granting 
long-term credit, promoting stock, and providing technical assistance. 
  By 1870, the activities of the Société Général along with the rest of the Belgian 
financial system had contributed to making Belgium the most industrialized country 
8 The Société Général pour Favoriser L ‘Industrie National was established in Belgium, but until 1830, Belgium was 
part of Netherlands.
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of Europe (Cameron 1972b, 129). Two points concerning this development should be 
appreciated: that in a time of political crisis and economic need a new type of institution 
developed, and that this institution served the independent development of Belgium 
very well.
 The next milestone in the development of investment banking was the Société 
Générale du Crédit Mobilier. This was founded by the Brothers Pereire9 as a Joint Stock 
Company in November, 1852. Both brothers belonged to the Saint-Simon brotherhood 
and were experts in economic issues. Eckalbar (1979, 84) stresses the importance of their 
membership in the brotherhood, from which they took both the general idea of the 
importance of banking, and the specific idea that bankers must direct production to 
the benefit of the workers. Compared to the earlier Belgian Société (which was still 
very active at this time), an important new aspect of the Crédit Mobilier, as sugges-
ted by its name, was its much broader channels for mobilizing credit. This enabled it to 
provide a much greater volume of capital, which was increasingly necessary as indus-
trialization continued. In addition and equally directly important to the topic of this dis-
sertation, it deepened the integration of banking into production, financing, mining, and 
manufacturing. Finally, as opposed to just seeing itself as involved in profitable op-
portunities, it was explicitly conscious that “the mobilization of credit and the marriage 
of banking and industry” (Cameron 1953, 463) which it carried out was essential in the 
process of creating modern infrastructure and enterprises, and from that the development 
of a country.  
9 Émile and Isaac Pereire were financial advisers for James Rothshild until they had enough money to be the main 
stockholders of the Crédit Mobilier. The Rothshilds, one of the most important families in France, dominated European 
finance throughout the 19th century.
 The Crédit Mobilier was a stock company with three basic functions (Newmarch 
1858, 444 - 445): 1) it was a Trading Association which could contract loans, build for 
example railways, and manage for example coal and gas and omnibus companies, 2) 
it could buy other trading companies, and 3) it was a universal bank. The funds of the 
15
10 Haute Finance were the most powerful international banks in Europe in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 
20th century. These banks not only carried out activities such as local and international lending, but also they were 
involved in geopolitics around the world in order to secure easy profits. Although it was independent of any European 
government, Haute Finance had close relations with governments in regard to geopolitical issues that were important 
to their profits, such as wars. In regard to the relation of Haute Finance to this financially important issue of wars in the 
19th century, Polanyi points out: “The Rothshilds were subject to no one government; as a family they embodied the 
abstract principle of internationalism; their loyalty was to a firm . . . They were anything but pacifists; they had made 
their fortune in the financing of wars, they were impervious to moral consideration; they had no objection to any number of 
minor, short, or localized wars. But their business would be impaired if a general war between the Great Powers should 
interfere with the monetary foundations of the system.” (Polanyi 2001, 11).
Société came from both from its members and from deposits by the public (Ibid., 445). 
During its lifetime, the Crédit Mobilier financed a relatively narrow set of infrastructure 
projects like railroads and steamboats, and a relatively narrow set of productive enterprises 
such as ones in the coal and gas industries. Geographically, however, it was very new 
in that it operated not only in France but also in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, 
Italy, Russia, Turkey, and Holland.
 Gerscheskron argues that the brothers Pereire were central to the rise of industrial 
banking which was so important to modern development. Specifically, they made an 
extremely important innovation in expanding the credit in France and Europe at a low 
rate of interest. This started a spiral of increasing financing that led to the emergence of 
other banks that focused on investment in industry and to the increase of long-term credit 
by haute finance,10 when neither the Bank of France nor haute finance had earlier been 
disposed to grant long-term credit. Gerchenskron (1965, 13) points out:  
When the Rothschilds prevented the Pereires from establishing the Austrian Credit 
– Anstalt, they succeeded only because they became willing to establish the 
bank themselves and to conduct it not as an old fashioned banking enterprise but 
as a crédit mobilier, that is, as a bank devoted to railroadization and industrialization 
of the country.
 It is important to note that leaving aside its other major banking activities mentio-
ned above of buying commercial companies and universal banking, the Crédit Mobilier’s 
development financing was quite narrow. It financed mostly railroads, although its 
influence in that area was impressive: “Due in large measure to its aid, the French rail 
network expanded from 3,600 kilometers in 1852 to 18,000 kilometers in 1870” (Came-
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ron 1961, 147). However, it had little involvement in promoting anything approaching a 
broad industrial agenda. Because of this, France’s rate of capital formation to foster eco-
nomic activities was low, and hence, its rate of growth of total industrial production and 
the economy was slower in the second half of the 19th century than the other European 
countries such as Germany (Cameron 1958, 2). While the activities of the Crédit Mobi-
lier were to continue until 1867, more important was that a number of other banks were 
founded in Europe starting in the 19th century following its model. However, the further 
development of the essential aspect of development banking, the close connection bet-
ween banks and productive activities and enterprises, was to come out of Germany.
2.3 Germany
 In the second half of the 19th century, the German states (27 territories) took the 
development of industrial banking a step further. According to Tilly (1972, 151), in the 
first half of the 19th century, these states were well behind other countries like Britain, 
France, and Belgium in economic growth and development. Universal banks did exist 
in Germany since the 1830s, mainly involved with the construction of railroads, but 
economic growth could not be unleashed because of restrictions by the government 
(for example in the formation of joint-stock companies), the church, and the aristocracy. 
Haute Finance at that time lent to the governments rather than to capitalists and therefore “. 
. .whatever private bank lending for industrial purposes that was done before the 1840s, was 
a relatively local phenomenon, confined to the nascent industrializing areas themselves . . .” 
(Tilly 1972, 160).
 During the 1830s and the 1840s, the important textiles, iron, and coal industries 
were supported largely by retained profits or by merchantil capital. As stated by 
Cameron (1953, 465) and Diamond (1957, 26), it was then that interest in the idea of 
(broad, beyond railroads) industrial banking began to develop in Germany with the help 
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of the French Crédit Mobilier. The Crédit Mobilier participated in the foundation of the 
bank of Darmstadt in 1853, which was to serve as a model to the German big banks that 
emerged in 1870s. Tilly (1972, 176) points out that the relationship between banks and 
joint-stock companies grew after 1840s. Banks then contributed to the industrialization 
of Germany and to the high rates of economic growth from the 1850s to the 1870s.  Table 
2.1 shows the impressive rate of growth of the production of coal and iron in this period.

















Adapted from Source: Tilly 1972
 The important issue for the history of the development of investment banks from 
the German development is that in the second half of the 19th century, the relation 
between the industries being promoted and the banks promoting them developed to a 
much greater degree than had occurred with any previous industrial banks. The relation 
was not only through mobilizing long-term credit, but it also involved the following 
five additional aspects: 1) because Germans banks were universal banks, they provided, 
in addition to the long-term credit necessary for creating the industry, the short-term 
credit necessary for its daily operations; 2) German private banks provided credit 
through a current account,11 which allowed for the relation between banks and industrial 
companies to be reciprocal: both banks and companies could be either debtors or creditors 
to the other, and this could be in the short or long term;  3) banks helped enterprises 
to raise capital even when it was direct and not through banks (for example, through 
11 Neuberger and Houston define the current account as “. . . a combined demand-deposit account and line of credit. 
Interest was paid on credit balances at a rate of one percent under the Reichsbank discount rate and charged on debit 
balances at one percent over that rate plus minor fees” (1974,  713).
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12 Especially later, the banks are considered to have been central to large parts of all economic activity and growth in 
Germany, but the concern of this thesis is only their role in industrialization and development.
a stock market), through the creation of a good reputation for companies they worked 
with, and then they connected further to the companies by floating securities, underwriting 
them, and even holding some of the equities themselves; 4) industrial companies received 
“technical advice and managerial talent” from the banks (Diamond 1957,  25); and fina-
lly, 5) as opposed to Belgian and French universal banks, German universal banks were 
represented “...on the supervisory boards of joint – stock companies...” (Edwards and 
Ogilve 1996, 428).
 One example of this is in railroads, as Tilly comments (Tilly 1972,  179; see also 
Edwards and Ogilve 1996, 434):
From the beginning Rhenish bankers were engaged in the organization and 
financing of the Rhenish Railway Company. . . Their current account advances 
and brokerage services kept the company afloat throughout the difficult early 
years of the 1930s and 1840s. They rewarded themselves with promotional and 
stockjobbing profits while maintaining their positions of influence within the 
company by holding or obtaining voting rights over significant blocs of its 
shares, and by occupying strategic positions upon its boards of directors. This 
pattern was repeated in the development of other railroads
 The conventional view, and the one adopted in this dissertation, is that in 
Germany, the banks played an extremely important role in the industrialization 
and development12 of the country. Gerschenkron argues there is a relation between 
banks and companies “...from the cradle to the grave, from establishment to liquidation 
throughout all the vicissitudes of its existence...” (Gershenkron 1992, 94). Tilly (1992, 
94,) argues that German banks had a positive influence above all in heavy industry and 
new companies such as metals, engineering, utilities, and transportation:
 Despite some dissent, the historical literature generally attributes to the banks a 
positive and significant contribution to Germany’s economic development in the 19th cen-
tury. This contribution consisted in the financing of risky investments, particularly heavy 
industry, and included entrepreneurial feats such as the formation of new enterprises.
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 Finally, Goldschmidt  (quoted in Diamond 1956, 26) argues the banks actually really 
direct many of the big companies of Germany all the time: 
Scarcely a single important company in Germany had been founded without 
the collaboration of a bank. Whether it is a case of converting a private firm 
into a limited company, or of exploiting a new invention by establishing a new 
enterprise, the assistance of a bank is always involved. The Bank examines the 
situation and, when necessary, obtains reports from experts in the particular 
line...If the bank, after examination, decides to found the company, it draws up 
the scheme of financing, determines the amount and types of capital to be issued 
and then, in some cases itself takes a part of the shares into its security portfolio 
with the idea of issuing.
2.4 Japan
 The intent of this section is not to review the development of industrial banks in 
Japan even as briefly as I reviewed the prior development in Europe and in particular 
Germany, but only to highlight two important differences in the development in Japan, 
in regard to my further considerations of development banking in this dissertation. The 
first was the much stronger participation of the state in the process of mobilizing sa-
vings for industrial development. The second was the formation of competing industrial 
groups with their own particular bank and financial system.
 The marriage between banking and industry in Japan involved a very strong 
participation by the state. This state’s leadership played an essential role in the transfor-
mation of Japan from an agricultural country to an industrial one during the Meiji era, 
roughly from 1868 to 1912. The result was that Japan’s economy grew at almost 4 
percent per year during this whole period (Patrick 1967, 242). Specifically in regards 
to the overall process of providing industry with the finance for investment, as opposed 
to the European system, the state mobilized the population’s potential savings and then 
lent these to private banks which in turn lent them to industry. Lazonick and O’ Sullivan 
(1995, 36)  point out that:
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After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan did not possess institutions that could 
provide the financial commitment required for sustained industrial development. 
Yet the restoration had put in power a political elite who were determined to 
industrialize the economy. In the early 1870s, as an alternative to borrowing on 
foreign capital markets, the Japanese instituted the postal saving system to 
mobilize household saving in the hands of the government. The Japanese state 
then made this money available to private banks engaged in the financing of 
industry 
 The private industrial banks had a different relation to industrial enterprises than 
in Europe. In Europe, we saw above that industrial banks were open to consider any 
enterprise’s industrial project that seemed to be potentially profitable. In Japan power-
ful competing industrial groups, conglomerates of industrial enterprises, formed with 
their own particular bank and financial system. These groups were called Zaibatzu, and 
four of the largest ones were Mitsui, Sumitomo, Yasuda, and Mitsubishi. They emerged 
in the second half of 19th century and expanded during the 20th. This structure gave the 
industrial enterprises very favorable access to finance.
 Hence, the specific form for financing the development of industry in Japan was 
1) the State accumulates savings from the public, 2) the central bank channeled these 
deposits to private banks, and 3) private banks granted long-term credit to companies 
that belonged to their corresponding Zaibatzu.13
 Notwithstanding the specific differences from Europe and the cautions expres-
sed in the last footnote, it thus seems safe to conclude in regard to the central concern 
of this dissertation that like Europe, industrial banks were important to Japan’s indus-
13 There are two minority challenges to this common view of industrialization in Japan. One is that the Japanese 
industrialization was actually carried out through stock markets. Miya and Ramseyer (2002) demonstrate this 
was the case for textiles, railroads, and electrical utilities. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1995), however, argue that while 
stock markets were indeed important for these three industries, that was not the case for any others.  A more serious 
challenge to the standard picture comes from scholars who do not question the participation of the Zaibatzu in the 
industrialization of Japan, but rather their extent. Patrick (1967, 286), for example, argues that as late as 1912, the five 
most important banks did not dominate the Japanese banking system, since at that time, these banks only concentrated 
20.6 percent of the total security holdings in Japan, 17.7 percent of the total loans, and 20.5 percent of the public deposits. 
Similarly, for Yamamura (Cameron 1972a, 21) the Zaibatzu only became relevant after the 1920s, after the period of 
basic industrialization.
 The common view remains dominant, and is accepted as roughly what happened in Japan in this dissertation 
as it considers development banking alternatives.
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trialization. As Cameron (1972a, 22) stated: “In spite of these problems it is possible to 
draw two firm conclusions about the role of banking in Japanese economic development: 
the role was an important one, and much research needs to be done to determine its 
modalities and mechanisms.”
2.5 Early Industrial Banks in Underdeveloped 
Countries – The Case of Mexico
 Much less known than the development of industrial banking in Europe and 
Japan are some early scattered experiments in America. Interestingly, and connected to the 
much smaller private capital that was available and interested in developing industrial 
banking, two such early experiments in Mexico involved totally government-sponsored 
industrial banks; Banco del Avío Minero and Banco del Avío.
 For almost three centuries, Mexico was a Spanish colony called New Spain. The 
conquest by Spain of the area that was to become Mexico ended in 1521, and Mexico 
achieved its independence in 1821. During this period of time, the most profitable eco-
nomic activity was mining, especially silver. Spain needed silver to pay its soldiers for 
its many wars,14 and to buy manufactured goods from other Western European countries, 
particularly Holland, Germany, and England. According to Sólis (1965, 65), the majority 
of the silver extracted from the Spanish possessions came from Mexico.
 The exploitation of the mines was a difficult activity that required a significant 
amount of finance, but in almost three centuries, the Spanish autorities did not find 
any important financial institution for Mexican economic development. The only two 
financial institutions were the mint (casa de moneda) and national pawn shop (Nacional 
Monte de Piedad) (Brothers and Sólis 1996, 5). 
 The wealth in New Spain was controlled by two powerful groups, the Catholic 
14 Mostly in the 18th  century.
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Church and the merchants. For various reasons, the Catholic Church was never involved 
except peripherally in mining.15 Given that the state barely participated at all in the eco-
nomy for the first 200 years, it then was the merchants who came to head up the entire 
Mexican system of production (except that run by the Church), and in particular mining 
(del Valle 2003).
 This situation changed in the second half of the 18th century. Mines had to 
be dug deeper, and this required a significant increase in capital. The first attempt to 
address this involved state intervention operating through the existing private merchants. 
Bancos de plata (Silver Banks) were set up in 1755, and operated as follows. The mer-
chants obtained easy credit from the authorities of New Spain. The funds for this easy 
credit in turn came from a form of special tax on intrastate commerce called Alcabala, 
and hence were from the Spanish crown. For a number of reasons and especially because 
of the ongoing problem of favoritism where powerful authorities favored some 
merchants, this system led to continuous contention and controversy.
 To put an end to the this situation and to the resulting difficulties that private 
capital was having exploiting the mines, in 1784 the Banco del Avío Minero was esta-
blished. Its capital resources were again directly provided and owned by the Spanish 
crown. In this case, the crown obtained the money for the bank by taxing silver that was 
presented to be coined. 
 The establishment of this bank should not be seen as an isolated policy to assure 
the necessary capital to foster silver production. Rather, it was part of a many-faceted 
plan to develop the industry of silver mining in particular, but more broadly mining, the 
main economic activity of New Spain. At almost the same time, the new Mining Ordinances 
of 1783 were established, a set of laws to give a new legal structure to the extraction of 
silver. In 1793, the Real Academia de Minas was founded, “the first school of engineering 
15 The Catholic church’s financing was mostly involved with agricultural activities.
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in the Americas.” The Spanish Crown was deliberately trying to change the process 
where the exploitation of the mines in New Spain had been left to the individual efforts 
of small partnerships or private capitals, to one where it was a state controlled industry. 
As Howe (1949,  9) expresses this change, “The part played by the government was in 
general a passive one consisting in the broad permission granted to search for and work 
in the mines. With the passage of time the government was forced into a closer relation 
with the industry.”
 The Banco del Avío Minero only functioned from 1784 to 1792 (even in some 
years it did not have regular activities). Among the reasons that it failed, the two key 
ones were the hostility that it faced from the powerful merchants and the corruption of 
its members. A further intent to finance development came later on, after Mexican 
independence.
 When Mexico obtained its independence in 1821, it was very backward economically, 
because the Spanish crown has deliberately impeded the development of its possessions 
with measures such as barriers to intrastate commerce (alcabalas) and the prohibition 
of production of any manufactured goods.  The war of independence not only caused 
extensive material destruction, but it also left the new country economically and politi-
cally unstable. Specifically, the cost of the war of the independence and the additional 
burden of the loans taken for reconstruction from British financiers from 1821 to 1825 
left the new country heavily indebted. It defaulted in 1827 and then renegotiated the 
debt from 1831 to 1836 (Sandoval, 2005).  Politically, a civil war between conservatives and 
liberals broke out very soon in the newly independent nation. This was soon followed 
by growing intervention from more powerful countries such as Spain, France, and the 
United States. 
 In its first years of independence, Mexico tried to encourage economic libera-
lism, allowing trade with all the countries of the world.  The liberal policy of allowing 
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unrestricted imports largely destroyed the incipient Mexican textile industry. More 
generally in relation to the topic of this dissertation, under the liberal economic policy 
of the first years of independence, there certainly was no attempt to promote industry or 
development with public resources. Several members of the government opposed the 
free-trade policy because the main source of revenues for the state was taxing imports. 
These people considered as a better option to allow imports and to tax them and with 
these resources to encourage industrial development.
 Finally in 1830 was established, by President Anastacio Bustamente, the second 
industrial development bank in the Americas, the Banco del Avío. Its most immediate 
goal was to revive the textile industry, but beyond that, its broad goal was to create a 
productive capitalist industrial sector. The funds of this bank would come from a tax of 
20 percent on manufactured cottom imports. 
 During its 12 years of existence from 1830 to 1842, the bank carried out both 
the functions of a lender to companies at lower than market interest rates and of a 
provider of machinery and technical assistance (Potash 1953, 263), almost the same 
activities as the European industrial banks at the same time. The Foreign Trade Bank of 
Mexico (BANCOMEXT) did a review of the goals and activities of this early develop-
ment bank: creating a source of capital accumulation through the taxation of imports...; 2) 
stimulating the creation of a Mexican capitalist sector by means of stock companies, 
which once formed would be financed by the government, through an institution that 
would be created for that purpose...; 3) bringing either from Europe or the United States the 
modern machinery necessary for the creation of the factories...; 4)  bringing either from 
Europe or the United States the necessary technicians who would come to teach the 
Mexican students (BANCOMEXT 1966, 19, author’s translation).
 During its lifetime, this bank promoted not only the textile industry but also the 
iron and paper industries. The failure of this bank is attributable to a combination of 
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factors: the misallocation of resources by the authorities of the bank (favoring them-
selves - corruption), the political turmoil in which Mexico was still involved with the 
battle between the conservatives and liberals, the battle between the government and the 
Catholic Church, and finally the growing intervention into Mexico by foreign nations 
such as Spain, France, and the United States.
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CHAPTER 3
MEXICO: THE EXPERIENCE OF NAFINSA (1934-2010)
3.1 Introduction
 In history, the process of industrialization in England did not require a strong rela-
tionship between banks and industry. Other nations, like Belgium, France, Germany, and 
Japan needed a stronger relationship to support their efforts to catch up with England. The 
association of banks and industry in some cases was carried out through private banks, 
while in other cases, this association had to be fostered by the state because the private 
banks did not have either the resources or the willingness for that relationship.16
 This formula of developing institutions to mobilize finance for the purpose of 
promoting industrialization and development was successful, to differing degrees at 
different times, in a many countries. In other countries, however, in particular among 
those in the Third World, this strengthened finance instead increased the power of the 
elites and worsened the conditions of life of the common people. What was the case 
of Mexico? Did finance, either by private banks or government-sponsored banks, 
contribute to development? This question does not have a unique answer in all time 
periods, since both external factors and internal class struggle in Mexico have evolved 
differently at different times during the 20th century. To evaluate the contribution of in-
dustrial financing to the industrial and economic development of Mexico at any particular 
16  Development banks are not only good at promoting industrialization in early stages of development. The existence of 
development banks like the Kredintaltanlt fur Weidarufban  (KfW) in Germany, the Development Bank of Japan, and 
the Business Development Bank of Canada shows that they are also important in advanced economies.
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time, the following aspects must be considered:
1) The evolution of the Mexican economy.
2) The government’s policies to promote industrialization and economic growth.
3) The nature, structure, and procedures of the financing.
4) The role of NAFINSA, which was for decades the most important bank in Mexi-
co concerned with industrial and economic development.
 These aspects will be considered in relation to the development of NAFINSA 
throughout its entire history. Although the focus of this chapter is the relationship 
between NAFINSA and Mexican economic performance, in order to understand that, it 
is necessary to first discuss as background the structure of the Mexican economy from 
the Porfiriato (1876-1911) until 1934, the year in which NAFINSA was founded.
3.2 Economic Background 1: The Mexican Structure of  
Production and Financing During the Porfiriato 
Dictatorship, 1876 - 1911
 The main characteristics of the Mexican structure of production during the Porfi-
riato were:
 1) The Mexican economy enjoyed political stability under the dictatorship of 
President Porfirio Diaz (1876-1911), and it averaged a 3.3 percent rate of growth from 
1877 to 1910. Internationally, this period was characterized by the existence of big 
monopolies and large-scale exports of both goods and capital. Mexico was inserted into 
the world markets via its exports of minerals and other products such as coffee and 
henequen, mostly to the US.17 Foreign interests dominated these activities, as they also 
did the key industries of railroads and banking. The main source of revenue for the 
government was taxes on imports. In this period, Mexico had incipient industrialization in 
17  Though Mexico was not a big exporter compared to other Latin American countries. In 1912, exports per capita were 
11 dollars in Mexico, 62 in Argentina, and 65 in Cuba (see Knight 2010, 478).
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beer, cement, textiles, glass, and railroads, among others. With strong protection by the 
government along with the increase of railroads in the country, these industries achieved 
a healthy initial growth. The vast majority of the population, however, was peasants, 
who had minimal participation in markets. 
 2) Financing was dominated by foreign banks. British capital was the first to 
arrive during the second French occupation (1861-1867). It established the first private bank 
in Mexico in 1864, Banco de Londres, México y Sudámerica. French capital came later, 
but soon became the most important. It founded the Banco Nacional Mexico (BANAMEX) 
in 1881 and the Banco Mercantil in 1882. 18  These banks merged in 1884.  Hence, by 
the 1880s, the French were the main exporters of capital to Mexico, and had gained 
control of Mexican banking. The extent that this was true is indicated by the fact 
that the Banco Nacional de Mexico was a private bank that acted as a central bank 
and had special privileges such as to hold less required reserves, to be exempted from 
particular taxes, and to branch all over the country, privileges that made the creation of 
other banks in Mexico more difficult. For those reasons, some authors maintain that 
“[Mexican banking was dominated by a] small but energetic French colony...” (Ramírez 
1986, 18).19 French dominance in Mexican banking lasted until 1910, the end of this period.
 3) Foreign banks generally only granted capital to the members of their own 
financial group. A first harmful result of this slow and unequal development of credit 
intermediaries was that it was very hard for Mexicans and hence Mexico to establish 
new companies. As Haber points out (1991, 566), most manufacturers simply could not 
obtain bank financing, and those that could only succeeded in obtaining short-term loans 
to cover working capital costs.
18 There were other banks in Mexico, such as the Bank of Santa Eulalia and the Bank of Hidalgo founded in 1875 and 
the Banco Minero, the Banco of Chihuahua, and the Banco Mexicano de Chihuahua founded in 1883, but they were not 
as influential as the Banco de Londres and the Banco Nacional de Mexico. These two banks were the only ones with 
national acceptance and circulation.
19 One of the explanations offered for why countries such as Germany and the United States industrialized faster than 
France is that French savings did not contribute to the capital formation in France but rather left the country. According 
to Cameron (1958, 5) “... From 1850 to 1914 between one-third and one-half of all French savings were channeled 
abroad in the form of foreign investment...”
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 Maurer (1999, 332 and 340) describes how banks such as BANAMEX, then the 
most important bank in Mexico, largely practiced ‘insider lending’ in which the directors 
of BANAMEX belonged to the boards of other industrial companies: 
Banks adopted a strategy of making long-term loans to individuals and firms 
associated with their directors -’insider lending’ -in response to the scarcity of 
information that characterized the Porfiriato... [For example] Banamex already 
participated in the textile industry to some extent. It lent heavily and long-term 
to CIMSA, and provided working capital to the Compania Industrial de Atlixco 
cotton textile mill (CIASA) in Puebla. These were insider loans. Banamex 
owned part of CIMSA; the rest was held by Banamex shareholders. CIASA was 
connected to Banamex through two of its three board members and chief partners: 
Luis Barroso Arias, a prominent Banamex board member, and Agustin Garcin, 
who owned extensive interests in CIASA, CIMSA, and Banamex.
 Similarly, these practices were also followed by smaller banks such as the Banco 
Mercantil de Veracruz and the Banco de Nuevo Leon.20 Therefore, the conclusion was 
(Idem., 343):
When Porfirian banks made long-term loans to companies, they preferred to 
lend to their directors as individuals, who then used the funds to finance their 
particular businesses. When they lent directly to companies, they demanded 
personal guarantees from the managers.
 4) There was a well-coordinated relationship among members of the govern-
ment, capitalists, and bankers in order to establish profitable businesses. Companies 
received protection according to whether or not they had political connections with 
Porfirio Diaz’s regime (Haber 2010, 421; Knight 2010, 477). It was not only as already 
mentioned that the government protected industries and that bankers largely restricted 
credit to members of their own group, but further that members of the government of 
the Porfiriato belonged to the boards of the biggest Mexican joint-stock companies, and 
that bankers in some cases served as official representatives of the Mexican government. 
The result of all of this was the early rise of big financial and productive groups that 
later on would dominate the Mexican economy.
20  Which later contributed to forming the powerful Monterrey group.
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 5) The incipient industrialization of Mexico greatly expanded the number of 
wage-laborers. Their organizations emerged first mostly in railroads, mining, and the 
textile industries. Unions were, of course, fiercely repressed, as were peasants by the 
expanding agricultural capitalists who were taking their land (Knight 2010, 486). 
 6) The Porfirian state was particularly openly supportive of the capitalists (Ceceña 
1979, 50). Internationally, this was demonstrated by its open and strenuous efforts to 
attract FDI, and its treatment of foreign banks. Domestically, this was shown on the one 
hand by the government’s initiatives to foster joint-stock companies and the necessary 
credit institutions, on the other by the existing repression of workers and peasants.
3.3 Economic Background 2: The Mexican Structure of 
Production and Financing in the Recuperation from the
 Revolution and the First Period of Mexican 
Development, 1911- 1940
 The dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz was ended in 1911 by the Mexican political and 
economic revolution which had as main demands: 1) free voting and no reelection, and 
2) return of the land that had been taken by the agricultural capitalists. There is a debate 
on what happened to Mexico’s GDP during the Revolution. Haber (2010, 427) argues 
that GDP and industrial capacity were not damaged severely since revolutionary and 
government armies did not destroy companies, but rather only seized their revenues. 
Thus by 1921, the level of real GDP was higher than the level of 1910. On the another 
hand, FitzGerald (1979, 263) argues that “most of the initial capital bases for modern 
agriculture and industry laid under the Porfiriato were destroyed during the years of 
revolutionary violence between 1911 and 1924, and output in all branches fell.” 
 Where there is a consensus is that the Revolution caused a lack of means 
of payment. Particularly relevant to this dissertation, the period that followed also led 
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to a precipitous drop in bank credit, which fell from 603 million pesos in 1910 to 342 
million pesos in 1925,21 and then to 245 in 1932 (see Solis 1970, 105 and 106 and also 
Ibarra, 1986, 230). Related to these points, only a few banks could survive during the 
Revolution because most could not recover the loans they had granted. Finally, there is 
also consensus that it was not the most progressive sectors of Emiliano Zapata and Francisco 
Villa which triumphed in the Revolution, but rather the petite bourgeoisie, which organized 
the postrevolutionary ruling political-military bureaucracy (Leal 1975, 50).
 The country in the 1920s suffered extreme social, economic, and political inequa-
lity. As a result, the rate of growth of Mexican GDP averaged minus 1.03 percent from 
1921 to 1933, and was quite volatile. In the immediate postrevolutionary recovery from 
1921 to 1926, the Mexican GDP grew at a rate of 2.68 percent, but then from 1926 to 
1932, the Mexican GDP growth rate collapsed to -3.81 percent. Although the effects of 
the world Great Depression affected the latter part of this period, the Mexican GDP had 
already started to slow down sharply in 1926. See Figure 3.1.
 This economic downturn crippled the relaunching of the process of industrialization 
in two ways. First, there was a lack of capital available in the economy to build the 
necessary infrastructure. Second, the extensive poverty meant there was weak demand 
for domestic industrial products. Given these conditions, the new focus of the Mexican 
government’s attempts to promote development from 1920 to 1940 was not (primarily) 
industrialization (as it became after 1940), including, as will be discussed, during the 
first six years of the national development bank NAFINSA after 1934. The four foci for 
development in this period were 1) the consolidation of the Mexican state, 2) initiatives 
to restore the financial system, 3) nationalization of key productive activities, and 4) the 
promise to carry out the land reform. Hence, the first postrevolutionary period of Mexi-
21  By the mid-1920s, the French dominance had weakened, to the benefit of other foreign banking interests 
(Marichal 2007, 83). In 1924, foreign banks collectively held 70 percent of the metallic money and 83 
percent of the demand deposits (Cardero 1972, 732).
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can development from 1920 to 1940 was characterized by the following government 
actions:
 1)  Pacifying the country after the armed revolution (that had started in 1910), 
the Cristero war22 (1926 - 1929) and the three attempts to obtain the presidency through 
armed insurrection in the years 1923, 1927, and 1929. By the end of this period, 
an institutional mechanism for presidential succession had been developed, occurring 
through a powerful political party and not by disputes among commanders of the Mexican 
army. Some scholars call this the beginnings of the construction of the national state (see 
FitzGerald 1978, 264). This was a capitalist state, dominated by the petite bourgeoisie 
which had triumphed in the extended armed revolution. The state had an important 
degree of autonomy from international capital and fought its domination of agriculture 
and mining (Hamilton 1983, 3). Domestically, as discussed below, it worked to prevent 
the land reform, which was the greatest popular demand during and after the Revolution, 
and to establish a labor code to regulate the relations between capital and labor, a 
regulation that was necessary to promote the development of capitalist production.
22  The Cristero war had as its objective to relax the strongest anticlerical provisions of the Constitution of 1917 and 
subsequent anticlerical legislation.
Figure 3.1 Log Mexican GDP from 1921 to 2006.
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 2) Putting into Mexican hands the main economic activities that had always 
been in foreign hands, such as minerals and agriculture (Meyer 2000). Furthermore, 
public investment in the 1920s though small was concentrated on roads, and there was a 
marked increase in economic and social spending later in the period under the presidency 
of Lázaro Cárdenas from 1934 to 1940 (Solís 1970, 10-11).
 3) Creating new institutions and enacting new laws and reforms for reconstructing 
and promoting the financial system. The National Banking Commission and the Banco de 
Mexico, founded in 1924 and 1925, respectively, had the task of centralizing the issuing 
of money. By doing this, the state could then manage the national currency, exchange 
rates, and the interest rate. The General Law of Credit Institutions in 1924 and 1932 and 
the Banking Reform in 1931 established the currency issued by the central bank as the 
national currency and established reserve requirements for private banks to be held by 
the central bank.23 Further, a goal of these acts of 1924, 1931, and 1932 was to enable 
the National Banking Commission and the Banco de Mexico to provide credit to the 
Mexican economy and in particular to restore the banks’ liquidity. These points were 
important not only because previously money was entirely controlled by foreign banks, 
but also because the newly established institutions allowed Mexico to abandon the gold 
standard in 1931. In addition to this, other specific key institutions were founded to 
promote concrete sectors in the Mexican economy, such as the National Agricultural 
Credit Bank in 1926 under the presidency of Plutarco Elías Calles (1924 - 1928), the 
National Urban Mortgage and Public Works bank in 1933, and finally, the focal object 
of this chapter, Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA) in 1934.
 4) Carrying out the land reform. Although it proceeded slowly from 1920 to 
1934 in the face of government resistance as indicated above, it made a jump forward 
23  When founded, the Banco de Mexico carried out the functions of both a central bank and a commercial bank. Given 
that, the consolidation of the Banco de Mexico as the sole issuer of legal tender gave it a major competitive advantage 
against other banks. To avoid the major struggle this would inevitably lead to, all commercial activities by the Banco 
de Mexico were ended in 1932 and ceded to BANAMEX. (Hamilton 1983, 11)
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from 1934 to 1940 during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas. “...The land distributed 
during the Cárdenas regime was more than three times the amount distributed by the 
previous... presidents” (Ramírez 1986, 61).
 5) Creating a stronger capitalist sector. In the first place, this involved the 
construction of infrastructure in the 1920s. However, beyond that and more immediately 
related to the topic of this dissertation, the creation of the Banco de Mexico strengthe-
ned the relationship between the government and the bankers (Del Ángel 2010, 640 and 
Bennett and Sharpe 1979, 41). Banco de Mexico held the reserves of the private banks, 
but it also granted credit to the private banks’ companies (Hamilton 1983, 8). A further 
very clear example of how the relationship of the capitalists and the state worked was 
the National Agricultural Credit Bank. In 1926 and 1927, it granted 17 million pesos 
to 1,000 thousand big Hacendados, including the ex-president Álvaro Obregón and 
the Defense Minister Joaquin Amaro, while at the same time it granted only two million 
pesos to 10,000 small farmers (see Hamilton 1983, 9).24
 Table 3.1 gives a few indications of some overall changes across this period of 
recuperation from 1920 to 1940. Agriculture declined as indicated, in both employment 
and the value of output (despite its strong performance under Cárdenas from 1934 – 
1940 as mentioned above, and further indicated below). Services increased employment 
significantly, but with little increase in the value of output. Industrialization was very 
slow, as measured by the minor increase in employment. Its value indeed went up by 
1940, but an important part of that was the increased prices of raw materials in 1940 
that resulted from the outbreak of WWII.
24  There were many cases of “the revolving door” where government officials later went to the private sector and used 
their government connections. One prominent example is Luis Montes de Oca who was Finance Minister and the Head 
Director of the Banco de Mexico and afterwards founded the Banco Internacional. A second similar case was Eduardo 
Suarez who was Finance Minister and afterwards Head Director of the Banco Comercial.
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Table 3.1 Structure of the GDP and Employment in Mexico
1920 1920 1940 1940
Sector GDP Employment GDP Employment
Agriculture 23.3 70.5 20.2 65.4
Industry 13.1 12.9 19.4 13.7
Services 52.1 15.0 54.3 19.1
Mining 11.5 1.6 6.1 1.8
Adapted from source: Márquez 1997
3.4 The Foundation of NAFINSA (1934 - 1940)
 While NAFINSA was founded in 1934, the first six years of its existence can 
almost be considered a “prehistory” of the development bank. As will be documented, 
it certainly had some effect on Mexican development in those years, but there is a debate 
as to how much. In any case, it certainly had much less effect than after it took on the 
role of industrial promoter in 1941, when one could say that its real history as a development 
bank began.
 Reversing the draconian decline of the economy at -3.81 percent per year from 
1926 to 1932 that was noted above, in this period (during the World Great Depression), 
the rate of economic growth in Mexico was 4.7 percent. See Figure 3.1. This was in the 
first place a result of the agricultural sector, and secondly of the small industrial sector. 
As was mention before, in this period, there was massive distribution of land compa-
red with previous postrevolutionary years. Lázaro Cárdenas distributed 9.6 percent of 
Mexico’s surface area which was equivalent to 3 times more land than distributed by 
the previous postrevolutionary presidents combined. The sectoral composition of GDP 
was 20.2 percent in the primary sector, 25.9 percent for the secondary sector, and 54.5 
for the tertiary sector from the period 1936 to 1940. These proportions were almost 
the same as from 1932 to 1936. It is worth noting that in the years from 1933 to 1936, 
which were still during the international Great Depression though after its worst years, 
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Mexico had continual growth. Scholars agree that this relatively fast recovery was 
driven by the expansion of public spending (Cárdenas 2010, 530) and a positive trade 
balance. After that, the following years in this period were characterized by instability.
 Nacional Financiera, S.A., (NAFINSA) was founded in April of 1934 by 
President Abelardo L. Rodríguez with equal participation of public and private capital, 
although disbursements were made mostly by the state. Its supervisory board consisted 
of 7 members, 3 of them selected by the state and 4 selected by the private sector. 
According to Ares (2007, 8), this composition of the supervisory board brought credibility 
and trust from the business community. A counter argument would be that it was not just 
the “trust” from having 4 representatives but rather the influence and even control that 
the structure gave over the institution to the capitalist sector that was the key to the capita-
lists’ acceptance.25
 NAFINSA had the following mandates: 1) to sell real estate in order to provide 
liquidity to the Mexican economy, 2) to develop capital markets, 3) to be a legal agent 
of the government to its domestic and foreign creditors, and 4) to be an investment pro-
moter via the organization and the creation of companies and corporations (Villa 1976, 
3). Yet NAFINSA’s main function until 1935 was to provide liquidity to the economy 
in order to promote the agricultural sector. As Mexico at that time did not allow private 
banks to hold any significant amounts of real estate (Blair 1964, 206), NAFINSA had 
to sell properties that had been frozen in the accounts of the Mexican credit institutions 
from the years of the Revolution until 1934.
 NAFINSA data on the finance it provided to the economy divide it into three 
types: Inversion en valores (buying securities), Crédito (extending credit) and Ávales 
(bank guarantees). Figure 3.2 shows the division among these three components in this 
25  Banco de Mexico was founded in the same way in 1925. 4 members of the supervisory board belonged to the private 
sector and 5 to the private sector (see Ortiz 1998, 16). 
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early period.26 NAFINSA started granting credit, but over the 1930s and during WWII, 
it increasingly engaged in buying securities, in line with its mandate to work to develop 
the stock market. 
 There is a debate on the importance of NAFINSA to Mexican economic develop-
ment in this period. The side that argues it was marginal, such as López (2009, 8) can 
point out that if one takes into consideration only total financing divided by GDP, 
NAFINSA’s participation was minimal as it was less than 0.40 percent of GDP in the 
whole period. More directly relevant, its financing was generally under 3 percent of the 
financing of the total banking system (see Table 3.2).
26 This figure will be referred back to later for considerations of the later periods that are also shown in it. These data 
were not provided in the same form after 1990.
Figure 3.2 Credit, Securities, and Bank Guarantees as Percentage of NAFINSA’s Total 
Financing
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Table 3.2 NAFINSA’s Financing Divided by GDP, and by Total Bank Financing. Percent.
1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
NAFINSA’s total financing over 
GDP
0.38 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.24
NAFINSA’s total financing over to-
tal financing of the banking system.
4.25 3.02 2.49 1.79 1.54 1.17 1.82
Adapted from Source: Villa 1976.
 The other strong argument for the marginality of NAFINSA to Mexican develop-
ment in this period is that President Lázaro Cárdernas had compromised with the agri-
cultural sector (Villa 1976, 6), as a result of which NAFINSA even had to cede about 
a half of its capital to the Agricultural Credit Bank in 1935 (see Ares 2007, 208; Villa 
1976, 4; López 2009, 8).
 One argument to the contrary for NAFINSA’s importance was its role in the 
development of the stock market, in line with its mandate as indicated above and as 
one sees some support for in Figure 3.227, 28 Blair singles out (1964,  206 and 207):
At the time of NAFIN’s creation, the securities market in Mexico was feeble. In 
1934 the country’s only stock exchange, the Bolsa de Valores in Mexico City, 
recorded a mere 4 million pesos in total transactions…Taking its function 
seriously, NAFIN bought and sold 2 million pesos worth of securities in 1935 
and rapidly increased its annual transactions to a level of 44 million in 1937. In 
1940, in an effort to stabilize a market ruffled by world events and the uncertainties 
of an election year, it made purchases and sales totaling nearly 73 million pesos 
 Besides, in a further effort to try to promote the incipient financial markets, 
NAFINSA issued its own securities in 1937 and by the end of the period that we are 
looking at in 1940, NAFINSA, with its varied experiences and the amount of securities 
it held, “…was clearly the most influential institution operating in the Mexican securities 
market (Blair 1964, 2007)
27  The figure shows securities as a percent of NAFINSA’s total finance, which does not directly speak to NAFINSA’s 
share of the stock market.
28 There of course is a current debate about whether developing a stock market (today) contributes to a country’s growth 
and development.
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 In addition to its activity promoting the stock market, NAFINSA carried out a 
few other development-related activities. It constructed one hospital, it participated in 
the nationalization of some key industries such as electricity, and it gave minor support 
to activities in some industrial sectors such as steel, beer, tobacco, and paper (Ares 
2007, 208). These activities did not have a great impact in promoting industrial activities 
in the Mexican economy during this period, but they are sometimes claimed to have 
established precedents and procedures that were to later strengthen its industrial develop-
ment (López 2009, 5).
 A balanced evaluation of the role of NAFINSA in this period appears to be that 
it had some but not an extremely strong influence on Mexico’s development, that what 
it had was mostly on the stock market and to a lesser extent through the promotion of 
some companies, and that its influence was much less than it was to be for the following 
several decades.
3.5 Economic Background 3: The Mexican Structure of 
Production and Financing During the Industrialization 
Efforts, 1941 – 198129
 From 1941 until the debt crisis in 1982, Mexico promoted import substitution 
industrial activities. It is important to understand, however, that neither at that time 
nor in the subsequent neoliberal period that promoted exports did Mexico develop 
a long-term industrial policy, and consequently, external factors have always been a 
key in determining its specific policies (Guillén 2000, 36). It is worth noting that during 
the import substitution period, Mexico achieved high and sustained rates of economic 
growth; in contrast, during the neoliberal era, rates of growth were quite feeble. 
29  As already indicated, Mexico greatly increased its industrialization efforts beginning in 1941. Since some of the 
data I want to support  I argue goes back to the mid-1930s, I use it as presented, but 1941 remains the beginning of 
this period for our analysis. Similarly, a major shift in the approach to industrialization occurred with the debt crisis in 
1982, so I end this period at 1981, but some of the data go to 1986 when the new approach becomes fairly consolidated.
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 A stylized fact about Latin America and the Great Depression is that a number of 
the more important economies responded out of necessity to the world downturn by 
initiating import substitution industrialization programs. There is a particular debate 
about if Mexico increased its import substitution then, and if that contributed to 
the recovery beginning in 1934 that is visible in Figure 3.1. Authors like Díaz Alejandro (2000, 
140), Garrido (2002, 233), Bulmer–Thomas (2003, 206-208), and Márquez (1997, 313) 
argue that the recovery was led by import substitution, while Solís (1970, 99) and 
López (2009, 3) argue against that. In Table 3.1, we saw that measured by employment, the 
industrialization between 1920 and 1940 was quite weak, and I argued that the signifi-
cant increase in the value of the output was largely a result of price increases that occu-
rred only near the end of the period in 1940 as WWII began. I argued along with many 
authors that the recovery was driven primarily, though not exclusively, by the improved 
performance and increased output in agricultural under Cárdenas. 
 Regardless of one’s position on the importance of the relatively small increased 
industrialization in the 1930s to the recovery then, there is much broader agreement that 
starting in the early 1940s, industrialization became the main factor in Mexican econo-
mic growth. This resulted from the following reasons: 1) the acceptance of the idea that 
key to promoting industrialization and development was using the state on a large scale 
to create and support private capitalist industrial enterprises, 2) exports (hence demand 
for Mexican industrial production) boomed especially starting in  1942 during WWII 
because the need by the United States and England for a lot of manufactured goods and 
minerals, 3) with the end of the conflict with the US over oil expropriation, the door was 
opened to Mexico for credits granted by the Ex-Im bank in 1941,30 and also to increased FDI 
30  The relationship between Mexico and the Ex-Im (Export - Import) Bank of the United States started in 1941. According 
to Green (1978, 3) and Villa (1976, 104), the main purpose of the Ex-Im Bank was to encouraged US exports and not 
the development of poor countries. Subsequently, from 1941 until the end of  WWII, the Ex-Im Bank worked to main-
tain a trade between some goods that Mexico was able to produce and the US needed, and some US products that the 
US wanted to have promoted.
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from the US,31 and 4) spending in industrial promotion as a percent of public investment 
grew from 1943 until 1981; in 1950, it became more important than agricultural promo-
tion and, at the end of the 1950s, it became more important than the spending carried 
out in communication and transports (see Figure 3.3).
31 This remained fairly low at this time, however, because of the strong protection.
Figure 3.3 Mexican Public Investment by Sector. Percentages Out the Total
 With this background as to why industrialization took off after 1940, we can 
now look at the main characteristic of the Mexican economy from 1940 to 1981. Of 
central importance to the issue of industrialization, in particular in comparison to 
the period that followed it, were the two points that it was largely (not exclusively) 
inward looking industrialization, and that it rested on a high participation by the state 
(see Figure 3.1). The key economic and financial characteristics of the period were:
 1) Mexico grew, not without fluctuations, at an average rate of 6.0 percent from 
1934 to 1981. During this period, it had three major expansions (defined as four continuous 
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years of growth); from 1933 to 1936, from 1954 to 1957, and from 1978 to 1981. Simi-
larly it had three major downturns (defined to need three continuous years); from 1947 
to 1949, from 1965 to 1967, and from 1974 to 1977.
 2) The agriculture sector grew steadily and brought in foreign exchange that 
could be used by the industrial sector, until it reached its peak in 1965. Since then, the 
rate of growth of agriculture has declined and Mexico now imports several basic products 
for the population’s nourishment, for example wheat, rice, and beans (Yúnez 2010, 
734), draining foreign exchange that could otherwise be used by industry.
 3) The sectoral composition of the Mexican GDP has continually shifted in favor 
of industry and services. The participation of the primary sector declined from 22.4 
percent during the period 1932-1936 to 8.8 percent during the period 1977-1981. 
Conversely, over the same span of time, industry increased from 23.2 percent to 32.7 
percent and services from 54.4 percent to 58.6 (Márquez 2010, 558). This change in 
the sectoral composition of the GDP caused massive movements of people from the 
countryside to the cities. The urban population was 33.5 percent in 1930 and 66.3 
percent in 1980. In this process, Mexico City received a disproportionately large proportion 
of the migrants from other parts of the country, having 1,644,921 inhabitants in 1940 
and 9,623,151 inhabitants already in 1970.
 4) Mexican exports were directed almost entirely to the US, reaching more than 
80 percent during WWII and the Korean War. The Balance of Trade was almost in balance 
until 1956 and 1957, after which Mexico has had recurrent deficits.
 5) The rate of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFKF) grew steadily32  from 8.6 
percent in 1940 to 22.63 percent in 1980. The participation of the state was nearly 40 
percent in the whole period, and its main concern was to promote industry. As FitzGerald 
(1978, 272) points out, one cannot make a case for the conservative argument that 
this caused a crowding out process, since private and public investment moved together.
32  Except for a short contraction from 1976 to 1978.
43
 6) At least from the end of WWII onward, the import substitution model was 
central to Mexico’s approach to industrialization and development. This model was 
based on import licenses and other barriers to (unregulated) trade. There was a 
close relationship between the business sector (both financial and industrial) and the 
state (both during the import substitution period being discussed here, and the 
subsequent export promotion during the neoliberal period). The structure of production 
had the foreign companies, which came via FDI, at the top, and was dominated by the 
high technology companies. National companies commercialized the products of foreign 
high tech companies and produced some intermediate and nondurable goods Also, there 
were state-owned companies that provided basic productive intermediate products such 
as steel, electricity, oil, and infrastructure.
 7) Urban and rural workers were organized into massive unions such as the 
Peasant National Confederation (Confederacion Nacional Campesina) and Workers 
National Confederation (Confederacion Nacional de Trabajadores) that where instruments 
of support for the government. Dissidents existed, such as in the cases of the railroads 
in the 1950s and electricity in the 1970s, but they were at a minimum highly persecuted, 
and generally over time suppressed. The goal of the official unions was to provide some 
social services to their members (Leal 1975, 55), such as a health system (Villarespe 
2001, 35), housing and education, and to achieve higher wages. However, the benefits 
of national growth consistently went more to the capitalists than to the workers, as pro-
fits almost always grew faster that wages. Manufacturing wages were stagnant during 
the 1940s, but then did expand in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s (Valle and Martinez, 
2011). As wages depend upon productivity and income distribution and the latter worse-
ned since 1950, it can be said that the increase in wages was due to the increase of producti-
vity. This phenomenon provoked the “. . . the generating [of] large profits for subsequent 
reinvestment, although the average real wage rate rose steadily as labor shifted from 
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agriculture to industry...” (FitzGerald 1978, 265).
 8) National companies were not at the top in standards of international producti-
vity, but they were the most favored during this period (even more than the workers 
and peasants that were organized by the government). In so doing, Mexican state tried 
to protect national companies from international competition via barriers to trade. For 
example, Mexico signed a trade agreement with the USA in 1943 which reduced trade 
tariffs (López and Zabludovsky 2010; Moreno-Brid and Ros 2010), yet the following 
year, the Mexican state tried to put the agreement back in order to promote the creation 
of a nascent capitalist class. Afterward, import tariffs were established from 1944 to 
1947. In the same vain, Mexico rejected the GATT in 1947, and  later put an end to the 
US trade agreement in 194933 (López and Zabludovsky 2010).34
 9) Total financing by the banking sector was 27.4 percent of the GDP from 1934 
to 1981, low if it is compared with other countries such as Argentina and Brazil (Del Ángel 
2010, 10). This average by itself, however, hides the radical change in the amount 
of financing over the period. Starting from 9.0 percent in 1934, it grew fairly steadily 
to 19.4  by 1943 just after the beginning of the period we are looking at in this section. 
It then rose and fell repeatedly over the next 14 years, ending up with very little net 
change at 18.8 in 1957. It then grew strongly and steadily to 43.8 in 1973, after which 
it again stagnated over the 1970s to end up at 48.9 at the end of this period in 1981. As 
one can see from Figure 3.4, private banks provided little more than the single development 
bank,35 NAFINSA, and the average contribution over the period of the private sector 
at 13.3 percent of the GDP was likewise under half the 27.4 percent total just noted. 
Further, these private resources were granted mainly to companies of their bank’s group 
33  One sector of the capitalist class that attempted to encourage protection was the small business group called Cámara 
Nacional de la Industria de la Transformación (CANACINTRA). 
34 Questions arose about this way of encouraging industrialization whether or not the import substitution model 
was taken consciously as heterodox way of searching economic of growth. 
35  In addition to the private banks and the development banks, there was foreign finance via loans by the World Bank 
and the Ex-Im Bank of the US.
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and to the government, thus constituting the same problem of insider lending discussed 
above for the period 50 years earlier.
Figure 3.4 Total Financing in Mexico from 1934 to 1984. Percent of GDP
3.6 NAFINSA as an Industrial Promoter (1941-1947)
 For Mexico, this period was characterized by economic growth and inflation. 
The rate of economic growth was 5.6 percent.  As previously indicated, four conditions 
enabled Mexico to start industrialization:
 1)  There were favorable external conditions caused by WWII that supported 
industrialization in Mexico. The United States was demanding a lot of raw materials 
and manufactured goods, therefore a trade agreement was negotiated between the US 
and Mexico in 1941. This agreement provided for a stable provision of commodities 
with a fixed exchange rate (Ceceña 1979, 189 ). Mexican exports therefore boomed, parti-
cularly in 1942 and 1943. Beyond the positive trade balance, particularly important was 
the part of the agreement that allowed the import of certain industrial equipment that 
before had been restricted (Ares 2005, 11). 
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 2) There were taxes on imports and exports that were a great source of revenue 
for the Mexican government (Bueno 1972, 13). 
 3) There was foreign credit available for Mexico,36 and also FDI.  The country 
had been largely excluded from such capital markets for most of the 19th and early 20th 
century. In addition to the usual cheap labor, the attraction for FDI was that, notwiths-
tanding its other protectionist measures, Mexico allowed the free remittance abroad of 
profits (Barking 1975, 70).
 4) Surpluses generated in the agricultural sector made it possible to obtain the 
necessary imports to build the industrial sector.  
 In addition to these conditions, some people (Ares 2007, 10) highlight the political 
aspect with the presidency of Manuel Ávila Camacho who worked to bypass the existing 
policies that favored the agricultural sector in order to institute policies that favored 
the industrial capitalist sector. However, it seems more plausible that the ideological 
push for industrialization came from the then world-wide developing convic-
tion that industrialization was the key to development, rather than from the individual 
convictions of the president. This desired goal was then enabled by the existing external 
conditions such as the positive trade balance and the increased access to capital markets 
just discussed. It took the shape of state-promoted industrialization under the conviction 
that the need for the industrialization to be rapid could only be achieved by the extensive 
resources that the state could mobilize being used to compliment and support the private 
sector (Villa 1976, 10).
 Notwithstanding that there was a strong participation of the state in this period, 
it is important to note that Mexico has never had an industrial policy for long-term 
projects. National development has been put forward as a general strategy without 
36  In this period, there were four agreements on foreign debt: i) a 1941 agreement on land claims, ii) the 1942 Zevada-
Cooke agreement on claims concerning oil expropriation, iii) a Direct Debt agreement in 1942 on bonds whose debt 
service had been suspended during the armed Revolution and iv) an agreement in 1946 on debt concerning the railroads 
(see Ceceña 1979, 199-201).
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comprehensive well-coordinated supporting policies. Villa (1976, 15 and 26) points out 
four mechanisms through which the government can promote industrialization which 
are 1) protection, 2) fiscal policies, 3) promotion and financial support, and 4) technical 
assistance and educational support. In the period that it is being considered, the only 
important fiscal policy, of taxing exports, was not being used to give the govern-
ment revenue in order to support the generation of market demand, but rather as simple 
protectionism. While this was important, by far the most important industrialization and 
development policies were those of financial support and promotion. This was very 
clear in the redefinition of the functions of NAFINSA that were established under a 
new law in 1940 (see Aubey 1966, 40 and Villa 1976, 9):
1. Oversee and regulate the national securities and long-term credit market;
2. Promote the investment of capital in all categories of enterprises in the country;
3. Act as an institution of support for investment companies when they issued 
credit guaranteed by securities;
4. Oversee and direct the operation of the stock exchange;
5. Act as a finance or investment company;
6. Act as a fiduciary, especially of the federal government and its dependencies;
7. Act as the agent and adviser of the federal government, of the states, 
municipalities, and official dependencies in the issuance, recall, conver-
sion, and all other transactions of public securities.
8. Be a legal depository for all classes of securities.
  Hence, developing the stock market, being the legal agent of the government 
to its domestic and foreign creditors, and financially promoting industrialization were 
NAFINSA’s main functions. As a participant in developing the stock market, it fulfi-
lled its role in 1941 by issuing ten different kinds of bonds for various states of Mexico 
or state-owned companies. Also, NAFINSA issued its own securities such as Certifica-
48 49
dos de Participacion  (1941) and Titulos Financieros (1941),37 where the latter were 
denominated in dollars. As the legal agent of the government, NAFINSA negotiated the 
first loans granted by the Ex-Im Bank of the United States for an amount of 30 million 
dollars, which were used to build roads.
 However, its main function was to ensure that incipient industries had sufficient 
finance when the private sector was unwilling to provide it. From 1940 to 1946, this 
took the form of investment in securities, which increased 56-fold. Figure 3.2 shows the 
tremendous increase in securities as a percent of NAFINSA’s total financing over this 
period, from 50% to 90%. Table 3.3 gives the absolute levels of NAFINSA’s financing 
via securities and credit over this period. Again, one can see that at this time, NAFINSA 
granted resources primarily via security investments, and that the role of credit only 
became important in this period after 1945.
37  Both securities were callable.
 The amount of this expansion of securities was such that there was also a tremendous 
expansion of NAFINSA’s total financing over these years, as illustrated by Table 3.4 
which summarizes the same two elements as Table 3.2: 1) NAFINSA’s total finan-
cing over GDP, and 2) NAFINSA’s total financing over total financing of the banking 
system. As can be seen, both aspects are markedly greater than in the previous period 
before this new definition of NAFINSA’s responsibilities was created. Further, both 
aspects increased steadily from its redefinition until the end of the war in 1945, and then 
largely leveled out for the following 2 years. By 1945, NAFINSA represented an impor-
Table 3.3 NAFINSA Distribution of Total Financing
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947
Credit 16.53 8.02 4.19 8.81 22.72 31.38 32.18
Securities 70.08 86.38 89.59 82.13 62.72 56.31 45.73
Adapted from Source: Villa 1976.
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Table 3.4 Total NAFINSA Financing. Percentage of GDP and the Banking System.
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947
Total financing over GDP 0.52 2.28 3.63 2.87 3.9 3.35 3.66
Total financing over total financing 
of the banking system.
3.15 12.0 18.71 16.59 19.68 19.08 19.75
tant amount of total bank financing, going from less than one thirtieth to almost one fifth 
in 4 years, and even became a noticeable part of the GDP.
 Thus NAFINSA financing contributed to the development of many industrial 
companies such as Nueva Compania Eléctrica of Chapala, S.A., (electricity), Compañia 
Industrial Atenquique, S.A., (paper), Vidrio, S.A., (glass), Banco Cinematográfico, 
S.A., (films), Altos Hornos de México, S.A., (steel). Cementos Oaxaca, S.A., (cement), 
Guanos y Fertilizantes de México, S.A., (fertilizers), Carbonífera Unidad de Palau, 
S.A., (coal), Cobre de Mexico, S.A., (copper), Empacadoras de Calidad S.A.,(packing), 
Cementos Porltland Moctezuma, S.A., (cement), Banco Cinematográfico, S.A., (films), 
Cementos Portland del Bajío, S.A., (cement), and Industria Eléctrica de Mexico, S.A., 
(electricity).  Table 3. 5 shows some of the companies that NAFINSA helped to create 
during this period. In 1945 NAFINSA had stocks in 35 companies, and it was the major 
stockholder in 5 (Bennet and Sharpe 1979, 46).
 The degree of participation in each company differed greatly, from 100 percent 
in Guanos y Fertilizantes de México, S.A. to 7 percent in Compañia Industrial Atenquique, 
and the industries supported were quite diverse. This diversity which often was quite 
arbitrary highlights the assertion I made above that Mexico had no well-formulated 
industrial policy. 
 In some cases, Mexican capitalists tried to exploit the opportunities offered by 
the US’s declining exports of intermediate goods to Mexico, such as the case of steel. 
Altos Hornos de Mexico was a project started by Mexican capitalists because of the 
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38  Capital must be understood as the total shares issued by each company.
39  The creation of Altos Hornos was a success. In 1944, Altos Hornos produced 3.4 percent of the national steel 
production. By the time of 1948, it produced 33 percent of the national production (Ramírez 1986, 67).




1940 Nueva Compañía Eléctrica Chapala, 
S.A.
69 % of total liabilities
1941 Compañia Industrial Atenquique, S.A. 7 % of the social capital. 100 
% of total liabilities
1941 Vidrio Neutro, S.A. 100 of total liabilities
1941 Banco Cinematográfico 20 % of the social capital
1942 Altos Hornos de México, S.A. 57 % of the social capital
1942 Cementos Oaxaca, S.A. 50 % of the social capital
1943 Guanos y Fertilizantes de México, S.A. The totality of the  social 
capital
1943 Carbonífera Unidad de Palau, S.A. 20 % of the social capital
1943 Cobre de México, S.A. 45 % of the social capital
1943 Cementos Porltland Moctezuma, S.A. 40 % of the  social capital
1944 Empacadoras de Calidad, S.A. 50 % of the social capital
1944 Cementos Portland del Bajío, S.A. 19 % of the social capital
1945 Industria Eléctrica de Mexico, S.A. 30 % the social capital
declining steel exports to Mexico from the US. However, the project ended up being so 
costly that the State had to intervene to make the creation of this company39 possible. In 
other companies, NAFINSA only supplied credit, as for example was the case for Cela-
nese Mexicana S.A. (textile).
 The case of Celanese is an illustrative example of how NAFINSA interacted in 
its work with private corporations and private banks to promote private corporations. 
When imports of synthetic textile fibers from Italy and Japan were cut off because of 
the war, the idea was to promote domestic production. NAFINSA found a partner in 
the Celanese Corporation of America, which on initiating the operations of Celanese 
Mexicana S.A., on August 5, 1944, became the first large U.S. company to enter Mexico 
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since 1938. In addition to a 15 million pesos credit from NAFINSA, BANAMEX, the 
largest private bank in Mexico, financed the venture (Celanese, 2010). By 1970, Celanese 
had become the eleventh biggest company in Mexico, and the major stockholder was 
BANAMEX.
3.7. NAFINSA During the Post-WWI Period of Stable Development 
(1948-1970)40
 This period had a high rate of economic growth in Mexico as a result of the 
outstanding performance of the world economy. This performance occurred after WWII 
with the expansion of international production and trade led by the US. This process of 
growth was distributed unevenly between different countries, with Western Europe and 
Japan benefiting the most. Underdeveloped countries also benefited from these decades 
of growth for two reasons: 1) the large demand for raw materials and 2) large amounts 
of FDI and other transfers of capital.
 During this time, the Mexican economy grew at about 6 percent per year for 
almost the entire period (see the Figure 3.1), GDP per capita almost doubled, and there 
was low inflation and a stable exchange rate. This growth was called the Mexican mira-
cle, or less ostentatiously, stable development. During this span of time, the health and 
university systems were built, representing the compromise between the government and 
the official unions. Manufacturing wages per hour rose steadily, which can be at-
tributed with certainty to the increase in productivity since income distribution worsened. 
The sectoral composition of GDP finally shifted decisively against agriculture, with 13.6 
percent of GDP in the primary sector, 30.8 percent in the secondary, and 55.7 percent in 
the tertiary in the period from 1962 to 1968. Mexico’s exports were mainly agricultural 
40 This period is appropriately referred to as one of stable development by comparison with any other period of such 
length, but there were of course some instabilities such as the devaluation of 1954 and the subsequent high inflation 
until 1958.
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products and minerals. Protectionist licenses to import and tariffs continued to be used to 
promote industrialization, since 1944 and 1947, respectively. Mexico continued to soli-
cit transnationals through the quartet of cheap labor, free remittance of profits, subsidies 
in basic inputs, and captive markets. Subsequently, much FDI arrived that contributed to 
the shaping of the Mexican capitalist sector. This included a temporary reversal of the decli-
ne of the capitalist agricultural sector with an increase of exports of primary products, 
mainly maize, due to the Green revolution, until the mid-1960s (Garrido 2002, 5).
 In this period, the role assigned to NAFINSA changed with respect to the previous 
period (1941-1947). Some people argue that the reason for this change was that the 
industrial capitalist sector had become hostile to NAFINSA because they thought that 
the participation of NAFINSA in Mexico’s industrialization had become too big, creating 
crowding out effects. However, this argument is inconsistent with the data since 
private investment moved together with public investment (see Figure 3.5). In addition, 
public investment grew slower than private investment over the 30-year period from 
1940 to 1970 except for the 10-year period from 1955 to 1965. The increases in private 
investment were 453, 36.2, 42.9, and 80.5 percent from 1940 - 1955, 1955 – 1960, 1960 
– 1965, and 1965 – 1970, respectively. The increases in public investment in the same 
periods were 165.8, 43.7, 70.2, and 52.6 percent. Finally, the public sector was 
investing in either infrastructure or basic industries that were not as profitable as the 
industries that the private sector was investing in. Thus, concern with crowding out is 
not a convincing argument.
 An alternate more plausible hypothesis for the change of NAFINSA’s functions 
is that a number of difficulties were identified in the Mexican structure of production. 
The incipient industrialization had shown problems associated with transport (railroads) 
and communications. Problems such as irrigation to satisfy the rate of growth in 
the agricultural sector and problems in the development of basic industries like oil 
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Figure 3.5 Public and Private Investment in Mexico. Millions of pesos.
and electricity existed. Therefore, as opposed to the previous approach of pumping 
finance into various industries, what was needed now was that the state had to provide 
infrastructure and basic inputs to promote further industrial progress. Aubey describes 
this situation:
First, the heavy emphasis on manufacturing industries, resulting in their rapid 
development, caused certain economic bottlenecks. A shortage of transportation 
facilities arose, as well as shortages in fuel oil, electric energy and materials. 
These shortages, among other things, caused a decrease in the rate of manufac-
turing production (Aubey 1961,45).
 The Organic Law of December 1947 established that NAFINSA was to play a 
role in supporting the industrialization of Mexico by the private sector, but greatly reduce 
its role in directing the industrialization through its financing. Given that, almost all 
the resources of NAFINSA were assigned to finance infrastructure using credit, and 
its entrepreneurial role and its securities’ purchases were sharply scaled down. The 
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 Consequently, NAFINSA played a major role in financing Mexican development 
in this period. If we look back at the part of Figure 3.4 for this period, we see that soon 
after its 1947 redefinition, NAFINSA was by itself providing almost as much financing 
as all the private banks,41 and it continued to do so until the mid-1960s when the total 
from all private banks again outgrew that from NAFINSA. For the whole period 1948 
– 1970, it provided 79.2 percent of the resources provided by all the private banks. The 
absolute magnitude of its contribution in this period was 8.1 percent of the GDP. Its 
share of total financing can be seen in Table 3.7 to have peaked in 1955, during the 1954 – 
1957 strongest years of growth of the Mexican miracle.
 Although as has been indicated NAFINSA in this period had mostly transferred 
its finance to infrastructure, its entrepreneurial role had not entirely ceased. NAFINSA 
now was involved with only a few companies, but they were among the biggest in 
Mexico. Some of the companies that NAFINSA supported in this period were Diesel 
aforementioned aspects are depicted in Figure 3.2 and in Table 3.6. Figure 3.2 shows 
how the role of investment in securities decreased sharply in this period with the adop-
tion of the new policies in 1947 and continued to fall at a declining rate until the early 
1960s. Table 3.6 illustrates how infrastructure grew to be main recipient of NAFINSA’s 
financing, again growing over the whole period and ending at over 70 percent.
Table 3.6 Division of the Total NAFINSA Financing
Activities 1945 1947 1953 1958 1963 1964 1968 1970
Infrastructure 7.6 28.5 47.3 48.6 61.4 64.9 72.1 70.9
Industry 92.4 71.5 27.3 39.9 30 25.6 23.8 29
Basic 60.4 27.4 12.6 14.0 10 7.3 7.5 7.4
Other industries 32 44.1 14.9 25.9 15.7 18.3 16.3 21.6
Other activities - - 14.9 11.5 8.6 9.5 1.6 .1
41  It actually surpassed the contribution from all the private banks in 1953 and at the beginnings of the 1960s. The first 
case was probably due to the decline in total Mexican economic activity that year while the second one was a result of 
the major support by NAFINSA then for electricity, and transportation and communications.
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Nacional, S.A. (automobile), Metalúrgica Peñoles, S.A. (mining), Constructora Nacional 
de Carros de Ferrocarril, S.A., (railroad cars), Fertilizantes Monclova, S.A., (fertilizers), and 
Tubos de Acero, S.A., (steel). 
 The case of Diesel Nacional (DINA) is worth noting, as another example of the 
type of relationship between the government and the private sector noted above that 
permeated the Mexican economy. One of the cofounders of DINA was Luis Montes de 
Oca who had been director of the Mexican Central Bank, Banco de Mexico, and then 
had launched a project to found his own bank, Banco Internacional. When this project 
turned out to be beyond the resources of Montes de Oca and the other capitalists working 
with him, NAFINSA rescued the project and obtained 85 percent of the total stocks of 
this company. By 1958, NAFINSA held 100 percent of the capital of this company (Ben-
net and Sharpe 1979, 50 and 51).
Table 3.7 NAFINSA Financing to Industrial Activities as Percentage of the
 Total Banking Financing
Year % Year % Year %
1942 4.8 1953 40.9 1964 40.3
1943 12.3 1954 45.1 1965 38.0
1944 15.0 1955 50.0 1966 38.4
1945 24.0 1956 48.9 1967 35.7
1946 23.9 1957 46.6 1968 35.6
1947 26.7 1958 47.2 1969 32.1
1948 28.3 1959 43.5 1970 29.7
1949 33.1 1960 45.9 1971 31.7
1950 33.2 1961 44.7 1972 31.3
1951 30.9 1962 41.2 1973 31.1
1952 36.4 1963 40.7 1974 36.4
 In some cases, NAFINSA was not interested in owning shares of companies 
itself, but did want the companies to be under “Mexican control.” This happened for 
example in the branches of mining, electricity, food, tobacco, automobile, and 
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aluminum. In this case, it was made mandatory that 51 percent of the capital be Mexican. 
Sometimes, private Mexican capital was not willing to invest in such a company, and 
then, NAFINSA had to act as an investor of last resort (Ibid., 1979, 54).
 The link of NAFINSA to productive enterprises went beyond financial support. In 
addition to being on the board of directors of the Central Bank, NAFINSA’s president was 
on the board of directors of the country’s largest companies such “. . . as the steel company, 
the telephone company, the nationalized petroleum company, and key corporations in 
textiles, cellulose and paper, coke and coal, light and power, electrical apparatus, 
automotive assembly, and railroad car manufacture . . .” (Blair 1964, 198). In addition 
to this “ . . .NAFINSA personnel were on the boards of dozens of companies in the 
public and private sector . . .” (Ibid., 198). While on the one hand their presence could 
offer the enterprises influence with NAFINSA and hence possible preferential access to 
credits, it was also a channel through which NAFINSA’s technical personnel made their 
ideas felt on the enterprises.
  These companies were involved mainly with basic industries. NAFINSA could 
finance big companies because of its good financial situation, obtaining resources in 
two ways: 1) issuing securities and 2) obtaining loans from the Word Bank and the Inter 
American Development Bank. NAFINSA had great acceptance for its Certificados de 
Participacion in 1953, but there was some concern that these were only highly liquid 
short-term securities and so the following year, they stopped issuing them for 10 years. 
Instead, they issued other less liquid securities such as Certificados de Co-propiedad 
Industrial. However, in this period, NAFINSA did not play the important role it had in 
the previous period in the further development of the stock market (Villa 1976, 113). 
Not only was the stock market now larger, but as one can see from Table 3.8, the percentage 
of securities in NAFINSA’s total resources dropped 19.7 percent from 1952 to 1969. 
This was more than replaced by the increase in external financing which rose 58.8 percent, 
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 While this period had been the best in the 20th century for the growth and 
development of Mexico, by its end, several factors were developing which were to un-
dermine the Mexican economy in the period that followed, and in fact up to the present. 
These developments in turn were to lead to economic policy changes,42 including in the 
conduct of NAFINSA.
 The fundamental economic developments by the end of this period that under-
mined the continued relatively strong performance of the Mexican economy were the 
following factors:
 1) The decline of the agricultural sector due to the incomplete land reform 
and the specialization in a very limited number of products. The most productive land 
was held by a very few owners, while the vast majority of peasants could not produce 
enough for the reproduction of their families. Quoting Eckstein, Barkin (1975,66) points 
out:
In agriculture, the agrarian reform provided a stable institutional framework 
within which most beneficiaries (about 90 percent of the 2.8 million) received 
land which, though, did not produce enough income to support a family. At 
the same time, however, public agricultural development policy deliberately 
enriched a relatively small number of people who worked to develop a capital-
intensive agriculture which could incorporate important advances in agricultural 
Table 3.8 NAFINSA’s Source of Resources. Percent
Source 1952 1969
Capital and reserves 4.4 4.2
Securities Issued 29.5 23.7
External financing 23.1 36.7
Other 43.0 35.5
Total 100 100
a major shift in the structure of NAFINSA’s resources.
42  The changes in the economy made policy changes necessary, but there is no intended implication here that the changes 
that were made, and in particular the adoption of neoliberal policies, were the best policies that could have been adopted 
for the growth and development of Mexico under the new conditions.
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technology, the extension of irrigation, agricultural credit facilities, and price 
support programs. As a result, 3 percent of the farms (some 79,000 units out of 
a total of 2.5 million) produced 55 percent of all agricultural produce in 1960 
and accounted for 80 percent of the increase in the value of production in 
the 1950s. 
 2) The first stage of import substitution, nondurable goods, was carried out 
successfully by the 1960s. However, the substitution of intermediate and capital goods 
was more difficult. In 1950, capital imports were 35.3 percent while by 1968, they had 
climbed to 46.3 percent. It is therefore obvious that import substitution was not happe-
ning in these sectors, notwithstanding that NAFINSA (1971,15) pointed out that there 
had been improvements in the sufficiency coefficients43 to 93.4 percent in steel, 100 
percent in electrolytic copper, 98.5 percent in cement and sulfuric acid, 100 percent in 
paper, 80.3 percent in fertilizers, 98.3 percent in sugar, 86.7 percent in artificial fibers, 
and 86.7 percent in motor vehicles, among others. Scholars claim that the failure to 
(sufficiently) develop the domestic production of intermediate and capital goods resul-
ted primarily from two factors. The first was the continually overvalued exchan-
ge rate that promoted cheap imports for national capitalists (Reynolds 1977, 1004). 
The second was the presence of many foreign companies in the most dynamic sectors of 
the manufacturing industries, whose production processes depended on imported tech-
nology, which made the substitution of Mexican capitals goods impossible (FitzGerald 
1978, 269).
 3) The presence of many foreign companies (the majority from the United 
States) in the most dynamic sectors of the Mexican economy had other consequences 
beyond the one just noted. These companies operated with backward technologies in 
international terms, but by operating in oligopolistic markets and under the protective 
system of public subsidies, they could achieve higher profits than average in the Mexican 
economy (Garrido 2002, 242).44 In addition, the foreign companies consistently remitted 
43 The sufficiency coefficient is the percentage of a product (such as steel) used by a country that is produced domestically.
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44 This situation was the same for Mexican-owned private companies that operated in these sectors, distributing and 
commercializing the manufactured products or producing intermediate or nondurable goods, though as noted these 
sectors were dominated by foreign companies.
large profits to their countries of origin.
 4) The Mexican structure of production was dominated by groups as indicated 
before, involving strong narrowly focused relations between industry and banks. The 
relationship was expressed in two ways: companies that owned banks, and banks that 
owned companies. There was a discussion about which of these relationships was more 
important. FitzGerald argued that both groups were powerful (1978, 268). However, 
Garrido (2002, 15) and Leal (1975,  10) argued that in the Mexican banking sector, there 
was less competition and therefore banks dominated the accumulation of capital. Of the 
50 biggest companies in Mexico in 1970, the major stockholders in eleven were three 
banks: BANAMEX, Banco de Comercio, and Banco Comercial Mexicano. According 
to Garrido (2002, 248), these banks accounted for almost 40 percent of the total finan-
cial resources in the financial system (see also Del Angel 2010, 650). The presence of 
the largest private bank BANAMEX was paramount, being the major stockholder of 
seven of the companies. BANAMEX even had an important presence in the state de-
velopment bank NAFINSA; the director of BANAMEX was on NAFINSA’s board of 
directors.
 Both of the above factors plus others contributed to a persistent balance of trade 
deficit and to a dependency on foreign capital with all its associated economic pro-
blems. The trade deficit averaged 2.7 percent of the GDP from 1951 to 1970. The 
current account had a deficit of minus 442.9 million dollars in 1965 which grew to mi-
nus 1,187.9 million dollars in 1970. In essence, the particular import substitution model 
employed required foreign capital to finance it, primarily foreign debt.
 A further factor that inhibited the formation of capital in Mexico in this period 
was a regressive fiscal policy. On the one hand, there were various tax exemptions for 
capitalists and free remittances of profits for foreign capitals. On the other hand, the 
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government obtained a large and growing part of its revenues by taxing workers, and 
via foreign debt. Income tax in this period was 19.6 percent of the income revenue, 
peaking in 1963 at 28 percent (see Figure 3.6). This not being enough to finance the 
government’s spending, the Mexican economy was compelled to borrow abroad. 
External debt rose from 0.73 percent of the GDP in 1948 to 12.0 percent in 1970.  
Figure 3.6 Taxes on Imports and Income Taxes
3.8. NAFINSA in the Times of Crisis (1971 - 1982)
 This period was troublesome and full of turbulence for the world economy and 
Mexico. At the international level, it encompassed a world crisis at the beginning of the 
1970s and the Latin American debt crisis at the beginnings of the 1980s. The former 
involved a slowdown in world production and growth. Two other aspects were 1) less 
demand for exports and 2) an excess of liquidity (Hamilton 1983, 1).45  
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45  While it can be argued that the excess liquidity was the result of a long period which generated higher growth of profits 
than new opportunities to reinvest them at comparable profit rates, the jumps in world oil prices (to make up for long 
periods of losing value to inflation) in 1973-4 and 1979-80, whose gains went to countries that could not begin to 
profitably invest them domestically, was certainly a major contribution to the sudden appearance of this massive excess 
liquidity at this time.
 At the beginning of  the 1970s, two central objectives of the Mexican government 
were 1) the improvement of the income distribution, since income per capita had do-
ubled during the period of the stable development but wages were controlled and so 
income distribution worsened, and 2) the improvement of national companies in order 
to reduce the high foreign dependency in Mexico’s structure of production. Both of 
these implied increased public spending.
  Some people add to these issues political considerations such as the outbreak of 
social movements in rural areas of Mexico, the impact of the riots of 1968, and the 
discontent of the middle classes (Ares 2007, 218 and 219), that finally along with the 
world economic crisis caused the Mexican government to increase its social spending 
in order to gain legitimacy. I argue that since government spending had not increased by 
1971 well after these additional factors had set in and then increased over the following 
years as the world and Mexican economic crises deepened, it is better to consider the 
crises as the main factor of the increase of the public spending.
 Fiscal deficits in Mexico that had appeared at the end of the 1960s and at the 
beginning of the 1970s were covered by external debt. As just noted, at this time, developed 
countries and their commercial banks came to have available a very large mass of liquid 
capital that they did not want to invest in their own countries (Green 1988, 156). There 
was a massive accumulation of resources in the world financial system as Eurodollars, 
and underdeveloped countries and Mexico in particular were candidate locations for 
these surpluses. The discovery in Mexico beginning in 1972 of vast new deposits of oil 
both created the need for massive additional debt to finance the infrastructure to access 
the oil, and provided security for lenders to make the loans. Mexico’s external debt 
increased twelve-fold from 1970 to 1982. While Mexico had economic growth rates 
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higher than international interest rates, debt was not a problem.
 However, when the United States sharply increased their interest rate in 1979, 
Mexico (and other Latin American countries) could not pay the debt service (interest 
and amortization), and this gave rise to the debt crisis indicated above. 
 The dependency from borrowing could have been diminished by a fiscal reform, 
but this failed in 1973. According to some scholars, this was due to the opposition of the 
rich to a progressive tax reform, and to the lack of willingness of the president Luis 
Echeverria to strongly promote it (Hernández 2010, 586; Guillén 2000, 42).
 The debt crisis, together with the various problems that had developed in the 
import substitution model by the end of the 1960s that were discussed at the end of the 
last section, provoked a structural change in the Mexican economy. This was characterized 
by a reduced rate of economic growth (see Figure 3.1) and a change (beginning at the 
end of this period but characterizing the next period) to an export-oriented economy.
  The average rate of economic growth over the whole period was 6.0 percent, 
but this involved great variability. There was an extended downturn from 1974-1977, 
which ended with a further sharp drop in 1977. This was followed immediately by a 
strong upturn in 1978 that resulted from the oil boom. 
 Private bankers opened this period by progressively restricting credit. Even 
though beginning in 1974 banks were allowed to form multibanks, commercial financing 
plummeted from 20.3 percent of GDP in 1970 to 13.1 in 1977. Although the oil boom 
restored commercial lending to 18 percent by 1980, the private credit restriction (both 
before 1977, and after 1977 in relation to what the oil boom economy needed) led to 
two problems beyond the limited finance for productive investment itself, a drain of 
reserves and a dollarization of the Mexican savings system. From 1973 to 1982, the-
re was a drain of at least 23 billion dollars in foreign exchange reserves.46 In addition, 
the reserves that existed were coming largely from the public sector (oil and debt) and 
46  Some scholars claim that this drain in foreign exchange reserves could have reached 60 billion dollars (Cárdenas 2010, 528).
63
not the private sector that the public sector was so focused on promoting (Arriola and 
Galindo 1984, 130). The dollarization of the savings system was so serious that in 1982, 
bank obligations in dollars were 50 percent of the total obligations (Garrido 1987, 531).
 From 1970 to 1982, NAFINSA and Mexico’s other specialized development 
banks underwent the same turbulence as the country. As indicated above, private 
financing dropped from 20 percent of GDP in 1970 to 13 percent in 1977, and while it 
recovered to 18 percent after that, the total capital needs were larger because of the oil 
boom. The development banks had to cover that gap. They had to provide the finan-
cing for the increased participation by the Mexican state in the GFKF from 33 percent 
in 1970 to 43 percent in 1980. Consequently, public spending rose from 21.9 percent of 
GDP to 43.6 percent in 1982 (Guillén 2000, 44). Neoliberal opponents of government 
promoted development argue that the development banks were financing too much 
investment throughout the 1970s. The data, however, could just as well be read to argue 
that the private sector was inadequately financing industrial activities and as a result, the 
state development banks had to fill the gap.
 The national turbulence of 1970-1982 affected NAFINSA. This instability can 
be divided in two periods, from 1970 to 1973 and from 1977 to 1982. In 1971, NA-
FINSA only had one branch in Mexico, and the approvals for more branches occurred 
very slowly (Martínez, 1985). In addition, it was not allowed to take domestic deposits 
(which would have been very limited anyway with its negligible number of branches). 
In addition, it was not supposed to compete with domestic commercial banks for bo-
rrowed resources. As a consequence, during the first period, NAFINSA obtained 
almost all its resources in dollars from abroad. By the early 1970s, such international 
lending to developing countries mainly via private banks, as opposed to earlier when 
much of it came at lower interest rates, came from international agencies such as the 
World Bank or the Inter America Bank of Development. Further, in the name of the 
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3.9 Economic Background 4: The Mexican Structure
 of Production and Financing During the Period
 of Financial and Commercial Liberalization, 
1982 to the Present
 In the face of the overwhelming debt crisis, Mexico had to solve two problems, 
one external and one domestic. The latter was by far much easer to solve since it invol-
ved negotiations among the Mexican ruling classes rather than negotiations with the 
most powerful commercial banks in the world involved in the former.
 The bank nationalization under the presidency of José Luis López Portillo in 
Table 3.9 Compositions of NAFINSA´s Total Financing
Sector 1963 1974 1979 1981 1983 1984 1987
Infrastructure 60.3 65.1 55.7 45.6 20.5 21.2 1.6
Industry 35.6 30.6 28.4 32.4 54 52.4 87.6
   Basic 18.4 10.3 16.7 23.1 41.4 39.5 6.7
Manufacturing 17.2 20.3 1.7 9.3 12.6 12.9 80.1
now sacrosanct belief that “promoting competition” was good for development, NA-
FINSA now sometimes financed more than one project with a similar objective, even 
when the combined capacity of the projects surpassed the needs of the Mexican eco-
nomy. For example, it financed Altos Hornos de Mexico and Las Truchas, both of which 
were involved in the production of steel. The result was that capital inflows were both 
more expensive than they had been before and were more than they needed to be. 
NAFINSA’s activity in the second period was quite different. In response to the growing 
negative impacts on the Mexican economy of the world crisis, in the second period, it 
started to again promote industrial activities rather than infrastructure in order to increa-
se the level of employment and industrialization (see Table 3.9).
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1982, in light of what was just indicated, could be considered as an action to restore 
the Mexican Peso as the legal tender. However one looks at it, it constituted an action 
against the wishes of the most powerful elites that have always dominated the accumu-
lation of capital in Mexico (Garrido 1987, 531).
 Although the action was against the bankers, the business sector as a whole 
presented a unified rejection. As a result, under the subsequent presidency of Miguel 
de La Madrid, the following concessions were given to the financial sector: 1) the 
provision of dollars at a fixed exchange rate to heavily indebted private compa-
nies (through a program called FICORCA); 2)  the private sector could hold up to 33 
percent of the stocks of the nationalized banks by the end of 1983; 3) brokerage houses 
were given a monopoly on trading government securities; and 4) with the bonds that 
bankers received for the nationalization, they could buy the stocks of state-owned com-
panies, which later turned out to be an important compensation (Castañeda 2010, 610). 
However, even though Miguel de la Madrid made such major attempts to cooperate 
with the capitalist sector, the capitalists were never satisfied (Hernández 1986, 247).
 The nationalization of the banks against the wishes of the elite was considered 
an exceptional necessity by the state and should not be considered to indicate any significant 
shift in its attitude toward, or practices regarding, Mexico’s capitalists. The existing 
relationship between the two continued throughout this period, although some tensions 
did arise from the problems of the time (Dussel Peters 2000; Cárdenas 2010). The 1981 
rescue by the state of one of the most important business groups in Mexico, Alfa, is 
an example of the basic continuation of the relation as usual. The government granted a 
credit of 12 million pesos for the rescue without demanding any voting rights or any other 
control over the company (Arriola and Galindo 1984, 125).
 Internationally, this period was marked by spread and consolidation of neoliberalism 
around the world. Neoliberalism is an economic and political project of the capitalist 
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class whose objective is to increase the rate of profit that had decreased in the 1970s 
(Duménil and Lévy 2002). In Latin America, imposition (with the ready support of the 
majority of the Latin American elite) of neoliberal policies was prepared by the debt 
crisis of 1982. Many countries had to accept Structural Adjustment Programs. These 
programs consisted of a stabilization program (reductions in public spending or 
exchange rate alignments) and economic restructuring (trade and financial liberalization 
and the reduction of the presence of the public sector). The goal of these policies was to 
ensure the flow of debt payments to the commercial banks of the advanced countries. 
The implementation of these programs was directed by the World Bank  and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). Later, the policies imposed in Latin America came to 
be considered to constitute a model of development, which came to be known as the 
Washington Consensus.
 Thus, in 1983, an agreement concerning the payments on its debt service was 
signed with the IMF. In the same year, the Plan Inmediato de Reorganización Econó-
mica (PIRE) was implemented. This plan had the goals of bringing down inflation and 
reducing the government spending. In 1985, the import substitution model formally 
ended with the elimination of 366 import licenses (Rivera 1993, 156). Already in 1983, 
the government had started several programs to promote exports such as in the Plan Nacio-
nal de Desarrollo and the Programa Nacional de Fomento Industrial (PRONAFICE). 
Later, it launched another program for exports, Programa de Concertacion con Empre-
sas Altamente Exportadoras. It was during these years that NAFINSA’s central mandate 
was correspondingly changed to export promotion (Cypher 1987, 91).
 Three further neoliberal changes in this period with which Mexican government 
hoped to reignite economic growth were (Guillén 2000, 59): 1) allowing total foreign 
ownership in some industrial branches, 2) allowing the spread over the whole country 
of the maquiladora structure, and 3) decreasing the state’s activity in encouraging both 
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economic growth and the level of employment. There were 1,115 State Owned Enterpri-
ses in Mexico in 1982 that employed almost 1 million workers, 10 percent of the total 
formal nonagricultural employment (Ibid., 63). By 1988, the Mexican government had 
sold 743 of those enterprises. Although these companies were not the most significant 
ones in their contribution to GDP and national employment, it nevertheless marked the 
savage policy of privatization that would be followed in the future, in which NAFINSA 
participated strongly (discussed further below).
 During the period of 1982-1988, the Mexican economy plummeted sharply 
twice, in 1983 and 1986, and the average annual rate of economic growth was around 
0 percent. The lower rates of economic growth in this period (see Figure 3.1) were a 
result of the main objective of the neoliberal period being the payment of the massive 
and asphyxiating debt burden as opposed to growth.47 The debt service, amortization, and 
interest payments in many years were larger than the new credit Mexico received. Figure 
3.7 shows Mexico’s Net Transfer on External Debt, which aggregated to a net outflow of 
capital of 59.8 billions of dollars over this period. 
47  Neoliberal propaganda asserted that repaying the debt would lead to increased growth (through lower interest rates, etc.), but 
there was never any empirical evidence that countries that adhered to the Structural Adjustment Programs subsequently 
experienced above-average growth. There was empirical evidence that they suffered below average growth rates while they 
adhered to the programs of adjustment.
Figure 3.7 Total Net Transfers on External Debt
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 During the period from 1989 to the present, the rate of economic growth was 2.8 
percent, clearly slower than in the period of import substitution. There was an upturn 
from 1989 to 1992 mainly boosted by the impetus of the commercial and financial 
liberalization, that subsequently ended with the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995 where it 
was cut off from foreign capital and suffered a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate. 
In this period, there was also a large downturn from 2001 to 2003 caused by the US crisis 
and the slowdown of exports. The main characteristics of Mexico during this period 
relevant to this study were the following:
 1) The role of the state in directing the economy was dramatically reduced in 
favor of directing the economy by the private sector. This withdrawal of the state was 
in sharp contrast to all the previous periods considered, which were characterized by a 
high degree of participation of the state in directing the Mexican economy.
 2) Trade liberalization proceeded rapidly. Very soon after the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into force on January 1, 1994, Mexico became 
one of the countries in the world with the highest percent of its GDP traded: more than 
30 percent of the GDP is exports, mainly in autoparts. Mexico’s greater import needs, 
however, have resulted in a negative trade balance from the 1990s onwards. Mexico 
only had a positive trade balance in 1996 and 1997 and that was due to the crisis of 
1994-1995. In this process, export-capitalists benefited the most, while medium and 
small capitalists that had grown under the import substitution model were severely harmed 
(Hernández, 1986).48
 3) The conditions of life of the large majority of people in Mexico have worse-
ned. In 2007, the real minimum wage could buy one and a half fewer products than it 
could buy in the 1970s. The Mexican standard of living has suffered the most severe 
deterioration in Latin America under neoliberalism.
48  This was the reason why some capitalist’s advocaters during the import-subtitution model such as CANACINTRA opposed 
the neoliberal era of capitalism.
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 4) From 1990 to 2009, the GFKF averaged 20 percent of GDP. This is markedly 
low in comparison with more successful Third World countries in this period such as 
South Korea, which had 32.3 percent. What the private sector decided to do in relation 
to forming fixed capital in this period largely determined its rate of formation, since the 
private sector fixed capital formation constituted on average nearly 80 percent. When it 
slowed its formation so that its percent of the total formation dropped to 75.2 percent in 
1995, total fixed capital formation fell to 15 percent (see Figure 3.8).
 5) Total banking credit provided by the private sector as a percent of 
GDP remained relatively stagnant over the duration of this period. After the 14 month 
blitzkrieg campaign of bank privatizations in 1991, private credit did start to expand, 
but that ended with the banking crisis in 1994 and 1995 (in which the government had 
to rescue the majority of private banks) and total credit returned to where it had been 
before (see Figure 3.9).
 6) The financial liberalization, which had as an objective an increase in the rate 
of saving and thereby an increase in the domestic resources available for development, 
instead caused two important aspects of financialization for development to regress. 
First, the banking system became both more concentrated and more foreign dominated. 
Foreign banks controlled almost 80 percent of the total assets after the wave of priva-
tizations from 1991 to 1992 (see Garrido and Martinez 2004, 123; Guerrero, Lopez 
– Calva and Walton 2009, 119 and 120). By 2003, just three foreign banks controlled 
more than 60 percent of the total assets. This concentration is even worse than in the 
past. In 1950, there were 240 banks in Mexico, with the top four of them controlling 
only 40 percent of the total assets (Garrido 2002). Second, the financial liberalization 
and privatization did not bring any increase in credit to promote production.
 7) Mexican private banks continued to practice extensive inside lending very 
much as they have done for over one 100 years:
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Figure 3.8 Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Mexico. Percent of GDP
Due to the closed nature of the MBGs [Mexican Business Groups], it is an 
impossible task to be precise with the details of related credit in the Mexican 
financial system. Nevertheless, by analyzing the financial information of firms 
quoted on the stock exchange, one can get a first approximation of the pheno-
menon. With this objective in mind, related credit is defined as the financing 
received by a firm with a board member who sits on the board of directors of 
the same bank granting the credit. In the Mexican case, these members, more 
than being employees of the financial institution, are important stockholders 
of the MBG that consolidates the lending bank and the borrowing firm... The 
percentage of board members in a bank with ties to public firms -that oscilla-
tes between 13.64% for the Banco Industrial and 100% for Interacciones-. The 
percentage of board members with related credit -that goes up to 33.3% for In-
bursa-. The percentage of related firms that receive credit -that goes from 0% in 
Quadrum up to 37.9% in Bancomer-. The percentage of related credit with respect 
to the total credit received by the firms in the sample is larger than 30%, and has 
even reached 88.12% for Inbursa and 100% for Interacciones, with the excep-
tion of four cases (Quadrum, Banamex, Bital and Ixe). (Casteñeda 2000, 13)
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Figure 3.9 Total Banking Credit as a Percent of GDP. Private Sector
3.10. NAFINSA in the Period of Transition to Financial and 
Commercial Liberalization, 1982 to 1988
 Over the whole period, NAFINSA’s financing averaged 13.9 percent of the 
GDP, (see Table 3.10), somewhat above but not qualitatively different from what it had 
been over the preceding two decades (see Figure 3.4). Credit constituted 82.9 percent 
of NAFINSA’s Total Financing, mostly to such activities as chemistry and basic metals 
(NAFINSA 1986, 1991). The major swings of total financing over GDP in this period 
(see Figure 3.4) suggest, however, that NAFINSA was not carrying out any well-coordi-
nated long-term industrial policy. What occurred was that NAFINSA was being used 
as an important source of finance in the neoliberal process of privatizations. One major 
activity of NAFINSA in this period was just to channel credit to companies which had been 
selected for privatization strictly for the purpose of preparing them for sale. NAFIN-
SA started this period with 88 enterprises and was down to only with 48 in 1988. It is 
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important to note that the 40 companies that were sold from 1981 (since there is not 
data for 1982) to 1988 had contributed more than 40 percent of the employment in the 
companies in which NAFINSA had partial ownership in 1981 (see Table 3.11). During 
this period, the creation of companies and encouraging the level of employment were 
not government objectives.
Table 3.10 Total Financing in Mexico from 1982 to 1988. Percent of GDP





























 Despite the fact that Mexico had a heavy debt burden in this period, the way in 
which NAFINSA obtained capital was from foreign loans. Table 3.12 shows the 
continued high dependence of NAFINSA on foreign borrowing to meet its somewhat 
higher than before financing requirements that one saw in Figure 3.4. A final change for 
NAFINSA in this period was that the Mexican government encouraged the development 
of other financial agents under the ideology of promoting competition to improve 
efficiency, thus ending NAFINSA’s status as the unique legal agent of the government.
3.11 NAFIN49 in the Period of Financial and Commercial 
Liberalization, 1989 to the Present
 The transition that started in 1982 was completed in the period from 1988 to the 
present. The change was from a capitalism in the period 1941 – 1981 in which the state 
played a major role in directing the economy to a capitalism directed much more directly 
49  NAFINSA changed its name in 1985 to NAFIN.
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Table 3.11 NAFINSA Industrial Participation from 1964 to 1994.


































(a) Industrial companies only, (b) Included services, (c) data at the end of June, 31th.
Adapted from Source: Ares 2007
Table 3.12 NAFINSA´s Resources %















Adapted from Source: Ares 2007.
by the market and the private sector.  The change was from a capitalism where the 
accumulation of capital and development were considered the joint responsibility of the 
state and the capitalist sector (following the Gerschenskron hypothesis) to a capitalism 
where the market is consider the most efficient allocator of resources, and the state has 
only to correct small market failures.
 The transformation of NAFIN flowed from this ideological position that was 
fully adopted by the Mexican government by the late 1980s. Private industrial firms, 
and even projects in the public sector, should receive financial resources via the private 
sector. This was sometimes argued as being nonideological by claiming that the develo-
pment banks had become too expensive by the 1970s and that the same finance for pri-
vate and public projects could be provided at lower cost by the private financial sector. 
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50  Interestingly, development banks in their new role were more restricted in several ways than commercial banks. For 
example, they had a 10 percent reserves requirement while commercial banks only had 8 percent.
51 The law said that in some exceptional cases, it could be 50 percent, though it was not specific what the criteria were 
to hold that larger amount.
There was never any solid empirical evidence to support this, and so this claim must be 
understood just as an attempt to hide the ideological aspect of the change. Development 
banks were now to be dedicated to a much more narrowly focused aspect of financing 
(through the private sector), and in particular, they were no longer mandated to promote 
industrialization.50 
 NAFIN’s activities in this period were framed in this context. An important task 
for NAFIN that remained in 1989 was to finish implementing its Organic Law of 1986. 
First, NAFIN was to no longer permanently own stock in any company. It was to 
immediately (as soon as possible) reduce its ownership in all companies to not more 
than 20 percent,51 and to not hold stocks in any company for more than 7 years. Second, 
it had to continue to shift its resources to export oriented companies. And third, it was 
to shift its support and resources to encouraging SMEs. The neoliberal rationality of 
this idea was that development banks should direct their credit to sectors that were 
excluded of capital markets such as SMEs (Werner 1994, 1055), as opposed to being a 
tool for the government to finance the public sector as much of NAFIN’s activity had 
been in the past.
 For all these reasons, NAFIN had to sell many of its stocks. In 1988, NAFIN 
owned 38.3 percent of the social capital of 48 companies. These companies had a total 
employment of 100,162 workers, for an average enterprise employment of 2,087. By 
1993, NAFIN owned only 13 percent of the social capital in only 24 companies. These 
employed only 3,064 workers for an average employment of 128, hence much smaller 
enterprises as required (see Table 3.11).
 In addition to its diminished role in financing through stock ownership, 
NAFIN’s role in providing credit changed radically, both in regards to the amount and 
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in regard to how it was distributed. By 1989, NAFIN was converted to a second-tier 
financial institution. It meant that the credit granted by this institution was actually 
disbursed via private banks and other financial institutions. In line with the neolibe-
ral ideology, NAFIN’s role of supporting and promoting the private sector was now 
transformed into providing government support for the private financial sector to support 
the private sector, which often (depending on the desires of the private sector) meant to 
the detriment of Mexican productive activity.
 While NAFIN’s total financing rose briefly in the late 1990s from its 1989 level, 
it then began a precipitous fall at the very end of the decade that bottomed out in 2007 
at 0.9 percent of the GDP (see Table 3.13). The subsequent recovery since then was 
very small and partial. The reduction in finance for development was in fact even more 
severe than this indicates, because NAFIN was directed to switch its financing from the 
sort of long-term financing that is needed for most development to short-term financing 
(most is now not over 45 days) needed for the standard operating needs of existing 
(private) enterprises (Valenzuela 2007, 33).
Table 3.13 Total NAFIN Financing
Year 1990 1992 1997 2000 2003 2006 2007 2008
Total Nafin Financing 6.12 5.75 9.2 3 3.2 1.4 0.9 1.1
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CHAPTER 4
BNDES’ ROLE IN PROMOTING INDUSTRIALIZATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL (1952-2010)
 In the previous chapters, this dissertation discussed the functions of a development 
bank, the birth of development banks in Europe and Latin America, and the role of one 
particular development bank, NAFINSA, in the industrialization and development of 
Mexico from 1934 to the present. It was particularly important to divide NAFINSA’s 
performance into two phases, the import-substitution industrialization (ISI) model and 
the neoliberal period. In the former period, NAFINSA acted sometimes as a banker and 
sometimes as an entrepreneur having a large influence in the high rates of economic 
growth achieved by the Mexican economy. In the latter period, the Mexican economy 
stagnated, and NAFINSA served primarily to facilitate the privatization process and to 
“correct” what were considered market failures under the then dominant neoliberal 
ideology.
 This chapter describes the performance of a Brazilian development bank, Banco 
Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), from its founding in 1952 
to the present. It has a major difference in appearance from the last chapter in that it 
carries out this task both through a comparison for similarities and differences to the 
Mexican case,52 whose nature was presented in the last chapter, and through additional 
52  The goal of this dissertation is not a complete comparison of the economic development of the two countries, but 
rather only to consider those similarities and differences that help to understand how development banking operated in 
both countries. Hence, many other economic similarities and differences will not be considered here.
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direct commentary on BNDES itself.
 As was the case for Mexico, the investigation of Brazil’s development bank 
requires the following four aspects to be taken into account:
 1) The evolution of the Brazilian economy.
 2) The government’s policies to promote industrialization and economic growth.
 3) The nature, structure, and procedures of the financing.
 4) The role of BNDES, which has been the most important bank in Brazil 
concerned with industrial and economic development.
 Section 4.1 addresses the first two of these, presenting as much economic 
background on Brazil as is needed for the case study of its development bank that 
follows. Section 4.2 considers the founding of BNDES. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 look at the 
role of BNDES in Brazil’s industrialization and economic development during its two 
ISI periods, 1952 – 1964 and 1965 – 1982, respectively. A division is made between these 
two periods because from 1964 to 1966, Brazil accepted a stabilization program and 
attempted to develop financial markets following the US model of banking segmentation. 
However, by 1967, it returned to using state intervention to promote the private sector. 
Section 4.5 presents the role of BNDES under neoliberalism, 1983 to 2011.
4.1. Economic Background to the Development of BNDES
 A first aspect of their economic histories shared by Brazil in Mexico is their sub-
jugation to a colonial dominance for roughly three centuries (XVI – XVIII). In the last 
chapter, I briefly sketched Mexico’s economic development at the end of that period. 
Similar details on Brazil likewise made some contributions to its specific subsequent 
development, but here I will only note the importance of the colonial domination to both 
of them to making them “underdeveloped” in the early 20th century and hence create the 
conditions that development banks were adopted to overcome.
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 The following are ten background points on Brazil’s economy in the 20th century 
are aspects that are largely similar to Mexico.
 1) The qualitatively similar (in regards to other Latin American countries) scale 
as the two “large” countries in the size of their economy and population.53  
 2) Their rates of growth after WWII and their twofold nature with ISI and the 
neoliberal periods were similar. First, from the second half of the 1930s until the end of 
the 1980s, Brazil and Mexico had annual rates of growth around to 6 percent. More 
specifically in Brazil, from 1943 to 1981, it had an annual rate of growth of 6.8 percent. 
There were two particularly strong expansions during this time, 1958 to 1962 (the years 
of the Plano de Metas) and 1968 to 1973 (the years of the Brazilian Miracle). Both expan-
sions were characterized by important planning and state intervention. 
 In both countries, there was a process of convergence with the US. In 1940, 
the Brazilian GDP was 5.5 percent of that of the US, while it was up to 14.1 percent in 
1980.54 There was more volatility in the rate of growth of Brazil than Mexico, but this 
did not affect the magnitude of the rates of growth (see Araújo, Carpena, and Cunha 
2007).55 During this period, two major transformations occurred in both countries; 
they became industrialized and urbanized. Primary activities in Brazil constituted 29.4 
percent of the GDP in 1940, and dropped to 9.8 percent in 1980. Conversely, indus-
trial activities constituted 18.7 percent in 1940, and rose to 34.3 percent in 1980 (see 
Table 4.1). At the same time, the share of the population that was urban doubled, from 
31.3 percent in 1940 to 66.6 percent in 1980. The labor force in manufacturing activities 
grew somewhat slower, from 10.0 percent of the labor force occupied in manufacturing 
activities in 1940 to 16.8 percent in 1980. This caused a large increase over this period 
53  Brazil and Mexico together contribute 63 percent of the total GDP of all Latin American countries and comprise 53 
percent of the total population (see CEPAL 2011).
54 These data are from Maddison, (2011).
55 Araújo et al. (2007, 574 and 575) note that some scholars claim that there is an inverse relationship between ins-
tability and growth. These people argue that instability and associated uncertainty were responsible for the Brazilian 
stagnation in the 1980s and 1990s. These authors present evidence to support their claim that volatility does not have 
any effect on growth.
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of the percent of the population working in informal activities.
 Second, after 1980, both countries instituted neoliberal policies, i.e., inflation 
control, privatizations, fiscal equilibriums, and financial and commercial liberalization. 
Both countries had a stagnant rate of economic growth over much of this period. 
According to Baddini (1998), Brazil had to choose this adjustment over growth, and 
consequently, Brazil’s average annual rate of growth dropped to 2 percent and in addition 
suffered increased and high volatility. The process of convergence with the US stopped 
after 1980s, and it even marginally dropped to 13.3 percent of the US economy today.
 As it can be seen in the Figure 4.1, the annual rate of growth for Brazil and 
Mexico were similar. Although in the early 20th century, Mexico had undergone an ar-
med conflict (which destroyed its financial system and a great part of its economy) and 
later on suffered more from the Great Crisis of 1929 – 1933 than Brazil, after WWII, the 
patterns of growth of the two countries were similar. Note in particular that the world 
important oil shock did cause greatly different results in the two countries as one might 
expect, since Mexico was an oil exporter and Brazil was a net importer.
Table 4.1 Sectoral distribution of Brazilian GDP. 1900 – 2000.  Constant 1949 Prices














































Figure 4.1 Brazil and Mexico. Annual Rate of Economic Growth
 3) The industrialization process from 1940 to 1980 with relatively high rates 
of economic growth was led by the ISI model. However, as happened in Mexico, this 
model was not as successful as desired and projected for four principle and fundamental 
causes.
 First, building the stock of capital goods (and the capacity to make capital goods) 
so that they would not need to be imported for continued industrialization was a slow 
process. Early in the process in the period 1945-1949, the average of capital goods im-
ports over total imports was 39.6 percent, and that had only dropped to 33.4 percent 25 
years later during the period 1970 – 1974.
 Second, the Brazilian process of industrialization was dominated by foreign en-
terprises and countries, above all by the US. Almost 40 percent of Brazil’s total exports 
went there from 1945 to 1970.  Similarly, during the 1960s, the large inflow of foreign 
enterprises that located in Brazil to produce what had been imported before led to 40 
percent of the manufacturing sector being dominated by foreign companies (Caio Prado, 
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Jr. 1968). In addition, the most dynamic branches of the economy were dominated by 
foreign enterprises. These companies benefited from the (trade) protected fast growing 
domestic markets to make huge profits, of which they then remitted large amounts to 
their home countries (Baer 1978; Baer 1995; Chudnovsky and López 1998). Connected 
to these foreign enterprises were Brazilian industrialist whose operations depended on 
the foreign corporations, and who captured a large share of that part of the profits and 
benefits from the operation of the foreign enterprises that went to Brazilians (Quartim  
1971, 34).
 Third, the rate at which Brazil could carry out the import substitution of industrial 
goods depended on the First World countries in another way. The international division 
of labor originating in the nineteenth century had assigned to Brazil, and to most Third 
World countries, the role of supliers of primary products. Thus, its rate of economic 
activity and hence the rate at which it could carry out ISI was largely dependent on 
the level of economic activity of the industrialized centers of the world as the source, 
through the sale of Brazil’s primary goods, of the funds for the ISI.
 Finally, it had been hoped that ISI would result in greater economic independence 
for the country. In fact, industrialization only changed the nature of the dependency 
relationship. While the commodity composition of imports changed, producing many 
of the industrial goods that they began to produce required large imports of inputs. The 
import coefficient did not decline very much, and the result was that the country remai-
ned at least dependent on foreign trade and imports as before for its rate of economy 
activity. 
 4) Most scholars agree that a many decades surge of industrialization was caused 
by the Great Crisis and WWII. Like Mexico, however, one important reason that the po-
tential industrialization over this period failed to be realized was a lack of credit. At the 
beginning of this period, this was largely a result of the dominant practice since the 
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beginning of the century of granting credit short-term, or only to specific sectors closely 
linked to agriculture (since the lent capital came largely from agriculture) such as tex-
tiles. However, after WWII, the problem became, again like most periods in Mexico, a 
lack of credit provision by the private sector. The public sector such as Banco do Brasil 
and BNDES lent for industrialization, but their scale of resources were far short of what 
could have been successfully and profitably used.
 Later, from 1950s until the present, credit was granted by public institutions 
such as the Banco do Brasil and BNDES:
The financial system of the 1930s was essentially a carry-over from the late ni-
neteenth century. Given the fact that Brazil was mainly a primary exporter, this 
system concentrated on financing export production . . . Most of the undertaking 
which required long-term financing were by entrepreneurs with a direct link to 
the developed financial markets abroad . . .During the period 1947-1966, Brazil 
lacked developed mechanisms to finance and fund accumulation. Long-term 
finance was limited to two government banks, whereas private lending institu-
tions confined their operations to short-term loans for working capital. Financial 
markets were poorly developed and dealt in few securities . . .  Medium-term 
finance was mainly provided the Banco do Brasil, other official banks and, after 
1959, finance companies. The main sources of long-term financing were: (1) 
Banco do Brasil (especially agriculture); (2) the National Bank of Economic 
Development, after 1952; and (3) the federal saving bank (Caixa Econômica 
Federal) . . .Given the failure in 1954 – 1973 to develop a long-term oriented 
capital market, the impatience of the more interventionist  sector within the 
government was growing. The solution  found was similar to the one that exis-
ted  before the reforms: to transfer public funds to finance investment. However, 
because of the ‘liberal’ orientation of the military government, these funds were 
directed to the private sector. (Rogério Studart 1995, 100 and 102) 
Public banks were by far the largest suppliers of loans in the system, with 
around two-thirds of the total in the early 1990s. (Stalling and Studart 2006, 226)
 5) Like Mexico, the state was capitalist. As there, the government had a very 
important role in the development of industry from 1950 to 1980. Since that period, 
Brazil adopted a model of import substitution industrialization in which the state played 
a central role. Many instruments of industrial policy were employed and the state 
possessed a high degree of discretionary power to influence many variables and prices 
in the economy (Guimarães 2010, 49). Rogério Studart argues in the same vein (1995).
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 Within this frame of a capitalist state promoting industrialization, there were 
some secondary differences. The last chapter explained that in Mexico, the Revolution 
brought the petite bourgeoisie to power. It was this class that nationalized the production of 
maize in the 1920s, the production of oil in 1938,56 and also developed several institu-
tions to deal with money and promote development. In Brazil, the army, middle classes, 
and some sectors of the old oligarchy politically triumphed in the revolution of 1930. 
However, the overwhelming majority of scholars agree that in an economic sense, the 
old oligarchy remained almost unchallenged until the 1950s and 1960s, as demonstrated by 
the Brazilian state policy of buying coffee surpluses in order to prevent price declines, 
to the benefit of the old oligopolistic coffee exporters. To be sure, there was promotion 
of textiles even under the Old Republic before 1930, and as we will see ISI from 1940 
forward. However, the difference was that this process was not so fully commanded 
and controlled by a new industrial bourgeoisie coming out of the petite bourgeoisie as 
in Mexico, but as just indicated, still economically dominated by the old oligarchy into 
the 1960s (Weffort 1968; Prado Caio, Jr. 1960; Quartim 1971; Marini 1965; Castro 
2009; Santos 1968). This continued central economic role by the whole old oligarchy 
was even (of course) reflected in the political sphere, notwithstanding that overall, the 
Revolution could be characterized as a triumph of the army, middle classes, and some 
sectors of the old oligarchy as noted above. From the 1930s to the 1960s, there was an 
agreement between the middle classes and the old oligarchy to keep the pace of changes 
slow, and in the end, the old oligarchy controlled the parliament almost entirely until 
1964 (Furtado 1968). As an example, notwithstanding that in the first Republic with free 
elections since 1945, recognition of women’s right to vote, and party representation in 
parliament (Ribeiro and Guimarães 1967), the percentage of the population that voted in 
elections was kept down to only 15 percent (Moreira 2000). 
56  This is a partial simplification for oil, since it was the oil workers who started the conflict with a strike in 1937 that 
ended with the nationalization of oil in 1938. 
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 6) Like Mexico even if not as total, Brazil experienced extensive political stability 
after the1930s. This was so not only despite the 1930 Revolution, but despite Getúlio 
Vargas’ suicide in 1954 and the military coup in 1964. There was a continuity between 
the governments of Eurico Dutra (1945 - 1950), Juscelino Kubitschek (1956 - 1961), 
and João Goulart (1961 - 1964), whose political parties were those that Getúlio Vargas 
shaped  in 1945, the PSD (Partido Social Democrático) and the PTB (Partido Trabal-
hista Brasileiro) (Castro 2009).  Castro (2009) argues further that following the coup 
in 1964, there was a process of slow and gradual liberalization of the military regime 
during the 1960s.
 7) The partial and at-times cooptation and the partial and at-times suppression or 
disorganizing the working class.57 Six processes came together to effect this.
 First was the historical culture inherited when this period began. There was 
weak political participation by the Brazilian people during the old Republic (Santos 
1984).  Working class organizations were led by Anarchists who did not trust building 
institutions. There was a step forward during 1917 – 1921 when there were a series of 
strikes in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. This gave rise to the formation of the Commu-
nist Party (Partido Comunista) (PC) in 1922.
 Second, many in the middle classes were conscious of the need to coopt the 
working classes at this time. This cooptation was fueled by the way of thinking of the 
middle classes that made the 1930 Revolution, as reflected in the fact that one of the 
favorite slogans during the First Republic was “we should make the revolution, before 
the working class makes it” (Weffort 1968, 62).
 Third, flowing from this consciousness of the need to coopt the working class, 
from the first period of governance of Getúlio Vargas to the coup in 1964, he and the 
57  Government efforts at cooption ended in this period with the 1964 coup, excepting the few concessions under the 
dictatorship. A process of reorganization of the class began in the 1970s that was to continue to the end of this period, to 
the end of the dictatorship, and beyond. The prosecution of the (politically most active) elements of the working class 
continued through the end of this period.
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governments mentioned above as following his general approach successfully coopted 
significant parts of the working class through their policies.58 
 Fourth, the process of industrialization drew in a large “new working class” that 
came from the countryside, without any working class history or culture and hence one 
that was easily coopted by the government (Furtado1968; Moreira 2000). These workers 
were partially balanced by the continuation of what had been a small Brazilian working 
class before the industrialization drive, that now had accumulated some years of class 
conflict and experience and hence a working class history, consciousness, and cultu-
re, and more importantly, by an increase of immigrant workers from Europe with their 
accumulated experience. However, the size of the inflow from the country contributed 
stability on net form all these three processes.
 Fifth, there was the PC, whose existence in itself was destabilizing for the 
system but whose political limitations provided stability compared to its potential to 
destabilize. All left wing forces were grouped in the PC from 1922 to the end of the 
1950s when the PC divided. The contribution to stability came from the fact that PC 
in Brazil had a Reformism program through its entire history (political democracy and 
the control of the economy by the state) (Silva 2009). However, even that was not taken as 
sufficiently nonthreatening by the ruling classes and the PC was intensively persecuted at 
the end of the1930s,59 during 1946-1950, at the end of the 1950s, and after the coup in 
1964. Although the working class was coopted, it does not mean that there was not class 
struggle and episodes of extreme violence with people that opposed the regime. Mainly 
this violence involved attacking the PC.
 Finally, the persecution following the 1964 coup succeeded in disorganizing the 
58  Keep in mind that this was the same period as the even more successful cooption of a large part of the working 
class by Peron in neighboring Argentina, which of course had political effects on both the workers and ruling classes 
in Brazil.
59 In 1935, the PC founded the CUB (Confederacão Unitaria de Brasil). It grouped 500,000 workers and was a serious 
challenge to the Getúlio Vargas’ government.  Because of that, with the Estado Novo in 1937, the PC was prohibited and 
its main leaders persecuted (Santos 1984).
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left until the end of the 1970s when the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) emerged.60
 8) Like Mexico but markedly more so, the dominance of the middle classes, 
foreign companies, and the old oligarchy generated an extreme social and economic 
inequality that was not reduced even by the high and sustained economic growth that 
was obtained from 1940 to 1980 (Aguilar 1995; Gonzaga and Machado 2003).61 Based 
on data from ECLAC for 1963 and 1964, the ratio from the 9th and 10th deciles to the 2 
lowest deciles was 9.4 for Brazil and 16.5 for Mexico62 (see Table 4.2) (Furtado 1970). 
Brazil’s distribution by the same measure worsened markedly by 1996 to 33.9, though it 
then improved back down to 21.1 by 2008 (see Table 4.3). The Gini coefficient tells the 
same story of a worsening distribution over the ISI period and the beginning of the neolibe-
ral one, increasing from 0.5 in 1960 to 0.56 in 1970 to 0.59 in 1980 and to 0.63 in 1991.
60  This party was based on manufacturing (metallurgical) workers but also included old left wing people from the 
former PC, and left Catholic people that had been organized in different rural Catholic churches. The left wing churches 
had arisen in the 1950s (Meyer 1999). These churches sympathized with the agrarian reform and made a great contribution 
in the unionization of peasants. That process ignited first social consciousness and right after that social struggle in the 
rural sector. According to Meyer, one Catholic organization, La Accion Popular, was the most radical organization at 
the time of the coup.
61 According  to Aguilar (1995), Brazil and México had a large wave of economic growth which was accompanied by 
high inequality. In contrast, Argentina experienced lower rates of both economic growth and inequality.  
62 These numbers in Table 4.2 cannot be used precisely for comparisons between the countries because the data are not 
comparable: Brazil’s refer to individual earners and Mexico’s to households. Table 4.3 does not have this issue.
Table 4.2 Income Distribution in Brazil and Mexico in 1963-1964
Lowest
Decile























Mexico: Households. Brazil: Individual earners.
Adapted from Source: Furtado 1970.
 9) One explanation for the just documented worsening distribution in Brazil 
is the deterioration of the real purchasing power of salaries and wages from 1960s 
onwards (Idem., 480). This again is like Mexico, where both the minimum wage and 
the yearly manufacturing wage from the 1970s onwards have reduced their purchasing 
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63 Gonzaga and Manchado (2003, 470) point out two issues that a researcher must be careful with when dealing with 
minimum wages: 1) the existence of different minimum wages in different areas in Brazil, and 2) the price index to 
use to generate real minimum wages. In this case, the minimum wage that is provided by the Instituto de Pesquisa 
Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) has been used.
64 He presents the official urban minimum wage in the north-eastern part of Brazil 1934-1998, the official urban 
minimum wage in the south-eastern part of Brazil 1934 -1998, and the average manufacturing sector wage 1920 – 
2000. 
power by 75 percent (Valle and Marténez 2011, 106 - 108). From Figure 4.2, one can 
see that the level of the real minimum wage peaked at the end of the 1950s and at the 
beginning of the 1960s, dropped over the 1960s and then stabilized over the 1970s, 
and then suffered a second major drop with the onset of neoliberalism until bottoming 
out in 1995 at about one quarter its previous maximum value. From the mid-1990s 
onwards, there has been some recovery of real minimum wages back to about the level 
of the 1970s, but still well below their former peak.63  While unfortunately data on real 
manufacturing remuneration cannot be obtained, in analyzing Brazil’s wages from 
1900 to 2000,64 Frankema (2010, 356) concluded:
Wages in the manufacturing sector showed a rapid increase since 1920. Star-
ting out at levels comparable to the urban minimum wage, the average manu-
facturing laborer soon became much better off. Especially, during the 1950s 
manufacturing workers were earning much higher wages than their peers in the 
rural area and low-productive urban sector. Throughout the postwar era the gap 
remained large, but all wage workers faced declining shares from the 1960s 
onwards.
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Figure 4.2 Evolution of Real Minimum Wages in Brazil (including benefits). Thick Line 
12-month Moving Average. (Constant December 2001 Reales)
 10) Like Mexico, Brazil has needed an inflow of foreign capital over most of 
the period considered (and most of its history), and suffered from the problem of 
rescheduling foreign debt and defaulting.65  Just prior to the period of consideration of 
this dissertation, exports contracted and the debt – export ratio reached 4.0 in 1930, with 
the debt service absorbing 30 percent of export earnings. As a result, Brazil defaulted in 
the 1930s, which caused it to have no new access to loans until the 1960s (Abreu 1999).
 Brazil and Mexico were two of the largest victims of the aggressive (arguably 
predatory, unethical and in some cases illegal) policy of lending implemented carried 
out by the World Bank and especially commercial banks in the 1970s that led to hyper 
indebtedness and eventually rescheduling and defaults. From 1970 to 1982, Brazil and 
65 However, Brazil and Mexico have not always been capital importers. Mexico was a net exporter of capital during 
the colonial period (Marichal 2005, 1), and Brazil and Mexico were capital exporters during WWI (Estay 1996, 57). 
In the period covered by this dissertation, they both became capital exporters during the 1980s against their wills, as 
lenders refused to extend new loans to them and they continued repayments on old ones. Like a number of Third 
World countries, Brazil and Mexico moved to have a current account surplus to protect against speculative attacks on 
their currencies after the many financial crises of that type in the Third World at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s.
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Figure 4.3 Debt Service over Total Exports. Brazil and Mexico
 1) The history of banking in Brazil prior to the birth of the state development 
bank was significantly different from that in Mexico that was considered in the last 
chapter. We saw there that Mexico started its banking with banks focused on promoting 
development and industrialization (hence “development banks” though not like the 
Mexico’s external debts increased by factors of 16 and 12, respectively. With the rise of 
US (and from that world) interest rates in 1979, both countries could not pay the debt 
service in 1982. From 1982 on, Brazil like Mexico but even more so has had a huge debt 
service burden, as can be seen in Figure 4.3. Average debt service as a percent of total ex-
ports has averaged 50 percent in Brazil and 32 percent in Mexico over the last 3 decades.
 In addition to all these similarities, there was a particularly important difference 
between Brazil and Mexico in relation to the issue of the birth of a development bank. 
This difference came out of the interaction between the nature of the banking system 
prior to the beginning of the state development bank, and the class structure of the state 
power at the time of its birth.
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66 According to Holanda (1965) and Cardoso (2010), the purpose of finance development in Brazil with the Banco do 
Brasil was secondary and was never important. On the another hand for Jennifer Hermann (2010a, 6), the bank carried 
out the function of a development bank but she did not provide any further information. 
state development banks of the 20th century), the Banco del Avío Minero (1784) and the 
Banco del Avío (1830). On the other hand, Brazil started with a public bank in 1808, the 
Bank of Brazil (Banco do Brasil). Facing the threaten of revolutionary France, the seat 
of Portugal´s  kingdom was transferred from Portugal to Brazil. Once in Brazil, the prince, 
D. Joao VI, carried out three important economic measures: 1) promoting free trade 
with countries which were peaceful, especially with England, 2) removing the prohibi-
tion of establishing industrial manufacturing in Brazil (Ribeiro and Guimarães 1967), 
and 3) founding Banco do Brasil in 1808.  This bank was created through selling public 
offerings to the most important Portuguese capitalists (Holanda 1965). It was a mixed 
bank that could carry out activities such as taking deposits, discounting bills of exchange, 
or issuing money. However, the important aspect of it in regards to the concerns of this 
thesis is that its main function was to exchange gold for paper money with the objective 
of financing the Kingdom’s expenses; the promotion of trade and industrialization was 
only a secondary objective (Holanda 1965; Ribeiro and Guimarães 1967; Cardoso, 
2010; Vieira and Bertelle 2009 ).66 
 This first Banco do Brasil closed in 1829. A second Banco do Brasil, or Banco 
de Maua, opened in 1851. In 1853, this bank merged with Banco Comercial do Rio de 
Janeiro to create the third Banco do Brasil. By 1855, a regional banking system existed 
involving other regions of Brazil such as Bahía, Pernambuco, Maranhão, Pará, São Paulo, 
and Ouro Preto. This banking system contributed to an increase in the quantity of mo-
ney in circulation, which in particular facilitated the buying of slaves in the face of their 
increased price that resulted from the prohibition of slavery from Africa in 1850. The 
essential point relevant to this dissertation is that in spite of the existence of this (not 
overly extensive) banking system, there was almost no promotion of industrial activities 
(Haber 1991, 569).
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 Following the banking reform in 1905 up to 1930, there was an increased 
amount of banking and bank activity in Brazil. These banks were led by the Banco 
do Brasil. By international standards, it was an extremely modest banking system, but 
it was still larger than Mexico’s (Ibid., 570). However, the important difference from 
Mexico continued to be what these banks did. These banks could, and some of them did, 
direct credits to the textile industry, but central to their lack of development activity was 
that neither the domestic banks, the foreign banks, nor the public banks provided long-
term credit:
Foreign banks were especially active in conducting foreign currency exchange 
transactions and they often maintained higher levels of cash reserves than did 
the reserves of the Brazilian institutions. However, their credit and deposit 
activities were very similar in nature to domestic banks. All banks focused their 
business on short-term transactions to support commerce, which was largely 
concentrated in financing export agricultural commerce.
The Banco do Brasil credit policy was more conservative than that of other banks. 
By 1928, although the bank still had the largest credit portfolio in the Brazilian 
banking system, its reserve ratio exceeded the average of other banks by 15 
percentage points. (Triner 1996, 56 and 63)
 2) The colonial heritage led to a nearly exclusive export-oriented agricultural 
economy after Brazil’s independence in 1822 until well into the 20th century. The main 
Brazilian products to export to the world markets67 were rubber and, above all, coffee.68 
A fundamental difference between Brazil and Mexico is that in Brazil, there was not the 
sharp conflict between the petite bourgeoisie and the foreign capitalists and domestic 
(agricultural based) oligarchs as in Mexico after the triumph of its Revolution. In Brazil, the 
state did eventually come to promote industrial policies, as we will see in this chapter, 
but the interest of the old oligarchy was also protected, in particular with the coffee 
support programs.
67 From the 16th century until its independence, Brazil boomed due to a “succession of cycles of major export commodities” 
(Baer 1965, 4).  Brazil-wood and sugar were the main export commodities in  the 16th and 17th centuries, with their areas 
of production located in the northeast part of Brazil. Gold was discovered in the central part of Brazil, Minas Gerais, 
and became the main export commodity in the 18th century, while in the 19th century, coffee from the southeast of Brazil 
was the main commodity.
68 Coffee’s production was based on slave labor for almost the entire 19th century. After slavery’s prohibition in 1888, 
the production of coffee was based on immigrant workers.
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However, there was nothing like the dichotomy noted in the Mexican case. The 
Vargas government, in spite of the defeat of the counter-revolution backed by 
traditionalist groups in 1932, pursued a policy of compromised with the coffee 
growers, buying up surplus coffee stocks even when these mostly had to be 
destroyed. None the less, the acuteness of the crisis in Brazil made it extremely 
difficult to foster any illusion that the export sector could be restored to its 
former role. Thus, during the 1930s, the Brazilian government tried to unify the 
home market by eliminating the surviving trade barriers between states; it created 
the National Steel Company . . . and it promoted the training of industrial wor-
kers on a nationwide scale. (Furtado 1970, 91)
 In short, the power of the old oligarchy remained strong enough in Brazil to retard 
but definitely not to arrest industrial promotion.
 3) The above two factors, the existence of a broader banking system but one that 
was oriented to the interests of agricultural exporters and not national industrialization, 
and the greater political influence of the agricultural oligarchs (and foreign capita-
list interests) in the government, led to the influence of the Nation State on the industria-
lization process, the links between national institutions such as development banks and 
industrial activities, being weaker and slower to unfold (Furtado 1968). This is why the 
Brazilian development bank that we will study was founded so much after the Mexi-
can one, but beyond that, this is why there was minimal state promoted industrial develo-
pment in Brazil in the first half of the 20th century compared to Mexico.
 Three additional smaller results followed from the lesser use of the state to 
promote economic development. First, the consolidation of government institutions 
to deal with the national money was slower and more recent than in Mexico. In 1932, 
Brazil established the Caixa de Mobilizaçao Bancária (CAMOB) which dealt with real 
estate, and in 1945, the Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito (SUMOC). The details 
concerning SUMOC are not relevant to this dissertation, the relevant point here being 
only that SUMOC was created instead of a real Central Bank and had some but not all 
the powers of a real Cetral Bank, and in particular, it did not have control over the level 
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of monetray emmision, which stayed with the Treasury. 69 Second, given that State – 
Capitalists ties (either industrial or financial) that we saw were so strong in Mexico, in-
cluding via its development banks such as in particular NAFINSA, were not so evident 
in Brazil, the problem of ‘insider lending’ was not a major characteristic of Brazilian 
business groups (Musacchio and Read 2007). Finally, some scholars even claim that 
this absence of close State – Capitalists ties resulted in near total autonomy of BNDES 
from political interests during the 1950s (Willis, 1995). Although I claim (and we will 
see in this chapter) that there of course were important State – Capitalist ties and BNDES 
was far from autonomous from political interests, it is true that this relationship of the 
financial and industrial capitalist with the state was different from that in Mexico, 
which caused particular differences in the economic development policies and the nature 
and functioning of the development banks. 
 With the economic background relevant to the development of Brazil’s development 
bank established, the rest of this chapter will turn to considering BNDES’s history.
4.2 The Founding of BNDES
 BNDE (Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimiento Econômico) was founded in 
November 1952. It was structured in accord with the ideas of the Joint Brazil-United 
States Mission (CMBEU) which had worked on this project from 1950 to 1952 (Baer 
and Villela 1980, 423).70 It actually started operations, however, only in September, 
1953 (Idem., 1980; BNDES 2002).
 The Bank’s initial objective was to finance infrastructure and basic industry 
69 SUMOC was set up in 1945 by Instruction 7,293, and specifically had as an objective to “prepare and organize for 
a Central Bank.” It had the power to fix interest rates, fix a discount rate, manage the exchange rate policy (including 
setting multiple exchange rates for different imported goods), take deposits from banks, and set reserve requirements 
on what commercial banks must hold – but they held that money in the Banco do Brasil and not in SUMOC. However, 
most import for our concern here, and why it was not a Central Bank, it could only request from the Treasury the levels 
of monetary emission. That is, when it was set up, the government was not willing to give up its ability to determine the 
level of monitory emissions, and it gave to SUMOC in that regard basically the role of a technical advisor as to what 
was supposedly the optimal level of money, but not the power to enforce its suggestions on this.
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such as steel (Além 1998 and Batista 2002) in order to promote economic development in 
Brazil. In this sense, the initial role of BNDE was much smaller than that of NAFINSA 
in at least three aspects: 1) BNDE could not found or have ownership in enterprises, 2) 
BNDE could not promote the stock market, and 3) BNDE’s resources were minimal 
compared to the resources of NAFINSA.
 BNDE’s initial resources were projected to come from the US and the World 
Bank (500 millions of dollars) and internal resources. The Brazilian government sub-
mitted an initial request for 387.3 million dollars to realize 41 projects which were 
described in the CMBEU. However, the US Ex-Im Bank suddenly changed its position 
and refused almost all funding, and Brazil had to carry out the initiative almost entirely 
on its own. These internal resources were mostly from the Fundo de Reaparelhamento 
Econômico (FRE), particularly from income tax and undistributed profit taxes on indi-
viduals and enterprises, respectively. One can see in Table 4.4 the 100 percent funding 
with its own resources from the founding in 1953 and 1954.
Table 4.4 BNDE’s Resources71
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
I. Potential Resources
   1. Own Resources
   2. Special Resources





































Adapted from Source: BNDES 1996
70 In the 1930s and 1940s, Brazil was searching for foreign resources for industrialization. This gave rise to three Joint 
Missions between Brazil and the United States. The first one was the Aranha Mission in 1939, the second one was the 
Cooke Mission during WWII, and the last one before BNDE’s foundation was the Abbink Mission in 1945.
71 “Own Resources” are mostly Fundo de Reaparelhamento Econômico and resources from income taxes. “Special 
Resources” I and II are from the Wheat Agreements with the US in 1955 and 1956 (Primeiro e Segundo Acordos do 
Trigo). In these agreements, dollars that the US received from Brazil’s purchases of wheat where later transformed into 
credit lines from the US to Brazil. “Other Resources” are special funds that were managed by BNDE such as the national 
fund for electrification and the fund of railroad repairs.
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4.3 BNDE from  1952 to 1963
 From 1952 to 1963, Brazil’s annual rate of growth was 6.8 percent. The annual 
rate of fixed investment was 9.2 percent, consisting of an annual rate of growth of 9.4 
percent in the private sector and 12.3 percent in the public sector (Figure 4.4). The 
public investment through the Plano de Metas was important to overall investment and 
growth during its years (1958-1962) despite its modest overall level (discussed below), 
and the government also promoted development through special funds (as the Fun-
do de Reaparalhemento Econômico) and monetary emission. Overall, the years from 
1947 to 1963 can be characterized as ones where industrial development in Brazil pro-
ceeded with minimal contributions from the private financial system (Studart 1995, 80), 
with private banks granting almost only short-term credit. The key to development 
financing of domestic industrial companies was autofinancing and foreign resour-
ces, with a secondary role for public credit, and BNDE played only a minor role even 
in the latter, with the majority of public credit extended by the Banco do Brasil (Studart 
1995; BNDES 2002). Foreign capital made significant investments particularly in dura-
bles goods where they dominated the most important industrial branches and picked up 
the technologies that have to be used (Tavares 1977).
 The claims in the literature on what BNDE’s goals and purpose were during this period 
vary. Caio Jr says that BNDE’s purpose was to promote the private sector (1968, 33). Quar-
tim (1971) also lists this as a central goal and in addition lists making Brazil attractive to the 
foreign sector. However, BNDE (2002) itself considers its role then to have been to serve as a 
government tool to promote industrialization in order to keep pace with the world economic 
expansion and Guth (2006) points out that BNDE’s resources were granted to the public sector 
only. The line of thought on this by BNDE and Guth is also argued by Diniz72(2004).73
72 Diniz (2004,  10 and 11) also argues that the active promotion of the founding of BNDE by Finance Minister Horácio 
Lafer, who represented the interests of  São Paulo industrial capital, indicated that its founding served the interests of 
Brazilian private capital.
73 An explanation to this controversy is that BNDES granted credit to infrastructure in areas such as raildroads, steel, 
and electricity which were not rivals but rather complements to the private businesses.
96 97
Figure 4.4 GFKF as a Percent of GDP and Public Investment as a Percent of Total 
Investment
 Regardless of its specific purpose and goals, BNDE’s resources from 1953 to 
1955, while they constantly grew, were scarce and only priority projects were carried 
out. In 1953, BNDE’s resources as a percentage of the GFKF and GDP were 0.69 per-
cent and 0.10 percent in 1953, respectively (Table 4.5). These resources were assig-
ned over these first years with highest priority to railroads, electricity, and the chemical 
industry, with some variation between years as to their levels and even their order (Ta-
ble 4.6). However, the any hope that at its birth BNDE could be an industrial promoter 
on the scale of NAFINSA was far from a reality, given that the resources of BNDE were 
so minimal.
 BNDE´s disbursements in this period increased significantly as a share of GDP 
after 1955 (with variation and significant drop in 1961 -see Table 4.5) with the National 
Development Plan (Plano do Metas74). This plan was based on the ideas of the Joint 
74 Plano do Metas consisted of 30 targets concerning basic industries, transport, and education. 
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Table 4.5 BNDE’s Disbursements from 1953 to 1963 (in percent)













































Adapted from Source: Guth 2006.
Commission between BNDE and the ECLAC; according to Baddini (1998) it was the 
first Brazilian Plan which had an industrial policy. This plan consisted centrally of the 
following aspects (Diniz 2004, 21):
1. Special treatment for foreign capital. 
2. Expansion of the public sector .
3. Increase participation in the public sector in capital formation.
4. Enhancement of the private sector via credits provided by the Banco do Brasil
 To fulfill these tasks during the government of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-
1961), the following four measures were taken in order to increase BNDE’s resources. 
The government instituted  “a progressive additional income tax, and a 4% tax was placed 
on undistributed profits. In addition, insurance and investment companies were still 
required to contribute 25% of their funds to BNDE projects” (Baer and Villela 1980, 
427) and finally, the Ex-Im Bank and the World Bank agreed to increase the number of 
their loans to Brazil.
 Notwithstanding the important increase in BNDE’s level of operation from 1956 
to 1964 compared to its initial years just indicated, it could still only address and execute 
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Table 4.6 BNDE’s Activities in the Brazilian Economy from 1952 to 1963
















































































Adapted from Source: Guth 2006.
priority projects because the levels were still not particularly high, and especially because 
it was not easy to obtain long-term credit. Until the end of this period, a high proportion 
of its spending was dedicated to infrastructure (see Table 4.6 and Sochaczewski 2003): 
The Plano do Metas also aimed to intensify the process of import substitution of 
industrial goods. Industrialization was to be through the integrated development 
of a domestic consumer durables sector, an intermediary industry and an ade-
quate energy transport sector. In particular, the government allocated 92 per cent 
of the forecasted budget of public investment to investments in transport, basic 
industry and energy. (Studart 1995, 95)
 But again, the overall level was just so low that it kept BNDE a second tier 
actor. Notwithstanding that projects in electricity, basic industries, and transports were 
financed by BNDE, the resources of this bank were only 2.45 percent of GFKF and 0.39 
of GDP in 1963. BNDE’s resources only covered 20 percent of the total investment 
during the Plano de Metas (Guth 2006).
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4.4 BNDE from 1964 to 1981
 With the military coup on March 31, 1964, there was an attempt to establish 
more market-oriented policies and reduce the state’s intervention. It is not an objective of 
this dissertation to analyze the causes of the coup; see Quartim (1971), Cardoso (1968), 
Furtado (1970), Marini (1965) for an explanation of theses causes. What matters are the 
policies that were attempted after the coup under the Plano de Açao Econômica do 
Governo (PAEG). These policies were:
5. Control over wages.
6. Control over public spending.
7. Control over money and credit.
 The dictatorship was successful over most of its tenure from 1964 to 1985 with 
the first goal. One can see in Figure 4.5 that it was also successful, though like with the 
first goal also at the expense of the popular well-being, with the second goal, after a mo-
mentary marginal downturn in its first full year in 1965. To the contrary, its intended 
reform of the financial system, however, was largely a failure.
 The reform of 1964 – 1967 at the beginning of the dictatorship had several 
components. First, savings was to be promoted by tax exemptions for savers. These 
savings (by the wealthy) were then to become available to industry in accord with 
the US model of industrialization via the stock market. The typical third world coun-
try foreign exchange constraint was to be relaxed by promoting exports through tax 
reductions for export-oriented companies and opening the Brazilian economy to 
direct foreign investment and loans. Stability in the domestic financial market was to 
be improved by adopting the type of legal segmentation of financial institutions then 
current in the US (Hermann 2002 and 2010).
 In the long run, the PAEG did not achieve the results that were desired 
and expected, but the period soon after its implementation happened to be the ones of 
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Brazil’s strongest economic growth in its history, the Brazilian miracle from 1967 to 
1973. This Brazilian miracle was led by the utilization of idle capacity in the durable 
goods sector (Studart 1995) and excellent international conditions (Diniz 2004).
 The economic boom of the Brazilian miracle was of course reflected in the 
financial sector, which because of the reforms was able to manifest the following: 1) 
the number of financial institutions increased, 2) the quantity of bank loans grew as 
a percentage of GDP, 3) nonbanking institutions grew in number (see Hermman 2002, 
78), and 4) the Brazilian housing sector flourished (encouraged by government policies). 
Figure 4.5 Fiscal Deficit or Surplus as Percent of GDP
 The reforms also allowed the following to happen, the harmful effects of which 
however were to show up fully only after the end of the Brazilian miracle: 1) a higher 
concentration in banking, 2) investment banks supplied mainly working capital (Studart 
1995), and 3) long-term deposits in private banks were not used by the system to promote 
the process of development. With most industrial investment financing being self-finan-
cing, the stock market providing only small amounts of investment capital, and banks’ 
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75 During the first years of the 1970s, the mechanisms were set forth according to which private and international capi-
tal, and the government, should operate (BNDES,2002).
76 Very little of the spectacular growth during Brazil’s economic miracle went to the poor, and so in response to the 
rising social tensions, two new BNDE funds were created in 1974, O Programa de Integracão Social (PIS) and O 
Programa de Formação do Patrimônio Público dos Servidores (PASEP). As indicated, however, by this time, over three 
quarters of BNDE’s disbursements were to the private sector, so these funds were of quite limited size.
and investment banks’ activities concentrated on short-term and working capital; after 
the end of the miracle, the capital markets could not be characterized as supplying an-
ything approaching what was needed for healthy economic development (see Hermann 
2002; Stallings and Studart 2006).
 BNDE’s prime role during this period under the dictatorship was to provide 
financing to the private sector. Already in 1964 and 1965, several programs were created 
to finance the private sector. The Fund for Technical and Scientific Development (FUN-
TEC) and the Fund for the Acquisition of Machinery and Equipment (FINAME) were 
initiated in 1964, and  the Financing for Small and Medium Sized Firms (Fipeme) in 
1965. At the same time, the Fundo de Reaparalhamento Econômico (FRE) discussed 
above, not having this new focus, was closed in 1964. The effects across industries of the 
funding and changes in funding at this time was by design unequal. BNDE’s disburse-
ments to some basic industries such as steel were reduced (though it continued to support 
it), while the percent that went to chemistry, equipment, and other industries increased.
 During the years of the Brazilian miracle, PAEG continued to emphasize finance 
for the private sector, in particular basic industries75 (see Table 4.7). The private sec-
tor received  9.7 percent of BNDE’s disbursements in 1952-1956 but was up to 75.8 
percent by 1973 (Baer and Villela 1980).76 However, even as BNDE was increasingly 
focusing its government support on private industry, the government was increasing 
BNDE’s size. BNDE’S disbursements rose from 2.1% of GFKF and 0.31% of GDP in 
1964 to 6.1% of GFKF and 1.24% of GDP in 1973 (see Table 4.8).
 Resources for financing BNDE’s projects came from different sources. There 
was a 20 percent tax on all income receipts (Baer and Villela 1980). In 1967, a financial 
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transactions tax was introduced. And there continued to be an annual allocation from 
the federal budget (Diniz 2004).
Table 4.7 BNDE’s Activities in the Brazilian Economy, 1964 to 1973




































Adapted from Source: Guth 2006
 After 1973, the Brazilian economy started to slow down. According to Studart 
(1995), the Brazilian economy had reached full capacity. On the other hand, there was 
a deterioration of the international conditions that Brazil enjoyed as a result of the 
economic problems that had been growing for years in the US and the 1973 “oil cri-
sis.” 77 In any case, given the Brazil’s typical foreign Third World exchange constraint 
then, the accumulation of capital stopped because trade balance became negative from 
1965 to 1980 (see Figure 4.6). The fall in coffee prices made imported goods relatively 
more expensive. As in the case of Mexico, the import substitution model depended on 
external finance. An additional aspect that worsened Brazil’s economy was the unequal 
distribution of land and income that crippled the development of the domestic market 
and increased inflation.
77 There was significant international economic turbulence and disruption, including recessions in the U.S. and much of 
Europe following the October 1973 “oil crisis” and the subsequent rapid increase (by both the oil procuring countries 
and the giant international oil companies) in oil prices.
 Because of the slowdown of the import substitution model, The Brazilian 
government initiated a number of policies intended to restimulate economic growth, 
including among others the II Plano Nacional de Desenvolviemento (IIPND). According 
to Baddini (1998), this plan and the already mentioned Plano de Metas have been the 
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only ones in Brazilian history to feature an industrial policy; as a result, at the end of the 
1970s, Brazil had the most important industrial complex in Latin America (Guth 2006). 
This plan was based on government tax exemptions for private businesses and massive 
resources from abroad. The main focus of this plan was to promote infrastructure such 
as communications and transport, and manufacturing industries such as automobiles and 
chemistry. 
 Another focus of the policies was to deepen government support and encouragement 
of the private sector. During 1974 – 1979, the industrial sectors that were supported the 
most through financing and other channels were basic industries (including in particular 
steel and manufacturing industries) and capital goods. As an example of new approaches 
to supporting the private sector, BNDE bought several private companies in trouble, 
restructured them and made them profitable, and then sold stocks in these companies. 
In total, these operations involved 300 millions of dollars (BNDES 2002). In addition, 
BNDE expanded its efforts to promote the Brazilian stock market with the creation in 
1974 of three subsidiaries which were charged with buying and selling equities. These 
subsidiaries were Mecánica Brasileira SA (EMBRAMCE), Insumos Básicos SA (FIBA-
SE), and Investimento Brasileiro (IBRASA). These subsidiaries were very important since 
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Figure 4.6 Trade Balance. Percent of GDP
they represented 10.7 percent of BNDE´s resources in 1979. Then in 1976, the Programa 
de Estímulo ao Desenvolvimento do Mercado de Capitais was created to contribute still 
more to the strengthening of the stock market. 
 Hence, the share of BNDE’s disbursements to the private sector continued to rise 
during the slowdown from 75.8 percent in 1973, to 79.2 percent in 1977, and peaked at 
87 percent in 1978 (Baer and Villela; Baddini 1998). At the same time, the government 
continued to expand BNDE despite the slowdown. Its disbursements rose from 6.1% of 
GFKF and 1.24% of GDP in 1973 to 12.1% of GFKF and 2.7% of GDP in 1978 before 
dropping at the end of the period being considered (see Table 4.8) in response to the 
continued worsening of Brazil’s economic performance coming from the continuing 
decline in its terms of trade, the second oil shock, and then after 1979, the (US initiated) 
rise of world interest rates.  
 The three decades that have so far been discussed (1952-1981) were good for 
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78 Despite rather high volatility.
economic growth, achieving an average annual rate of growth of above 6 percent.78 The 
role of the government with the provision of credit, short-term via the Banco do Brasil, 
and long-term via BNDE (especially in the Plano de Metas at the end of the 1970s), was 
vital to this rate of growth. This last bank contributed especially in areas such as a steel, 
chemistry, transports, and electricity, using special funds. Hence, BNDE played a 
very important role in supporting the creation of the most important industrial complex in 
Latin America.
4.5 BNDES from 1982 to the Present
 From 1982 onwards, top priority among Brazil’s economic policies, carefully 
enforced by the US, their banks, and the IMF, was always the payment of its debt ser-
vice. These had become extremely burdensome following the above noted US initiated 
jump in world interest rates after October, 1979. Following the 1982 Mexican default, 
foreign banks sharply reduced their roll-over loans, with which Brazil like Mexico was 
at great cost meeting its now problematic debt service payments, thus making them still 
more burdensome.
 When debt service repayments have top priority, then unless there is a great 
abundance of resources, investment in both the public sector and the private sector are 
restricted. This tends to reduce growth. From 1982 to 2009, GFKF (determined above 
all by the private sector, given its high percent of the total) averaged only 20 percent of 
GDP. Growth averaged only 2.6 percent, as opposed to the 6.5 percent growth during 
the import substitution model.
 It should be stressed, since advocates of neoliberalism continue to simply 
assert without factual support the opposite, that the cause of this problem was not Brazil’s 
former adherence to an import substitution model, since as established above, Brazil 
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was not consistently carrying out any such model since 1964. We saw above that to the 
contrary, the military dictatorship had been using the state to promote liberalization and 
increased openness since it took power. From 1950 to 1967, the ratio of imports to GDP 
was 6.9 percent, while by 1968 to 1980, that ratio has increased to 9.0 percent. In Mexico, 
this process was even more accentuated. Martinez and Valle (2011) have argued that 
contrary to the import substitution paradigm, not only in Mexico where it was particularly 
acute but throughout Latin America, the elites promoted many aspects of neoliberalism 
such as openness and privatization well before 1982.
 The neoliberal approach to generating the funds to service its debt rested on five 
pillars: a reduced exchange rate, commercial and financial liberalization, privatizations, 
and stabilization programs which often included  programs promoting the first four 
pillars and in addition focused on hyper-low inflation and directly on fiscal and trade 
surpluses, generally involving contractionary economic policies.
 Summarizing, from 1952 to the end of the 1980s was a period of sustained and 
high economic growth which was based on import substitution and industrialization, in 
which process BNDE played a very important role providing long-term credit above all 
in the Plano de Metas and in the IIPND. In contrast, the policies of neoliberal era ba-
sed on the 5 pillars just mentioned79 in general have generated relative stagnation, and  
BNDE’S role has changed to promoting and executing the privatization process in the 
1990s and to being a second-tier financial institution financing the private sector in the 2000s.
 Next, this dissertation will describe the most important features for the Brazilian 
economy and BNDE in this period.
 The most important stabilization programs were the Plano Cruzado in 1986 and 
the Plano Real in 1994. However, there were others such as the Cruzado Novo (1989-1990), 
79 This is true even for the period that started in 2002 with Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Despite the conditions that brought 
the O Partido dos Trabalhadores to the presidency and would have served to generate broad support for sweeping social 
change, Lula da Silva maintained the policies of the neoliberal dogma such as primary fiscal surpluses and government 
support of the private sector (Morais and Saad-Filho 2005)
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Cruzeiro (1990-1992), and the Cruzeiro Real (1992-1994) (Ianoni 2009). The Plano 
Cruzado consisted of a new unit account and a price freeze, while the Plano Real 
consisted of a new unit of account,  a new coin, and contractionary policies to obtain a 
fiscal surplus. These contractionary policies included cuts in wages, layoffs in the public 
sector, and cuts in the education and health budgets.
 At the very beginning of this period with the development of the debt burden 
into a serious economic problem, Brazil responded by lowering its exchange rate to 
increase exports and reduce imports. As desired,80 this generated a trade surplus from 
1982 to 1995 (see Figure 4.6).  
 Neoliberal theory promotes commercial liberalization purportedly81 to improve a 
country’s balance of trade (and from that, its ability to service its international debts). At 
the beginning of the 1990s, Brazil embraced this approach and reduced import tariffs. 
Contrary to neoliberal theory, this led to a negative trade balance from 1995 to 2002 as 
a result of the skyrocketing imports (see Figure 4.6). The debt service continued to be 
paid, however, with the help of a special fund created ex professo, O Fundo de Emer-
gencia Social (FES).
 After 2002 until the last couple of years, the trade balance turned positive again 
(see Figure 4.6) because the international boom in demand for agricultural commodi-
ties and their increased prices. Brazil used this surplus to pay down part of its debt and 
hence lower its required debt service payments. This in turn has allowed it to increase 
80 As is well known, such an improvement is not a sure thing. This depends on the relation of the elasticity of exports 
to the elasticity of imports. The Marshall-Lerner condition must be met for such a devaluation to improve the balance 
of trade.
81 Neoclassical theory recognizes this is not a logical necessity, that the desired result requires the gains from increased 
exports and reduced imports to more than offset the reduced income from existing exports or increased cost of existing 
imports (depending if one calculates in home or foreign currency). Neoclassical policy recommendations then simply 
assume this will be obtained. Given the absence of evidence that trade liberalization in general improves a country’s 
balance of trade, an alternative explanation presented by many progressives for the strong pressure from the First World 
on Third World countries to liberalize their trade is that its opens up those countries to gains from the trading (profits) 
by First World companies, and the asserted neoliberal gains for the Third World country are just ideological covering 
for the real goal.
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its foreign reserves.82 Total reserves minus gold was 16 percent of total external debt in 
2002, while it had increased to 83 percent in 2010.
 The purported83 goal of neoliberal financial liberalization is to increase the 
quantity of credit granted by the private sector. This thesis argued that this process un-
der this goal was already well under way under the dictatorship in the previous period. 
The process continued and deepened in this period. In 1987, increased deregulation of, 
and openness to foreign investors in, the Brazilian capital markets was implemented, 
and universal banking was legalized. By 1994, the banking system had been extensively 
reconstructed through privatization and a high rate of interest in order to attract capital 
(one of the highest in the world). Finally, in the 2000s, foreign ownership of Brazilian 
banks was allowed. However despite all these extensive structural reforms to pro-
mote the Brazilian banking sector, other than two brief spikes at the end of the 1980s 
and early 1990s, credit to the private sector has remained stagnant (see Figure 4.7). Do-
mestic credit provided to the private banking sector averaged 40.6 percent of GDP from 
1994 to 2010. This is almost twice the amount provided in Mexico, but significantly less 
than the amounts provided in countries such as South Korea and Thailand. In addition, a 
great part of this credit is directed to the consumer sector. 
 Stallings and Studart (2006, 230) describe the situation as follows: “the government 
offers large amounts of well-remunerated bonds . . . These attract the banks to buy 
securities rather than make loans, thus feeding capital market growth.”
82 Following the East Asian financial crisis and others at the end of the 1990s, many of those Third World countries that 
could began to build up their foreign reserves as protection against the type of speculative attack on their currencies that 
had cost the Third World so early in the 1990s. It must be stressed that despite achieving significant success in pro-
tecting their currencies and hence avoiding such economic losses, it is not without a large cost for these countries. Such 
reserves represent money earned by the country that could be devoted to development but instead must be held idle, and 
in fact essentially loaned by these countries to the rich First World countries whose currencies they hold as reserves.
83 Particularly in the face of the absence of adequate provision of credit by the financial sector in the highly deregulated 
First World credit markets since the onset of the current “Great Recession,” a number of progressives now argue that 
the real goal of financial liberalization is to shift the income distribution between the (very) wealthy and the rest of the 
population, and the neoliberal claims about increased provision of credit are only ideological cover for the real goal. 
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Figure  4.7 Domestic Credit to the Private Sector. Percent of GDP
 Finally, privatization of State Owned Enterprises had begun already in the 1970s, 
but it accelerated in early the 1980s and  the 1990s. In 1981, the Special Commission on 
Privatizations (Comissão Especial de Privatizacões, CEP) was established. This com-
mission identified 150 companies, of which 20 were sold for $190 million from 1981 to 
1984. In 1985, stocks for Petrobrás were sold for $400 million (BNDES 2002). From 1990 
to 1995, there was a second wave of privatizations with the Programa Nacional de 
Desestatização (PND), where privatizations were carried out in steel, chemistry, fertili-
zers, railroads, and communications. After 1995, there was a third wave of privatizations 
which allowed 100 percent foreign ownership of companies in Brazil. From 1990 to 
2000, 130 state owned-companies were sold for $100 billion84  (Guth 2006, 132).
 As noted above, with the deterioration of the trade balance there were not ade-
quate resources to finance the public sector. There were cuts in public spending through 
the 1980s and 1990s. In 1982, BNDE was tasked with managing a new Social Investment 
84  This is the total in Table 4.9 of “Federal Government” and “State Governments.”
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Fund (Fundo de Investimento Social, FINSOCIAL). With this, BNDE changed its name 
to the National Bank of Economic and Social Development (Banco Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, BNDES), and began to finance social programs 
and projects for food, affordable housing, health, education, justice, and small producers.
 However, those social programs never became a priority for BNDES in the 
1980s. Other than the years 1983 – 1985 when they constituted from 7 to 17% of 
BNDES’s spending, they were always less than a marginal 5% (see FINSOCIAL in Ta-
ble 4.9). Rather, BNDES’s main priority remained to promote the private sector (Baddi-
ni 1998; Diniz 2004). After dropping from 44 to 33 percent in 1983, its private financing 
grew fairly consistently from then until it constituted nearly all its disbursements by 
1990  (see Table 4.10). In 1996, social projects again slightly increased their importance 
in BNDES with the creation of a special part of it in charge of social development, the 
Área de Desenvolvimento Social . 
 It is important to note the sharp drop in the percentage of BNDE’s resources 
granted to the private sector from the 87 percent in 1978 noted above to 44 percent in 
1981. This cataclysmic drop was caused by the combined effects of the extensive effort 
to reorganize the Brazilian State Owned Companies in response to the state’s spiraling 
foreign debt, and the simultaneous drive to build infrastructure (Baddini 1998). During 
these years, many resources granted to the private sector in previous years had to be 
channeled to the public sector, but as just indicated, the private sector quickly regained 
its former level.
 At the beginning of the 1980s, BNDES financed programs in energy (like alco-
hol), agriculture (supporting SMEs), and as discussed above, some social projects and 
carried out projects involved with infrastructure. In the second half of the 1980s, basic 
metallurgy was the priority area. In the early 1990s, BNDES financed export programs 
particularly for agribusiness and paper, promoted private infrastructure, and participated 
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Table 4.9 BNDES Resources According to Subsidiaries and Types of Financing







































































Adapted from Source: Diniz 2004.
intensively in the process of privatization. In the second half of the 1990s, its most im-
portant activities were the continued promotion of exports and the promotion of services 
such as tourism and shopping centers (Além 1998). From 2000, a major priority of 
BNDES has been support for very important companies in key sectors, such as in ener-
gy with Petrobras and in mining with Vale do Rio Doce. Some of these companies that 
BNDES financed are today among the biggest in the world. In this same period, BNDES 
also continued to promote exports, infrastructure, and innovation. The notorious support 
to agriculture from 2001 to 2005 did diminish after that.
 BNDES obtained resources during this period from new funds such as  Fundo da 
Marinha Mercante, Departamento de Contrução Naval, and Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvi-
mento. Despite all that, BNDES’ disbursements contracted 64 percent in real terms from 
1979 to 1990. As a percent of GFKF, its disbursements dropped from 10.6 to 3.3 percent 
between the same years (Hermann, 2010a) (see Tables 4.8 and 4.10).
 As percent of the GFKF, BNDES’s disbursements climbed from 8.0% the first 
year of this period to 11.1% the second, and then continuously fell over the 1980s to a 
low of 3.1% in 1989. It improved only slightly above that over the early 1990s, but then 
moved up to 12.5% by 1998 because of it participation in the process of privatization.85 
85  As indicated above, BNDES had to buy companies, make them profitable, and then immediately make them private 
by selling them.
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The ongoing process of privatization kept its percent in the formation of GFKF at about 
that level over the 1990s, only jumping in 2009 in response to the world economic crisis 
(see Table 4.10).
 Even though BNDES played an important anticyclical role at times in this 
period, its resources now came mostly from private financial intermediaries. That is, 
similarly to NAFIN, BNDES has increasingly become a second tier bank. For example, 





















































































































Table 4.11 BNDES Disbursements According to the Type of Ownership





























while the percent of BNDES resources granted as a second-tier bank was 41.3 in 2002, 
it was 61 percent for 2011. In addition, in accord  with the neoliberal tenets, almost all 
its resources were granted to the private sector (see Table 4.11).
 This is the end of the chapter where the case of Brazil, with its deveploment 
bank, was studied. As we have seen the Mexican case in Chapter 3, from now on, we 




 The first chapter of this dissertation opened with a motivation for this work, its 
background purpose. While explicitly indicating this dissertation would not in any way 
directly address the ongoing discussions concerning the nature of  the now-developing 
Banco del Sur, the background purpose is to draw some lessons about development 
banking that could possibly contribute to those discussions. This concluding chapter 
intends to very briefly present three issues related to and arising out of this dissertation. 
First, it will discuss the methodology used and in particular one aspect of the limitations 
of that methodology that must be kept in mind in regards to the indicated purpose of this 
dissertation. Second, it will draw possible conclusions from the material in each chapter 
and very tersely present them. Finally, returning to the background purpose of this work, 
without engaging with the concrete existing Banco del Sur at all, it will suggest some 
lessons concerning development banking that can possibly be drawn from the material 
in this dissertation which could be included in, and contribute to, the ongoing discus-
sion on the desired nature of the Banco del Sur.
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5.1 On Methodology and a Particular Limitation to the Relevance 
of Historically Based  Conclusions
 This dissertation has used a standard historical-descriptive case study methodology. 
The goal is to derive conclusions from the study of the history of particular (in this case) 
institutions, with the background purpose of using that information to contribute to 
discussions on the desired nature of a related institution currently being formed.
 The key possible limitation inherent in this methodology86  has been explicitly 
understood ever since Hume pointed out in 1748 that one cannot “logically prove” 
anything about the future from the past87 because patterns observed in the past will hold 
in the future only to the extent that, in regard to the issue being considered, the future 
resembles the past, which cannot be known a priori.
 The core of the situation studied in both the case studies of NAFIN and BNDES 
is the same as that faced by the Banco del Sur today. The goal remains to accelerate 
economic and social development through a state-operated development bank, in economies 
operating in a capitalist mode of production, beyond what private capital would do. 
Overlaying that core similarity are numerous important differences between the situa-
tion they faced over their history and what the Banco del Sur faces today. Three of the 
most important follow.
 First, international capital is much more mobile today. This results from two 
very different types of causes. First, there are general technical (above all communica-
tions), financial, and legal changes in international capital. But equally important 
is the ideological commitment of the ruling class of most countries to try to reduce all 
barriers to its capital’s unrestricted movements (one aspect of neoliberalism). The im-
portance of this second and sometimes overlooked aspect of today’s world-wide increased 
86  Or any other empirical methodology,  such as for example the standard repeated controlled experiments of the “hard 
sciences.”
87 While simultaneously noting that only a madman would not conduct his life as if one could make conclusions about 
the future from the past, the only information about the world that we have available.
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mobility of capital is highlighted by those few countries that are protecting their econo-
mies through existing and/or developing barriers to such minimally restricted interna-
tional capital mobility.
 Second, a broader88 and stronger domestic wealthy class exists in most Latin 
American countries than in the time of the greatest successes of NAFIN and BNDES. 
As opposed to then when the weaker wealthy class often saw the extensive intervention 
of the State into the economy and in particular into the process of development as a 
tool to promote its interests, today’s wealthy class generally adheres to the dominant 
neoclassical view among capitalists that a capitalist market economy with minimal 
direct government intervention is better for their class interest.89
 Third, 30 years of neoliberalism world-wide has caused a significant and important 
(far from complete) demobilization of the working class in its defense of its class interests. 
To be sure, Latin America is the leading partial exception to this, particularly in the new 
processes in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador (and in a different way, the longstanding 
process in Cuba), but more broadly in the masses throughout Latin America. Nevertheless, 
there too there has been an important weakening of the institutions through which the 
popular classes could exercise “pressure from below” in favor of progressive liberal 
policies such as state development banks with a social as well as narrowly economic 
mission. It is very unclear at this moment in history with the world capitalist system 
suffering its worst economic situation since the Great Depression at the same time 
that it is loosing its structure with a single hegemon which has always been best for its 
88  While the wealthy class is still narrow in comparison with the wealthy class in the advanced capitalist countries, the 
issue here is that it is broader than it was 60 years ago. 
89 Many liberals (including some capitalists) argue that a “regulated” or “Keynesian” capitalism would in fact be better 
for capital’s interests. Although 30 years of neoliberalism has demonstrated that it shifts the distribution of output in 
favor of the capitalists, these liberals argue that this is just a bigger share of a less rapidly increasing pie, and in addition 
that the now largely parasitic nature of neoliberal finance even threatens capitalism’s sustainability. The concern here is 
however not with this debate among advocates of capitalism as to which form is indeed better for its interests, but only 
to note that the majority of the broader and stronger domestic wealthy class in Latin America accepts the dominant view 
among capitalists in favor of neoliberalism with its minimal State direct intervention into the economy, and in particular 
its opposition to state-promoted development.
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stability, if in the short-run this demobilization of the working class will be reversed or 
continue.
 The essential core similarity of the issues of the Banco del Sur to the past cases 
of the Mexican and Brazilian development banks studied argues for the importance of 
drawing lessons from those cases to contribute to the broad discussion on the desired 
nature of the former, which has been the background purpose of this thesis. The inherent 
Humian limitation of such an exercise argues first that one should be cautious with 
claiming that anything that was successful in the past will necessarily be successful 
in the future, and beyond that, for trying to consider how the most important relevant 
changes between the past and the present seem most likely to change the outcomes of 
past policies and practices if implemented today. 
5.2. Conclusions of this Thesis Concerning the Historical
 Records of NAFIN and BNDES
 The objective of this dissertation was to do a historical review of a development 
bank in Mexico (NAFIN) and one in Brazil (BNDES) in order to obtain some conclusions 
which, with the important caution indicated in the first section of this chapter, could 
serve as contributions to the ongoing discussion about the desired nature of  the Banco 
del Sur, given that the Banco del Sur is intended to operate as a development bank pro-
moting the accumulation of capital in each one of the participants countries. Specifically, this 
dissertation investigated the structures of these two development banks and the policies 
they pursued.
 With this objective, after the introduction to the dissertation, the first chapter 
discussed the definition of a development bank. Four aspects were considered: firstly, 
what a development bank was; secondly, what sectors development banks could foster; 
thirdly, what type of ownership was possible and desirable; and finally, what kind 
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of enterprises, public or private, should receive resources. In line with other scholars 
on this issue, I argued that a development bank can only be defined according to its 
functions, and that despite large differences on other issues concerning development 
banks, there is broad  agreement among economists that the most salient functions of a 
development bank are to be a financial intermediary and to promote development. 
 Already an important conclusion, and one that is among the key issues involved 
in the discussion on the Banco del Sur, can be drawn from the material presented in 
Chapter 1 on the definition of a development bank. Within the agreement among most 
economists just indicated that a development bank should be a financial intermediary 
and promote development, there are two very broadly defined alternative visions of 
what that means. The first is broadly neoliberal and rests on “market fundamentalism,” 
a faith that markets always represent the optimal approach to any economic activity. A 
strong version of this view argues that development banks should be private, and they 
should by-and-large focus their attention and effort on the investment needs of private 
enterprises. This view advocates markets in the provision of finance for development, 
and markets for execution of development where development is defined as the re-
sult of private profit-driven investment. A less extreme version of this same idea ac-
cepts the idea of a state development bank, but still argues this bank should lend money 
to private profit-driven enterprises since they are intrinsically more efficient than any 
direct government efforts at development. This approach implicitly accepts that there 
may be a market failure for raising sufficient capital for socially optimal inves-
tment and so the state should contribute to that,90 but continues to advocate priva-
te capital and markets for carrying out their concept of development. The alternative 
“Keynesian” or “developmentalist” vision argues that historical evidence shows that 
90  Certainly some of the people who accept this view actually adhere to the former view, that it would be better if 
development banks were private, but accept the existence of state development banks as something historically and 
institutionally determined that they cannot change (at least in the short term), and therefore take this position to assure 
that the development funds will in their view be used “efficiently.”
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leaving the procurement of development funds to private banks has generally resul-
ted in less funds than are socially desired, and hence, a state run development bank 
is necessary. Further, leaving the investment of those funds up to private profit-driven 
enterprises (by having the state development bank simply support finance to private enter-
prises) does not guarantee optimal development, and in particular the social aspects of 
development will inevitably be ignored. This issue that already arose in the discussion 
in this chapter also arose again in this dissertation in Chapters 3 and 4 on the historical 
records of NAFIN and BNDES.
 Chapter 2 considered the birth of development banks (roots in industrial banks) 
in Europe, Japan, and Latin America, primarily in the 19th century. Scholars generally 
agree that in England, industrialization developed without state financial or technical 
support, and not even major support of this type through private banks, with the capital 
rather coming from the profits of merchants and putting-out system and pre-industria-
lization factory capitalists, and extensive reinvestment of profits from the earliest 
industrial capitalists. However, other countries then considered it necessary to develop 
appropriate institutions (we saw that some were private, some were state) “to catch 
up to England” industrialization. One type of institution that was considered necessary 
was one that would link savings and banking with industrial capitalists (with the provi-
sion of long-term credit to the latter being an early recognized need). Two impor-
tant early (private) industrial banks in Europe were Société Général pour Favoriser L 
‘Industrie in Belgium91 and Société General du Crédit Mobilier, with the latter opera-
ting on a much larger scale than the former, both concerning its channels to mobilize 
91  Set up at the initiative of the King of the Netherlands (but with private capital) while Belgium was still part of the 
Netherlands, its industrial banking activities did not move to an important scale until Belgium separated from the Ne-
therlands.
92  “Part” in the sense that it involved the aspect of a development bank participating in the management of the firm 
(bringing in technical and other expertise, etc.), but not the part involving financing social development. Note Société 
Général pour Favoriser L ‘Industrie earlier had provided technical advice to enterprises it supported, but again its 
activities were very largely restricted to Belgium.
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credit, and geographically, dispensing long-term credit not only in its home country of 
France but in many places in Europe. Then, a further step toward part92  of the deve-
lopmentalist concept of a development bank came out of Germany with the develop-
ment of a deeper connection (no long arm’s length via only finance) between banks and 
productive enterprises. Here, private banks began to not only grant credit to industrial 
capitalists,93 but extensive technical advice and, very important, they were also repre-
sented on the supervisory boards of joint – stock companies. Japan then represented still 
another step toward the modern development banks with the major involvement of the 
state, which mobilized national savings through a state savings system, and then lent 
that money to banks that then lent it to industry. All these contributed to successful 
(notwithstanding at great human cost in their early phases) industrialization.
 Most works on industrial banks before the 20th century focus on Europe and Japan, 
as just discussed. Much less studied and discussed are a number of early experiments in 
Latin America. One reason that these get so little attention is that these efforts, despite 
significant partial and temporary success in the narrow fields in which they were involved, 
by and large failed to promote the type of broad development that unfolded in Europe and 
Japan. They were very interesting, however, for a different particular reason. Long before 
20th  century state development banks became common throughout the Third World and a 
number of states in the First World, these banks were state industrial banks. For example, 
in the case of Banco del Avío Minero and Banco del Avío in Mexico, obtaining  resources 
and deciding how they would be disbursed was all controlled by the state. They rested on 
an idea that was not to bloom until the 20th century and then was to underpin the majority 
of development banks in the world (significantly but not entirely diminished by neolibera-
lism) - if private banks did not have the ability or desire/commitment to promote industria-
lization and development, the state should coordinate this necessary process.




 The basic conclusion I draw from the material presented in Chapter 2 is that 
institutions to promote industrialization can, at last under the right conditions, promote 
it successfully. In the 1800s, the European institutions were private and the Japanese 
structure was a private-state combination, but under the conditions of blooming capita-
lism (as measured by capital accumulation – often in a humanly very harsh process), the 
profit motive for private institutors to mobilize credit for private industry proved to 
be sufficient. This will serve as a point of comparison for the conclusions drawn below 
from the main investigation of this dissertation in the two following chapters, the deve-
lopment banks in Mexico and Brazil in the 20th century.
 Chapters 3 and 4 on the Mexican development bank NAFINSA and the Brazi-
lian development bank BNDES constituted the bulk of this dissertation. There were a 
number of important similarities informing the two cases - the push to originating their 
import substitution industrialization models coming from WWII, the relatively good 
growth during the Golden Era of capitalism and some gains in industrialization, the 
dominant belief among both economists and politicians after WWII that industrializa-
tion was key to the development of the Third World,94 the world-wide acceptance of the 
appropriateness of development banks after WWII (at least for the Third World), the 
countries’ deepening indebtedness that grew from the 1970s onward95 and led to the debt 
crisis and its devastating impact on Latin America, and the embrace of the neoliberal 
ideology from the 1980s onward96 resulting in redefining development banking.
 However, in addition to these often noted common characteristics, there are two 
others that I discuss in these chapters that are less noted, but I argue are more important 
94  With Raul Prebish and ECLAC, who focused their work on Latin America, being among the most famous proponents 
of this nearly universally held position. 
95 There is still a disagreement among economists concerning if this was an intrinsic result of any ISI policy, or if 
(noting that ISI policy did not lead to over-indebtedness for over 2 decades) it was rather the result of the way the ISI 
policy was carried out starting in the 1970s when not only was credit cheap but First World banks were extremely 
aggressive, even predatory, in their lending.
96 Important elements of the neoliberal ideology of development were incorporated piece by piece in both countries 
even before that, most clearly in Brazil from 1964 onward but also in Mexico from the late 1970s onward – but the jump 
to a full embrace of neoliberal ideology in the 1980s was still a quantum leap.
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to the issues of development banking and development. First and most important, there 
was the inadequate commitment or even desire by private banking to provide finance 
(not to talk of technical assistance or participation in management) to develop industry 
(and of course no interest in providing finance for social development) at any level near 
what the potential growth of the countires’ industrialization would require (arguably 
different from the cases of Europe and Japan in the 1800s considered in Chapter 2). This 
situation was fundamental to mandating state development banks to provide finance if 
industrialization was not going to languish far below its potential. Second, given this 
state role, the continual variation in what got financed and what the nature of the finan-
cing was made it clear that neither country had anything resembling even a me-
dium-term industrial policy, a clear commitment to what development goals they would 
pursue for the medium-term, and with that what development economists sometimes 
refer to as “patient finance.”
 Chapters 3 and 4 bring out differences between the two cases, that were impor-
tant to the detailed development of each, but do not affect the central conclusions from 
these chapters that I will discuss after indicating some of these differences. In Mexi-
co the petite bourgeoisie triumphed in the Mexican Revolution, and because of that 
(even as they mixed with the old bourgeoisie to become the new endogenous capitalist 
class), there was a higher degree of conflict (“nationalism”) in regard to foreign capital 
there throughout the Golden Age than in Brazil. Although in Brazil just as in Mexico 
there was a desire for rapid industrialization in the 1950s, the approach of trying to 
incorporate the agricultural capitalists as opposed to simply pursuing industrialization 
(even the actions of the development bank reflected this) delayed an accumulation of 
industrial capital, and further contributed to the slower formation of national institutions 
to deal with money. While it did make some contributions to Brazilian industrialization, 
BNDES’ participation was significantly less that NAFIN’s in Mexico.
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 The partial and proto neoliberal policies (a drive to “liberalize the economy”) 
initiated by the military in Brazil after its 1964 coup meant not only that the less neoli-
beral97  role of Mexico’s development bank was stronger, with many non-neoliberal 
aspects surviving up to the debt crisis at the beginning of the 1980s which brought 
the full embrace of neoliberalism in both countries.
 I draw the following fundamental conclusions concerning the practices of these 
development banks from the material presented in these chapters. The primary one is 
that the goal of both of these banks was not development per se, but rather the develo-
pment of capitalism, as manifested both by their policies and their total domination by 
the private banks and industrial capitalists.98 It must be underlined in this regard that 
although they were (correctly) called development banks and indeed undertook so-
cial development programs that a truly industrial bank would not have engaged in, these 
were almost always a minor to almost negligible part of their total spending. They 
indeed also often committed major funds to public infrastructure necessary for the 
development of capitalism which again purely industrial banks would not have inves-
ted in, but that had to do with the changed manner of such infrastructure development to 
being necessarily public in these countries, from its private nature in what were to  be-
come First World countries in the 1800s – railroads were a major part of the investments of 
the early European industrial banks, and to a lesser extent other transportation and commu-
nications industries. This commitment by NAFIN and BNDES to developing capitalism 
as their central goal came out among other places in the commitment of each bank to 
97 As will be discussed at length in the conclusions about this period, to say Mexico was less neoliberal in its polices at 
various times does not in any way imply they were less procapitalist. The procapitalist nature of the desired development 
and from that the activities of the development banks were essential to how they performed. The neoliberal versus 
non-neoliberal way they pursued this goal was important to their specific behaviors but secondary. 
98 At particular periods, particularly a number of periods under neoliberalism, one bank or the other was dominated 
entirely by the bankers (or more broadly, capitalist finance), to the exclusion of the industrial capitalists, and the goal 
of industrialization fell almost completely to the side in favor of using these development banks simply to finance wha-
tever capitalist sector “the markets” indicated was most important to support. In practice, under most of the neoliberal 
period, this was reduced in practice to financially supporting whatever sector was believed to have the greatest potential 
for generating foreign exchange earnings, originally for debt repayment to First World private banks, and then over the 
last decade to accumulating foreign reserves to protect their currencies against speculative attacks.
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developing the country’s stock markets (particularly NAFIN, which included participa-
ting with its own securities, that is, like a private capitalist enterprise), and more broadly 
the country’s financial markets (which again were even weaker in Mexico than the 
weak financial markets in Brazil).
 This given commitment to developing capitalism then immediately poses the 
question – why was this role not carried out by private banks as it had been in Europe 
(or even in Japan, where the actual investment was by private banks) in the 1800s? 
The surface answer is indicated in the these two chapters, and above in this chap-
ter – the private banks were not interested in financing industrial development, as they 
had been in Europe and Japan in the 1800s. The simple reason for this was that in the 
1800s, financing industrial development was equally lucrative for the private banks with 
other options for lending. In the 1900s, in Mexico and Brazil and in fact through most 
of the Third World, while there were some prize industrial projects that promised to 
be lucrative, in general, private banks had more lucrative alternatives (lending to their 
governments or financing government projects of any type, including military ex-
penditures, etc.), funding consumption by their rich, speculating in land, and so on). 
The result was not that there was no private finance funding of industrial development 
in these countries, but rather that the amount was far short of the amount needed in 
accord with their potential for industrialization. A second reason for state development 
banks in these places at this time instead of the private industrial banks was that, not-
withstanding the small amount of the total portfolios that it constituted, appearing to be 
doing some spending on direct social needs had become politically necessary because 
of the rise of the “pressure from below” from workers and the oppressed, and private 
industrial banks by their nature could not carry out this role. 
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5.3 Proposals for the Banco del Sur Based on the Conclusions 
of this Thesis on the Historical Records 
of NAFINSA and BNDES
 It is necessary to divide the possible contributions to the debate on the desired 
nature of the Banco del Sur that are connected to the conclusions of this dissertation into 
two groups (which unfortunately are often blurred together in the discussions) – those 
concerning industrialization (and to some extent related “narrowly economic” 
concerns), and those concerning development (which involves above all human well-
being). While my concern with a development bank is in the first place the latter, the 
lessons from NAFIN and BNDES (and the other material in this dissertation on earlier 
industrial banks) more directly addresses the former, for reasons I have mentioned and 
will repeat below.
 Concerning industrialization, this dissertation established that both NAFIN and 
BNDES were above all committed to supporting the development of capitalism, not to 
industrialization per se. This was particularly clear once they adopted the neoliberal 
ideology, which openly accepted that whatever capitalism perceived was best for itself 
was where social resources should be directed, and largely abandoned industrialization 
as a central goal for development (generally keeping it as a secondary goal, to be pur-
sued “when markets indicated it was appropriate”). The weakening (far from being “over-
turned”) appeal of neoliberal ideology today among some supporters of capitalism has 
returned the goal of industrialization as necessary for, or at least key to development 
of, all debates on development, including the desired nature of the Banco del Sur. The 
only certain conclusion from the presented history of NAFIN and BNDES is that they 
were never consistently committed to industrialization (abandoning that goal completely 
under neoliberalism, and being inconsistent and erratic during the Golden Age), and it is 
then arguable that as a result of that, they only had isolated successes industrializing (of-
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ten exactly what the development banks did support), as opposed to promoting successful 
industrialization. Beyond that, by any measure of development, these countries achieved 
no relative success in development (i.e., in closing the development gap with the First 
World). The failures of both development banks in these regards suggests trying the other 
long-proposed alternative – that the Banco del Sur should be consistently (and “patiently”) 
dedicated to promoting (coordinated) industrialization among its member countries.
 While arguably not inherent in all drives to industrialize, we saw that both Mexico 
and Brazil did develop large debts (some of it from efforts to industrialize, much of it 
from other causes) in  the 1970s that became deadly after the U.S. initiated explosion 
of world interest rates in the 1980s. This suggests that private international loans are a 
dangerous source to finance this industrialization. Internal sources would be safer. And 
one will have greater success at mobilizing large amounts of internal finance if one ope-
rates over a larger economic area than the relatively small economies of any single Latin 
American country (even Brazil or Mexico, and much more so for other Latin American 
countries). Hence the importance of the Banco del Sur involving as many related coun-
tries as possible to be able to minimize their external borrowing for industrialization.99
 The positive lessons concerning social development from the two case studies 
are minimal, since as has been noted, neither one ever committed major parts of its 
resources to this goal. What can be observed is a suggested negative lesson that in both 
countries, relatively small amounts of resources were directed to social develo-
pment (by the development banks or any other sources), and that there was no relative 
social development (catching up with the First World) over the lifetime of these banks.
 However, beyond considering social development in its most important aspect 
as a goal in itself, the increased standards of living that are part (not all) of social deve-
99 It would also be important if First World countries would return to significant country-to-country financing at below 
market rates of interest and for long terms as they used to during the Golden Age, instead of forcing Third World countries 
to turn to (First World) private banks for needed foreign financing, but that is outside the scope of this section’s proposal 
for the Banco del Sur, as well as apparently highly unlikely to happen.
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100 Conservative opponents continue to disingenuously refer to any such efforts to promote endogenous development 
as pursuit of autarky, which is clearly an entirely different thing than endogenous development as just defined here.
lopment enter back into the more “narrowly economic” debates. As has been stressed 
ever since Adam Smith, industrialization is linked to having markets to sell the indus-
trial products to. For the last half century, conservative theory has argued for “export 
promotion” to secure such markets. However, in today’s world, where essentially every 
country in the world that wants to increase its industrialization is looking to be a (net) 
exporter, simple math (as well as the reality facing many countries that they cannot do 
that) makes clear this is not possible for all countries. The idea of the need for all coun-
tries to develop their internal markets to allow successful growth and industrialization 
throughout the world (an idea Keynes wrote on at length, and he took to Bretton Woods 
in his initial proposals) has returned to a central role in development debates (though 
not yet to the policy orientations of the First World dominated International Financial 
Institutions like the IMF and WB). A suggested lesson from the observed failure of 
NAFIN and BNDES to successfully promote significant development is that the Banco 
del Sur needs to give social development a much greater role in its set of goals than did 
either of them. And it must do so not only because the goal of economics should be 
human development itself, but also because along the lines Keynes argued, this is key 
to developing the internal demand that is necessary for what development economists 
have long pursued, “endogenous development,” development primarily driven forward 
by an internal dynamic.100 And again, this can occur more easily over a larger potential 
internal market that the Banco del Sur should help to create.
 This section of the concluding chapter is concerned with conceptual issues 
confronting the Banco del Sur that are related to the material in this dissertation. In fact, 
there are two relatively well-defined positions. The one argues for a development bank 
that is oriented toward developing capitalism, is neoliberal, and  strongly resembles the 
IMF/WB joint institution (not even committed to industrialization, but rather pursuing 
that when markets say it’s best, like BNDES and NAFIN over much of their history). 
The other argues for a development bank that is focused on human development, wich 
means a joint focus (with significant resources for both) on industrialization and 
economic development and on social development. I hold the material discussed and 
analyzed in this thesis, and in particular the relatively modest to outright poor per-
formances of NAFIN and BNDES which tended to be worse during those periods 
when they more closely fully approached the former model, supports establishing the 
nature of the Banco del Sur as the latter.
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